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matrix-spec-proposals/proposals/2290-separate-threepid-bind...

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# Separate Endpoints for Binding Threepids
On the Client Server API there is currently a single endpoint for binding a
threepid (an email or a phone number): [POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#post-matrix-client-r0-account-3pid).
Depending on whether the `bind` flag is `true` or `false`, the threepid will
be bound to either a user's account on the homeserver, or both the homeserver
and an identity server.
For context a threepid can be bound to an identity server to allow other users to find
their Matrix ID using their email address or phone number. A threepid can
also be bound to a user's account on the homeserver. This allows the
threepid to be used for message notifications, login, password reset, and
other important functions.
Typically, when using the `POST /_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid` endpoint,
the identity server handles the verification -- either by sending an email to
an email address, or a SMS message to a phone number. Once completed, the
homeserver will check with the identity server that verification had indeed
happened, and if so, the threepid would be bound (again, either to the
homeserver, or the homeserver and identity server simultaneously).
Now, consider the fact that the identity server used in this process is
provided by the user, using the endpoint's `id_server` parameter. If the user were
to supply a malicious identity server that would immediately answer "yes" to
any threepid validation, then the user could add any threepid to their
account on the homeserver (which is likely not something homeserver admins want).
To solve this problem, we propose adding a second endpoint that is only used
for binding to an identity server of the user's choice. This endpoint will
not bind the threepid to the user's account on the homeserver, only the
identity server.
In addition, the existing binding endpoint will lose the ability to bind
threepids to an identity server, by removing its `bind` flag. Instead, it
will solely be used to bind to the user's account on the homeserver.
To be clear, the above issue is not a long-standing security issue. Indeed it
is not a problem in any released version of Synapse, as Synapse keeps a list
of "trusted identity servers" that acts a whitelist for what identity servers
a user can specify.
Synapse is soon to lose this whitelist however, as part of lessening the
reliance of homeservers on identity servers. This cannot be done while the
homeserver is still trusting an identity server for validation of threepids.
If the endpoints are split, the homeserver will handle the validation of
threepids being added to user accounts, and identity servers will validate
threepids being added to their own database.
One may question why clients don't just contact an identity server directly
to bind a threepid, bypassing the implications of binding through a
homeserver. While this will work, binds should still occur through a
homeserver such that the homeserver can keep track of which binds were made,
which is important when a user wishes to deactivate their account (and remove
all of their bindings made on different identity servers).
A bind could be made on an identity server, which could then tell the
homeserver that a validation occured, but then there are security
considerations about how to authenticate an identity server in that instance
(and prevent people pretending to be identity servers and telling homeservers
about hundreds of fake binds to a user's account).
This MSC obseletes
[MSC2229](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2229), which dealt
with changing the rules of the `bind` flag. Since this flag is being removed,
the MSC is no longer relevant.
## Proposal
A new endpoint will be added to the Client Server API: `POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid/identity/bind`, and will require
authentication. The endpoint definition is the same as `POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid`, minus the `bind` flag.
An example of binding a threepid to **an identity server only** with this new endpoint is as follows:
First the client must request the threepid be validated by its chosen identity server.
```
POST https://identity.server/_matrix/identity/v2/validate/email/requestToken
{
"client_secret": "don'tT3ll",
"email": "bob@example.com",
"send_attempt": 1
}
```
Once an email has been sent, the user clicks the link in the email, which
notifies the identity server that the email has been verified.
Next, the client completes the bind by calling the new endpoint on the homeserver:
```
POST https://home.server/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid/identity/bind
{
"three_pid_creds": {
"id_server": "example.org",
"id_access_token": "abc123_OpaqueString",
"sid": "abc123987",
"client_secret": "don'tT3ll"
}
}
```
The homeserver will then make a bind request to the specified identity server
on behalf of the user. The homeserver will record if the bind was successful
and notify the user.
The threepid has now been binded on the user's identity server without
causing that threepid to be used for password resets or any other
homeserver-related functions.
For completeness, here is an example of binding a threepid to the
homeserver only, using the old endpoint:
The homeserver is validating the threepid in this instance, so the client
must use the `/requestToken` endpoint of the homeserver:
```
POST https://home.server/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid/email/requestToken
{
"client_secret": "don'tT3ll",
"email": "bob@example.com",
"send_attempt": 1,
}
```
Once an email has been sent, the user clicks the link in the email, which
notifies the homeserver that the threepid has been verified.
The client then sends a request to the old endpoint on the homeserver to bind
the threepid to user's account.
```
POST /_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid
{
"three_pid_creds": {
"sid": "abc123987",
"client_secret": "don'tT3ll"
}
}
```
The threepid will then be bound to the user's account.
The achieve the above flows, some changes need to be made to existing
endpoints. This MSC requests that the `id_server` and `id_access_token`
parameters be removed from the Client-Server API's [POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid/email/requestToken](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#post-matrix-client-r0-account-3pid-email-requesttoken)
and [POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid/msisdn/requestToken](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#post-matrix-client-r0-account-3pid-msisdn-requesttoken)
endpoints, as these endpoints are now only intended for the homeserver to
send validation requests from. Additionally, the same parameters will be
removed from the [POST
/_matrix/client/r0/account/3pid](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/unstable#post-matrix-client-r0-account-3pid) endpoint's
`three_pid_creds` parameter as an identity server is no longer required to
perform verification.
This MSC also requests that the text "It is imperative that the homeserver
keep a list of trusted Identity Servers and only proxies to those that it
trusts." be removed from all parts of the spec, as the homeserver should no
longer need to trust any identity servers.
## Tradeoffs
It may be possible to reduce the two calls per flow into a single endpoint,
but the current asynchronous approach makes it easy for a client to send a
request, go offline, have the threepid be validated, and then come online
again to finalize the validation afterwards.
## Backwards compatibility
TODO
## Security considerations
Reducing the homeserver's trust in identity servers should be a boost to
security and improve decentralisation in the Matrix ecosystem to boot.
Caution should be taken for homeserver developers to be sure not to continue
to use user-provided identity servers for any sensitive tasks once it removes
the concept of a trusted identity server list.
## Conclusion
This MSC helps to minimize the homeserver's trust in an identity server even
further to the point where it is only used for binding addresses for lookup -
which was the original intention of identity servers to begin with.
Additionally, by clearly separating the threepid bind endpoint into two
endpoints that each have a clear intention, the concept of attaching
threepids to a Matrix user becomes a lot easier to reason about.