matrix-spec-proposals/proposals/3083-restricted-rooms.md

Restricting room membership based on space membership

A desirable feature is to give room admins the power to restrict membership of their room based on the membership of one or more spaces from MSC1772: spaces, for example:

members of the #doglovers space can join this room without an invitation¹

Proposal

A new join_rule (restricted) will be used to reflect a cross between invite and public join rules. The content of the join rules would include the rooms to trust for membership. For example:

{
    "type": "m.room.join_rules",
    "state_key": "",
    "content": {
        "join_rule": "restricted",
        "allow": [
            {
                "space": "!mods:example.org",
                "via": ["example.org"]
            },
            {
                "space": "!users:example.org",
                "via": ["example.org"]
            }
        ]
    }
}

This means that a user must be a member of the !mods:example.org space or !users:example.org space in order to join without an invite². Membership in a single space is enough.

If the allow key is an empty list (or not a list at all), then no users are allowed to join without an invite. Each entry is expected to be an object with the following keys:

• space: The room ID of the space to check the membership of.
• via: A list of servers which may be used to peek for membership of the space.

Any entries in the list which do not match the expected format are ignored.

When a homeserver receives a /join request from a client or a /make_join / /send_join request from a server, the request should only be permitted if the user has a valid invite or is in one of the listed spaces.

If the user is not part of the proper space, the homeserver should return an error response with HTTP status code of 403 and an errcode of M_FORBIDDEN.

It is possible for a homeserver receiving a /make_join / /send_join request to not know if the user is in a particular space (due to not participating in any of the necessary spaces). In this case the homeserver should reject the join, the requesting server may wish to attempt to join via other homeservers.

Unlike the invite join rule, confirmation that the allow rules were properly checked cannot be enforced over federation by event authorisation, so servers in the room are trusted not to allow invalid users to join.³

Summary of the behaviour of join rules

See the join rules specification for full details, but the summary below should highlight the differences between public, invite, and restricted.

• public: anyone can join, subject to ban and server_acls, as today.
• invite: only people with membership invite can join, as today.
• knock: the same as invite, except anyone can knock, subject to ban and server_acls. See MSC2403.
• private: This is reserved, but unspecified.
• restricted: the same as public from the perspective of the auth rules, but with the additional caveat that servers are expected to check the allow rules before generating a join event (whether for a local or a remote user).

Security considerations

The allow feature for join_rules places increased trust in the servers in the room. We consider this acceptable: if you don't want evil servers randomly joining spurious users into your rooms, then:

1. Don't let evil servers in your room in the first place
2. Don't use allow lists, given the expansion increases the attack surface anyway by letting members in other rooms dictate who's allowed into your room.

Unstable prefix

The restricted join rule will be included in a future room version to allow servers and clients to opt-into the new functionality.

During development, an unstable room version of org.matrix.msc3083 will be used. Since the room version namespaces the behaviour, the allow key and the restricted value do not need unstable prefixes.

Alternatives

It may seem that just having the allow key with public join rules is enough (as originally suggested in MSC2962), but there are concerns that having a public join rule that is restricted may cause issues if an implementation has not been updated to understand the semantics of the allow keyword. This could be solved by introducing a new room version, but in that case it seems clearer to introduce the restricted join rule, as described above.

Using an allow key with invite join rules to broaden who can join was rejected as an option since it requires weakening the auth rules. From the perspective of the auth rules, the restricted join rule is identical to public (since the checking of whether a member is in the space is done during the call to /join or /make_join / /send_join regardless).

Future extensions

Checking space membership over federation

If a server is not in a space (and thus doesn't know the membership of a space) it cannot enforce membership of a space during a join. Peeking over federation, as described in MSC2444, could be used to establish if the user is in any of the proper spaces.

Note that there are additional security considerations with this, namely that the peek server has significant power. For example, a poorly chosen peek server could lie about the space membership and add an @evil_user:example.org to a space to gain membership to a room.

This MSC recommends rejecting the join in this case and allowing the requesting homeserver to ask another homeserver.

Kicking users out when they leave the allowed space

In the above example, suppose @bob:server.example leaves !users:example.org: should they be removed from the room? Likely not, by analogy with what happens when you switch the join rules from public to invite. Join rules currently govern joins, not existing room membership.

It is left to a future MSC to consider this, but some potential thoughts are given below.

If you assume that a user should be removed in this case, one option is to leave the departure up to Bob's server server.example, but this places a relatively high level of trust in that server. Additionally, if server.example were offline, other users in the room would still see Bob in the room (and their servers would attempt to send message traffic to it).

Another consideration is that users may have joined via a direct invite, not via access through a space.

Fixing this is thorny. Some sort of annotation on the membership events might help. but it's unclear what the desired semantics are:

• Assuming that users in a given space are not kicked when that space is removed from allow, are those users then given a pass to remain in the room indefinitely? What happens if the space is added back to allow and then the user leaves it?
• Suppose a user joins a room via a space (SpaceA). Later, SpaceB is added to the allow list and SpaceA is removed. What should happen when the user leaves SpaceB? Are they exempt from the kick?

It is possible that completely different state should be kept, or a different m.room.member state could be used in a more reasonable way to track this.

Inheriting join rules

If you make a parent space invite-only, should that (optionally?) cascade into child rooms? This would have some of the same problems as inheriting power levels, as discussed in MSC2962.

Footnotes

[1]: The converse restriction, "anybody can join, provided they are not members of the '#catlovers' space" is less useful since:

1. Users in the banned space could simply leave it at any time
2. This functionality is already partially provided by Moderation policy lists. ↩

[2]: Note that there is nothing stopping users sending and receiving invites in public rooms today, and they work as you might expect. The only difference is that you are not required to hold an invite when joining the room. ↩

[3]: This is a marginal decrease in security from the current situation. Currently, a misbehaving server can allow unauthorised users to join any room by first issuing an invite to that user. In theory that can be prevented by raising the PL required to send an invite, but in practice that is rarely done. ↩