Fix non-permanent links in MSCs to withstand time (#3422)

As "unstable" changes and "latest" becomes no more, these sorts of links should be updated to reference the approximate section they intended to reference at the time of writing.

This change tries to link up the relevant bits for the time of the proposal, though it's not a perfect match. Some MSCs were brought into the spec before an API version could be assigned to the "old" text, so github permalinks are used instead.

proposals/1442-state-resolution.md

@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ rejected.
 
 [^1]: In the current room protocol these are: the create event, power levels,
      membership, join rules and third party invites. See the
-     [spec](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#pdu-fields).
+     [spec](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/7cb918407dc8c505c67c750578c63b43042c8425/specification/server_server_api.rst#41pdu-fields).
 
 [^2]: In the current protocol these are: power levels, kicks, bans and join
      rules.

proposals/1708-well-known-for-federation.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ with a `.well-known` lookup.
 ## Proposal
 
 For reference, the current [specification for resolving server
-names](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#resolving-server-names)
+names](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/6dab4b28f80f5beeb1d4f475ddc624cf9e7ad085/specification/server_server_api.rst#21resolving-server-names)
 is as follows:
 
 1. If the hostname is an IP literal, then that IP address should be used,

proposals/1711-x509-for-federation.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ approach for servers whose TLS certificates fail validation.
 However, this fallback will be strictly time-limited, and Matrix S2S spec r0
 will not accept self-signed certificates, nor will it include the
 `tls_fingerprints` property of the
-[`/_matrix/key/v2`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#retrieving-server-keys)
+[`/_matrix/key/v2`](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/6dab4b28f80f5beeb1d4f475ddc624cf9e7ad085/specification/server_server_api.rst#23retrieving-server-keys)
 endpoints. Synapse 1.0 will not accept self-signed certificates by default.
 
 The `matrix.org` team will proactively attempt to reach out to homeserver
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ intercepted by a MitM who can control the DNS response for the `SRV` record
 (perhaps via cache-poisoning or falsifying DNS responses).
 
 This will be in line with the current
-[requirements](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#resolving-server-names)
+[requirements](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/6dab4b28f80f5beeb1d4f475ddc624cf9e7ad085/specification/server_server_api.rst#21resolving-server-names)
 in the Federation API specification for the `Host`, and by implication, the TLS
 Server Name Indication <sup id="a2">[2](#f2)</sup>. It is also consistent with
 the recommendations of

proposals/1719-olm_unwedging.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ already created one for that given device in the past 1 hour.
 Clients may wish to take steps to mitigate the loss of the undecryptable
 messages.  For example, megolm sessions that were sent using the old session
 would have been lost, so the client can send
-[`m.room_key_request`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest.html#m-room-key-request)
+[`m.room_key_request`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1.html#m-room-key-request)
 messages to re-request any megolm sessions that it is unable to decrypt.
 
 The spec currently says, "If a client has multiple sessions established with

proposals/1819-remove-presence-lists.md

@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ CS API: Remove
   /_matrix/client/r0/presence/list/{userId}](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.4.0.html#get-matrix-client-r0-presence-list-userid)
 
 SS API: Remove
- * [m.presence_invite](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#m-presence-invite-schema)
- * [m.presence_accept](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#m-presence-accept-schema)
- * [m.presence_deny](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#m-presence-deny-schema)
+ * [m.presence_invite](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/8b65da1cf6fce5f657a2a46b5c6c8bcc24d32ae3/api/server-server/definitions/event-schemas/m.presence_invite.yaml)
+ * [m.presence_accept](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/8b65da1cf6fce5f657a2a46b5c6c8bcc24d32ae3/api/server-server/definitions/event-schemas/m.presence_accept.yaml)
+ * [m.presence_deny](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/8b65da1cf6fce5f657a2a46b5c6c8bcc24d32ae3/api/server-server/definitions/event-schemas/m.presence_deny.yaml)
 
 
 ## Tradeoffs

proposals/1954-remove-prev_event-from-essential-keys-list.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ implementations) have not implemented the bug and already omit
 ## Tradeoffs
 
