matrix-spec/proposals/2366-key-verification-accept.md

Key verification flow additions: m.key.verification.ready and m.key.verification.done

The current key verification framework is asymmetrical in that the user who requests the verification is unable to select the key verification method. This makes it harder for more experienced users who wish to guide less experienced users through the verification process, especially if they are not verifying in-person, but are using a trusted but remote channel of verification (such as telephone or video conference).

As an example, let us say that Alice is an experienced Matrix user and is introducing Bob to the wonders of federated communications. Alice wants to verify keys with Bob, so she clicks on the "Verify" button in her client on Bob's profile (which sends a m.key.verification.request message to Bob). Bob's device receives the verification request and prompts Bob to accept the verification request. At this point, under the current framework, Bob is responsible for choosing the verification method to use. However, with this proposal, Bob would be able to just accept the verification request without choosing a method, and allow Alice to choose the verification method.

In addition, the current key verification framework does not have a method for clients to signal to the other side that a key verification was successful. Some clients may wish to wait until the other side has either confirmed a successful verification or indicated an error before displaying the result of the verification, in order to give the two users a consistent view of the verification as a whole.

Proposal

Two new event types are added to the key verification framework when verifying in to-device messages. The new event types are already described in MSC2241 (Key verification in DMs). This proposal adds them to verifications in to-device messages.

The first event type is m.key.verification.ready, which must be sent by the target of the m.key.verification.request message, upon receipt of the m.key.verification.request event. It has the fields:

• from_device: the ID of the device that sent the m.key.verification.ready message
• methods: an array of verification methods that the device supports

It also has the usual transaction_id or m.relates_to fields for key verification events, depending on whether it is sent as a to-device event or an in-room event.

After the m.key.verification.ready event is sent, either party can send an m.key.verification.start event to begin the verification. If both parties send an m.key.verification.start event, and they both specify the same verification method, then the event sent by the user whose user ID is the lexicographically smallest is used, and the other m.key.verification.start event is ignored. In the case of a single user verifying two of their devices, the device ID is compared instead. If both parties send an m.key.verification.start event, but they specify different verification methods, the verification should be cancelled with a code of m.unexpected_message.

With to-device messages, previously the sender of the m.key.verification.request message would send an m.key.verification.cancel message to the recipient's other devices when it received an m.key.verification.start event. With this new event, the sender of the m.key.verification.request message should send an m.key.verification.cancel message when it receives an m.key.verification.ready or m.key.verification.start message, whichever comes first.

The m.key.verification.ready event is required for verifications in both DMs and in to-device messages to accept verifications requested using an m.key.verification.request event.

The second event type is m.key.verification.done, which has no fields other than the usual transaction_id or m.relates_to field. This indicates that the device has successfully completed its side of the verification.

Potential issues

Clients that follow the Client-Server 0.6.0 spec may not expect an m.key.verification.ready message in response to m.key.verification.request. However to our knowledge, no clients implement m.key.verification.request in this way yet -- to our knowledge, all clients that implement verification implement this proposal.