archive
/
matrix-spec
mirror of https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #1622 from matrix-org/rav/clarify_event_signing

Browse Source 
Rewrite the section on signing events
pull/977/head
Richard van der Hoff 6 years ago committed by GitHub
parent cee0a5ac7b 0f84c69805
commit 492df88024
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
3 changed files with 85 additions and 109 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File

3
api/server-server/definitions/pdu.yaml
Unescape Escape View File

@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ allOf:
hashes:
type: object
title: Event Hash
description: Hashes of the PDU, following the algorithm specified in `Signing Events`_.
description: |-
Content hashes of the PDU, following the algorithm specified in `Signing Events`_.
example: {
"sha256": "thishashcoversallfieldsincasethisisredacted"
}

6
api/server-server/definitions/unsigned_pdu.yaml
Unescape Escape View File

@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ properties:
prev_events:
type: array
description: |-
Event IDs and hashes of the most recent events in the room that the homeserver was aware
of when it made this event.
Event IDs and reference hashes for the most recent events in the room
that the homeserver was aware of when it made this event.
items:
type: array
maxItems: 2
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ properties:
auth_events:
type: array
description: |-
An event reference list containing the authorization events that would
Event IDs and reference hashes for the authorization events that would
allow this event to be in the room.
items:
type: array

179
specification/server_server_api.rst
Unescape Escape View File

@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Server implementation
{{version_ss_http_api}}
Retrieving Server Keys
Retrieving server keys
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. NOTE::
@ -979,143 +979,115 @@ Signing Events
Signing events is complicated by the fact that servers can choose to redact
non-essential parts of an event.
Before signing the event, the ``unsigned`` and ``signature`` members are
removed, it is encoded as `Canonical JSON`_, and then hashed using SHA-256. The
resulting hash is then stored in the event JSON in a ``hash`` object under a
``sha256`` key.
Adding hashes and signatures to outgoing events
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. code:: python
def hash_event(event_json_object):
# Keys under "unsigned" can be modified by other servers.
# They are useful for conveying information like the age of an
# event that will change in transit.
# Since they can be modifed we need to exclude them from the hash.
unsigned = event_json_object.pop("unsigned", None)
# Signatures will depend on the current value of the "hashes" key.
# We cannot add new hashes without invalidating existing signatures.
signatures = event_json_object.pop("signatures", None)
Before signing the event, the *content hash* of the event is calculated as
described below. The hash is encoded using `Unpadded Base64`_ and stored in the
event object, in a ``hashes`` object, under a ``sha256`` key.
# The "hashes" key might contain multiple algorithms if we decide to
# migrate away from SHA-2. We don't want to include an existing hash
# output in our hash so we exclude the "hashes" dict from the hash.
hashes = event_json_object.pop("hashes", {})
# Encode the JSON using a canonical encoding so that we get the same
# bytes on every server for the same JSON object.
event_json_bytes = encode_canonical_json(event_json_bytes)
The event object is then *redacted*, following the `redaction
algorithm`_. Finally it is signed as described in `Signing JSON`_, using the
server's signing key (see also `Retrieving server keys`_).
# Add the base64 encoded bytes of the hash to the "hashes" dict.
hashes["sha256"] = encode_base64(sha256(event_json_bytes).digest())
The signature is then copied back to the original event object.
# Add the "hashes" dict back the event JSON under a "hashes" key.
event_json_object["hashes"] = hashes
if unsigned is not None:
event_json_object["unsigned"] = unsigned
return event_json_object
See `Persistent Data Unit schema`_ for an example of a signed event.
The event is then stripped of all non-essential keys both at the top level and
within the ``content`` object. Any top-level keys not in the following list
MUST be removed:
.. code::
Validating hashes and signatures on received events
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When a server receives an event over federation from another server, the
receiving server should check the hashes and signatures on that event.
auth_events
depth
event_id
hashes
membership
origin
origin_server_ts
prev_events
prev_state
room_id
sender
signatures
state_key
type
A new ``content`` object is constructed for the resulting event that contains
only the essential keys of the original ``content`` object. If the original
event lacked a ``content`` object at all, a new empty JSON object is created
for it.
The keys that are considered essential for the ``content`` object depend on the
the ``type`` of the event. These are:
First the signature is checked. The event is redacted following the `redaction
algorithm`_, and the resultant object is checked for a signature from the
originating server, following the algorithm described in `Checking for a signature`_.
Note that this step should succeed whether we have been sent the full event or
a redacted copy.
.. code::