 When sending events over federation the events are [hashed and
-signed](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/unstable.html#adding-hashes-and-signatures-to-outgoing-events),
+signed](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.0#adding-hashes-and-signatures-to-outgoing-events),
 this involves operating not only on the original event but also the redacted
 form of the event. The redacted hash and redacted signed event are necessary if
 the event is ever redacted in future. As a result, any change of the essential

proposals/2312-matrix-uri.md

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ This MSC does not introduce new Matrix entities, nor API endpoints -
 it merely defines a mapping between URIs with the scheme name `matrix:`
 and Matrix identifiers, as well as operations on them. The MSC should be
 sufficient to produce an implementation that would convert Matrix URIs to
-a series of [CS API](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest) calls,
+a series of [CS API](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1) calls,
 entirely on the client side. It is recognised, however, that most of
 the URI processing logic can and should (eventually) be on the server side
 in order to facilitate adoption of Matrix URIs; further MSCs are needed

proposals/2320-identity-versions.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ this identity server supports. Its response uses the following format:
 ## Alternative solutions
 
 Another solution which was considered was using the status check endpoint ([`GET
-/_matrix/api/v1`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/identity_service/latest#get-matrix-identity-api-v1))
+/_matrix/api/v1`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/identity_service/r0.2.0#get-matrix-identity-api-v1))
 to serve this information. This solution was discarded because it's using a
 versioned endpoint, which doesn't make sense to advertise the supported versions
 of the API to use.

proposals/3122-deprecate-starting-verifications-without-request.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # MSC3122: Deprecate starting key verifications without requesting first
 
 Currently, the [Key verification
-framework](https://spec.matrix.org/unstable/client-server-api/#key-verification-framework)
+framework](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#key-verification-framework)
 allows a device to begin a verification via to-device messages by sending an
 `m.key.verification.start` event without first sending or receiving an
 `m.key.verification.request` message.  (The last sentence of the 5th paragraph

proposals/3173-expose-stripped-state-events.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ the room in some situations:
 
 * If the room has `history_visibility: world_readable`, then anyone can inspect
   it (by calling `/state` on it).
-* Rooms in the [room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms)
+* Rooms in the [room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms)
   expose some of their state publicly.
 * [Invited users](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#put-matrix-federation-v2-invite-roomid-eventid)
   and [knocking users](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2403)
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ to include stripped state events which are useful for displaying the invite to a
 > the room. The recommended events to include are the join rules, canonical alias,
 > avatar, and name of the room.
 
-The invited user receives these [stripped state events](https://spec.matrix.org/unstable/client-server-api/#get_matrixclientr0sync)
+The invited user receives these [stripped state events](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#get-matrix-client-r0-sync)
 as part of the `/sync` response:
 
 > The state of a room that the user has been invited to. These state events may
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ as part of the `/sync` response:
 > events do not replace any state that the client already has for the room, for
 > example if the client has archived the room.
 
-These are sent as part of the [`unsigned` content of the `m.room.member` event](https://spec.matrix.org/unstable/client-server-api/#mroommember)
+These are sent as part of the [`unsigned` content of the `m.room.member` event](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#m-room-member)
 containing the invite.
 
 [MSC2403: Add "knock" feature](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2403)
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ This does not seem to weaken the security expectations of either join rule.
 ### Revisions to the room directory
 
 A future MSC could include additional information from the stripped state events
-in the [room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms).
+in the [room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms).
 The main missing piece seems to be the encryption information, but there may also
 be other pieces of information to include.
 
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ N/A
 ## Footnotes
 
 <a id="f1"/>[1]: No changes are proposed to
-[the definition of `history_visibility`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest#room-history-visibility).
+[the definition of `history_visibility`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#room-history-visibility).
 The state of a room which is `world_readable` is available to anyone. This somewhat
 implies that the stripped state is also available to anyone, regardless of the join
 rules, but having a `world_readable`, `invite` room does not seem valuable. [↩](#a1)
@@ -190,6 +190,6 @@ from Synapse and generally seems useful for  a user to know before joining a roo
 [↩](#a4)
 
 <a id="f5"/>[5]: The room topic (`m.room.topic`) is included as part of the
-[room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/latest#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms)
+[room directory](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#get-matrix-client-r0-publicrooms)
 response for public rooms. It is also planned to be included as part of [MSC2946](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2946)
 in the spaces summary response. [↩](#a5)