matrix-spec/proposals/2134-identity-hash-lookup.md

MSC2134: Identity Hash Lookups

Issue #2130 has been recently created in response to a security issue brought up by an independent party. To summarise the issue, lookups (of matrix user ids) are performed using non-hashed 3pids (third-party IDs) which means that the identity server can identify and record every 3pid that the user wants to check, whether that address is already known by the identity server or not.

If the 3pid is hashed, the identity service could not determine the address unless it has already seen that address in plain-text during a previous call of the /bind mechanism.

Note that in terms of privacy, this proposal does not stop an identity service from mapping hashed 3pids to users, resulting in a social graph. However, the identity of the 3pid will at least remain a mystery until /bind is used.

This proposal thus calls for the Identity Service’s /lookup API to use hashed 3pids instead of their plain-text counterparts.

Proposal

This proposal suggests making changes to the Identity Service API's lookup endpoints. Due to the nature of this proposal, the new endpoints should be on a v2 path (we also drop the /api in order to preserve consistency across other endpoints):

• /_matrix/identity/v2/lookup
• /_matrix/identity/v2/bulk_lookup

address MUST no longer be in a plain-text format, but rather will be a peppered hash value, and the resulting digest MUST be encoded in unpadded base64.

Identity servers must specify their own hashing algorithms (from a list of specified values) and peppers, which will be useful if a rainbow table is released for their current one. Identity servers could also set a timer for rotating the pepper value to further impede rainbow table publishing (the recommended period is every 30m, which should be enough for a client to complete the hashing of all of a user's contacts, but also be nowhere near as long enough to create a sophisticated rainbow table). As such, it must be possible for clients to be able to query what pepper an identity server requires before sending it hashes. A new endpoint must be added:

GET /_matrix/identity/v2/hash_details

This endpoint takes no parameters, and simply returns the current pepper as a JSON object:

{
  "lookup_pepper": "matrixrocks",
  "algorithm": "sha256",
}

The name lookup_pepper was chosen in order to account for pepper values being returned for other endpoints in the future.

Clients should request this endpoint each time before making a /lookup or /(bulk_)lookup request, to handle identity servers which may rotate their pepper values frequently.

An example of generating a hash using the above hash and pepper is as follows:

address = "user@example.org"
pepper = "matrixrocks"
digest = hashlib.sha256((pepper + address).encode()).digest()
result_address = unpaddedbase64.encode_base64(digest)
print(result_address)
vNjEQuRCOmBp/KTuIpZ7RUJgPAbVAyqa0Uzh770tQaw

SHA-256 should be the first specified hash function. It has been chosen as it is currently used elsewhere in the Matrix protocol, and is reasonably secure as of 2019.

When performing a lookup, the pepper and hashing algorithm the client used must be part of the request body. If they do not match what the server has on file (which may be the case if the pepper was rotated right after the client's request for it), then the server can inform the client that they need to query the hash details again, instead of just returning an empty response, which clients would assume to mean that no contacts are registered on that identity server.

Thus, an example client request to /bulk_lookup would look like the following:

{
  "threepids": [
    [
      "email",
      "vNjEQuRCOmBp/KTuIpZ7RUJgPAbVAyqa0Uzh770tQaw"
    ],
    [
      "msisdn",
      "0VnvYk7YZpe08fP/CGqs3f39QtRjqAA2lPd14eLZXiw"
    ],
    [
      "email",
      "BJaLI0RrLFDMbsk0eEp5BMsYDYzvOzDneQP/9NTemYA"
    ]
  ],
  "pepper": "matrixrocks",
  "algorithm": "sha256"
}

If the pepper does not match the server's, the server should return a 400 M_INVALID_PARAM.

No parameter changes will be made to /bind, but identity servers should keep a hashed value for each address it knows about in order to process lookups quicker. It is the recommendation that this is done during the act of binding. Be wary that these hashes will need to be changed whenever the server's pepper is rotated.

Fallback considerations

v1 versions of these endpoints may be disabled at the discretion of the implementation, and should return a HTTP 404 if so.

If an identity server is too old and a HTTP 404 is received when accessing the v2 endpoint, they should fallback to the v1 endpoint instead. However, clients should be aware that plain-text 3pids are required, and should ask for user consent accordingly.

Tradeoffs

• This approach means that the client now needs to calculate a hash by itself, but the belief is that most languages provide a mechanism for doing so.
• There is a small cost incurred by performing hashes before requests, but this is outweighed by the privacy implications of sending plain-text addresses.

Potential issues

This proposal does not force an identity service to stop handling plain-text requests, because a large amount of the matrix ecosystem relies upon this behavior. However, a conscious effort should be made by all users to use the privacy respecting endpoints outlined above. Identity services may disallow use of the v1 endpoint.

Unpadded base64 has been chosen to encode the value due to its ubiquitous support in many languages, however it does mean that special characters in the address will have to be encoded when used as a parameter value.

Other considered solutions

Ideally identity servers would never receive plain-text addresses, however it is necessary for the identity server to send email/sms messages during a bind, as it cannot trust a homeserver to do so as the homeserver may be lying. Additionally, only storing 3pid hashes at rest instead of the plain-text versions is impractical if the hashing algorithm ever needs to be changed.

Bloom filters are an alternative method of providing private contact discovery, however does not scale well due to clients needing to download a large filter that needs updating every time a new bind is made. Further considered solutions are explored in https://signal.org/blog/contact-discovery/ Signal's eventual solution of using SGX is considered impractical for a Matrix-style setup.

While a bit out of scope for this MSC, there has been debate over preventing 3pids as being kept as plain-text on disk. The argument against this was that if the hashing algorithm (in this case SHA-256) was broken, we couldn't update the hashing algorithm without having the plaintext 3PIDs. Well @toml helpfully added that we could just take the old hashes and rehash them in the more secure hashing algorithm, thus transforming the hash from SHA-256 to SHA-256+SomeBetterAlg. This may spur on an MSC in the future that supports this, unless it is just an implementation detail.

Conclusion

This proposal outlines an effective method to stop bulk collection of user's contact lists and their social graphs without any disastrous side effects. All functionality which depends on the lookup service should continue to function unhindered by the use of hashes.