If the signature is found to be valid, the expected content hash is calculated
as described below. The content hash in the ``hashes`` property of the received
event is base64-decoded, and the two are compared for equality.
type is "m.room.aliases":
aliases
If the hash check fails, then it is assumed that this is because we have only
been given a redacted version of the event. To enforce this, the receiving
server should use the redacted copy it calculated rather than the full copy it
received.
type is "m.room.create":
creator
Calculating the content hash for an event
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
type is "m.room.history_visibility":
history_visibility
The *content hash* of an event covers the complete event including the
*unredacted* contents. It is calculated as follows.
type is "m.room.join_rules":
join_rule
First, any existing ``unsigned``, ``signature``, and ``hashes`` members are
removed. The resulting object is then encoded as `Canonical JSON`_, and the
JSON is hashed using SHA-256.
type is "m.room.member":
membership
type is "m.room.power_levels":
ban
events
events_default
kick
redact
state_default
users
users_default
The resulting stripped object with the new ``content`` object and the original
``hashes`` key is then signed using the JSON signing algorithm outlined below:
Example code
~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. code:: python
def sign_event(event_json_object, name, key):
# Make sure the event has a "hashes" key.
if "hashes" not in event_json_object:
event_json_object = hash_event(event_json_object)
def hash_and_sign_event(event_object, signing_key, signing_name):
# First we need to hash the event object.
content_hash = compute_content_hash(event_object)
event_object["hashes"] = {"sha256": encode_unpadded_base64(content_hash)}
# Strip all the keys that would be removed if the event was redacted.
# The hashes are not stripped and cover all the keys in the event.
# This means that we can tell if any of the non-essential keys are
# modified or removed.
stripped_json_object = strip_non_essential_keys(event_json_object)
stripped_object = strip_non_essential_keys(event_object)
# Sign the stripped JSON object. The signature only covers the
# essential keys and the hashes. This means that we can check the
# signature even if the event is redacted.
signed_json_object = sign_json(stripped_json_object)
signed_object = sign_json(stripped_object, signing_key, signing_name)
# Copy the signatures from the stripped event to the original event.
event_json_object["signatures"] = signed_json_oject["signatures"]
return event_json_object
event_object["signatures"] = signed_object["signatures"]
Servers can then transmit the entire event or the event with the non-essential
keys removed. If the entire event is present, receiving servers can then check
the event by computing the SHA-256 of the event, excluding the ``hash`` object.
If the keys have been redacted, then the ``hash`` object is included when
calculating the SHA-256 hash instead.
def compute_content_hash(event_object):
# take a copy of the event before we remove any keys.
event_object = dict(event_object)
New hash functions can be introduced by adding additional keys to the ``hash``
object. Since the ``hash`` object cannot be redacted a server shouldn't allow
too many hashes to be listed, otherwise a server might embed illict data within
the ``hash`` object. For similar reasons a server shouldn't allow hash values
that are too long.
# Keys under "unsigned" can be modified by other servers.
# They are useful for conveying information like the age of an
# event that will change in transit.
# Since they can be modifed we need to exclude them from the hash.
event_object.pop("unsigned", None)
# Signatures will depend on the current value of the "hashes" key.
# We cannot add new hashes without invalidating existing signatures.
event_object.pop("signatures", None)
# The "hashes" key might contain multiple algorithms if we decide to
# migrate away from SHA-2. We don't want to include an existing hash
# output in our hash so we exclude the "hashes" dict from the hash.
event_object.pop("hashes", None)
# Encode the JSON using a canonical encoding so that we get the same
# bytes on every server for the same JSON object.
event_json_bytes = encode_canonical_json(event_object)
return hashlib.sha256(event_json_bytes)
.. TODO
[[TODO(markjh): We might want to specify a maximum number of keys for the
[[TODO(markjh): Since the ``hash`` object cannot be redacted a server
shouldn't allow too many hashes to be listed, otherwise a server might embed
illict data within the ``hash`` object.
We might want to specify a maximum number of keys for the
``hash`` and we might want to specify the maximum output size of a hash]]
[[TODO(markjh) We might want to allow the server to omit the output of well
known hash functions like SHA-256 when none of the keys have been redacted]]
.. |/query/directory| replace:: ``/query/directory``
.. _/query/directory: #get-matrix-federation-v1-query-directory
@ -1126,3 +1098,6 @@ that are too long.
.. _`Canonical JSON`: ../appendices.html#canonical-json
.. _`Unpadded Base64`: ../appendices.html#unpadded-base64
.. _`Server ACLs`: ../client_server/unstable.html#module-server-acls
.. _`redaction algorithm`: ../client_server/unstable.html#redactions
.. _`Signing JSON`: ../appendices.html#signing-json
.. _`Checking for a signature`: ../appendices.html#checking-for-a-signature

Write Preview
Loading…
Cancel
Save