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@ -132,10 +132,18 @@ convention.
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## Tradeoffs
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## Tradeoffs
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## Potential issues
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Rather than broadcasting verification requests to Bob's devices, Alice could
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simply send an `m.key.verification.start` request to a single device. However,
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this would require Alice to choose the right device to send to, which may be
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hard for Alice to do if, for example, Bob has many devices, or if his devices
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have similar names.
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## Security considerations
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## Security considerations
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An attacker could try to spam a user with verification requests. Clients
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should take care that such requests do not interfere with a user's use of the
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client.
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## Conclusion
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## Conclusion
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This proposal presents common event definitions for use by key verification
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This proposal presents common event definitions for use by key verification
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