Spelling and typos

pull/977/head
Kegan Dougal 9 years ago
parent 3146b52f83
commit 6b72ddfb8c

@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ including the AS token on a ``/register`` request, along with a login type of
Application services which attempt to create users or aliases *outside* of Application services which attempt to create users or aliases *outside* of
their defined namespaces will receive an error code ``M_EXCLUSIVE``. Similarly, their defined namespaces will receive an error code ``M_EXCLUSIVE``. Similarly,
normal users who attempt to create users or alises *inside* an application normal users who attempt to create users or aliases *inside* an application
service-defined namespace will receive the same ``M_EXCLUSIVE`` error code, service-defined namespace will receive the same ``M_EXCLUSIVE`` error code,
but only if the application service has defined the namespace as ``exclusive``. but only if the application service has defined the namespace as ``exclusive``.
@ -375,9 +375,10 @@ an API is exposed.
Room Aliases Room Aliases
++++++++++++ ++++++++++++
We may want to expose some 3P network rooms so Matrix users can join them directly, We may want to expose some 3P network rooms so Matrix users can join them directly,
e.g. IRC rooms. We don't want to expose every 3P network room though, e.g. mailto, e.g. IRC rooms. We don't want to expose every 3P network room though, e.g.
tel. Rooms which are publicly accessible (e.g. IRC rooms) can be exposed as an alias by ``mailto``, ``tel``. Rooms which are publicly accessible (e.g. IRC rooms) can be
the application service. Private rooms (e.g. sending an email to someone) should not exposed as an alias by the application service. Private rooms
(e.g. sending an email to someone) should not
be exposed in this way, but should instead operate using normal invite/join semantics. be exposed in this way, but should instead operate using normal invite/join semantics.
Therefore, the ID conventions discussed below are only valid for public rooms which Therefore, the ID conventions discussed below are only valid for public rooms which
expose room aliases. expose room aliases.
@ -397,9 +398,9 @@ SHOULD be mapped in the same way as "user" URIs.
Event fields Event fields
++++++++++++ ++++++++++++
We recommend that any gatewayed events should include an ``external_url`` field We recommend that any events that originated from a remote network should
in their content to provide a way for Matrix clients to link into the 'native' include an ``external_url`` field in their content to provide a way for Matrix
client from which the event originated. For instance, this could contain the clients to link into the 'native' client from which the event originated.
message-ID for emails/nntp posts, or a link to a blog comment when gatewaying For instance, this could contain the message-ID for emails/nntp posts, or a link
blog comment traffic in & out of matrix to a blog comment when bridging blog comment traffic in & out of Matrix.

@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ because HTTP services like Matrix are often deployed behind load balancers that
handle the TLS and these load balancers make it difficult to check TLS client handle the TLS and these load balancers make it difficult to check TLS client
certificates. certificates.
A home server may provide a TLS client certficate and the receiving home server A home server may provide a TLS client certificate and the receiving home server
may check that the client certificate matches the certificate of the origin may check that the client certificate matches the certificate of the origin
home server. home server.

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable "split-brain" An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable "split-brain"
state in the cluster such that the victim's servers could no longer dervive a state in the cluster such that the victim's servers could no longer derive a
consistent view of the chatroom state. consistent view of the chatroom state.
Threat: Bad History Threat: Bad History
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Spoofing
An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without
the victim having sent the message in order to: the victim having sent the message in order to:
* Impersonate the victim while performing illict activity. * Impersonate the victim while performing illicit activity.
* Obtain privileges of the victim. * Obtain privileges of the victim.
Threat: Altering Message Contents Threat: Altering Message Contents
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ with a phony "origin" field.
Spamming Spamming
~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~
The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicicted or unsolicted The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicited or unsolicited
messages to the victim in order to: messages to the victim in order to:
* Find victims for scams. * Find victims for scams.

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