11 KiB
Restricting room membership based on space membership
A desirable feature is to give room admins the power to restrict membership of their room based on the membership of one or more spaces from MSC1772, for example:
members of the #doglovers space can join this room without an invitation1
Proposal
In a future room version a new join_rule
(restricted
) will be used to reflect
a cross between invite
and public
join rules. The content of the join rules
would include the rooms to trust for membership. For example:
{
"type": "m.room.join_rules",
"state_key": "",
"content": {
"join_rule": "restricted",
"allow": [
{
"type": "m.room_membership",
"room_id": "!mods:example.org"
},
{
"type": "m.room_membership",
"room_id": "!users:example.org"
}
],
"authorised_servers": ["example.org"]
}
}
This means that a user must be a member of the !mods:example.org
room or
!users:example.org
room in order to join without an invite2.
Membership in a single allowed room is enough.
If the allow
key is an empty list (or not a list at all), then no users are
allowed to join without an invite. Each entry is expected to be an object with the
following keys:
type
:"m.room_membership"
to describe that we are allowing access via room membership. Future MSCs may define other types.room_id
: The room ID to check the membership of.
Any entries in the list which do not match the expected format are ignored. Thus, if all entries are invalid, the list behaves as if empty and all users without an invite are rejected.
The authorised_servers
key lists servers which are trusted to verify the above
allow rules. It must be a list of string server name, a special value of "*"
can be used to allow any server with a member in the room. Any non-string entries
are discarded, if the list is non-existent or empty then no users may join without
an invite.3
From the perspective of the auth rules,
the restricted
join rule has the same behavior as public
, with the additional
caveat that servers must ensure that:
- The user's current membership is
invite
orjoin
, or - The
m.room.member
event has a valid signature from one of the servers listed inauthorised_servers
.
The above check must also be performed against the current room state to potentially soft-fail the event. This is the primary mechanism for guarding against state changes when old events are referenced. (E.g. if an authorised server is removed it should not be able to issue new membership events by referencing an old event in the room.)
When an authorised homeserver receives a /join
request from a client or a
/make_join
/ /send_join
request from another homeserver, the request should
only be permitted if the user has a valid invite or is in one of the listed rooms.
If the user is not a member of at least one of the rooms, the authorised homeserver
should return an error response with HTTP status code of 403 and an errcode
of
M_FORBIDDEN
.
It is possible for a homeserver receiving a /make_join
/ /send_join
request
to not know if the user is in a particular room (due to not participating in any
of the necessary rooms). In this case the homeserver should reject the join,
the requesting server may wish to attempt to join via another authorised homeserver.
If no authorised servers are in an allowed room its membership cannot be checked
(and this is a misconfiguration).
Note that the authorised homeservers have significant power, as they are trusted
to confirm that the allow
rules were properly checked (since this cannot
easily be enforced over federation by event authorisation).4
Summary of the behaviour of join rules
See the join rules
specification for full details, the summary below is meant to highlight the differences
between public
, invite
, and restricted
.
public
: anyone can join, subject toban
andserver_acls
, as today.invite
: only people with membershipinvite
can join, subject toban
andserver_acls
, as today.knock
: the same asinvite
, except anyone can knock, subject toban
andserver_acls
. See MSC2403.private
: This is reserved, but unspecified.restricted
: the same aspublic
, with the additional caveat that servers must verify them.room.member
event is signed by one of theauthorised_servers
if a member was not yet invited or joined into the room.
Security considerations
The allow
feature for join_rules
places increased trust in the authorised
servers. Any authorised server which is joined to the room will be able to issue
join events for the room which no individual server in the room could verify was
issued in good faith.
The increased trust in authorised servers is considered an acceptable trade-off between increased centralisation and increased security.
Unstable prefix
The restricted
join rule will be included in a future room version to allow
servers and clients to opt-into the new functionality.
During development, an unstable room version of org.matrix.msc3083
will be used.
Since the room version namespaces the behaviour, the allow
key and value, as well
as the restricted
join rule value do not need unstable prefixes.
Alternatives
It may seem that just having the allow
key with public
join rules is enough
(as originally suggested in MSC2962),
but there are concerns that changing the behaviour of a pre-existing a public
join rule may cause security issues in older implementations (that do not yet
understand the new behaviour). This could be solved by introducing a new room
version, thus it seems clearer to introduce a new join rule -- restricted
.
Using an allow
key with the invite
join rules to broaden who can join was rejected
as an option since it requires weakening the auth rules.
From the perspective of the auth rules, the restricted
join rule is identical
to public
with additional checks on the signature to ensure it was issued by
an authorised server.
Future extensions
Checking room membership over federation
If an authorised server is not in an allowed room (and thus doesn't know the membership of it) then the server cannot enforce the membership checks while generating a join event. Peeking over federation, as described in MSC2444, could be used to establish if the user is in any of the proper rooms.
This would then delegate power out to a (potentially) untrusted server, giving that
the peek server significant power. For example, a poorly chosen peek
server could lie about the room membership and add an @evil_user:example.org
to an allowed room to gain membership to a room.
As iterated above, this MSC recommends rejecting the join, potentially allowing the requesting homeserver to retry via another homeserver.
Kicking users out when they leave the allowed room
In the above example, suppose @bob:server.example
leaves !users:example.org
:
should they be removed from the room? Likely not, by analogy with what happens
when you switch the join rules from public to invite. Join rules currently govern
joins, not existing room membership.
It is left to a future MSC to consider this, but some potential thoughts are given below.
If you assume that a user should be removed in this case, one option is to
leave the departure up to Bob's server server.example
, but this places a
relatively high level of trust in that server. Additionally, if server.example
were offline, other users in the room would still see Bob in the room (and their
servers would attempt to send message traffic to it).
Another consideration is that users may have joined via a direct invite, not via access through a room.
Fixing this is thorny. Some sort of annotation on the membership events might help. but it's unclear what the desired semantics are:
- Assuming that users in an allowed room are not kicked when that room is
removed from
allow
, are those users then given a pass to remain in the room indefinitely? What happens if the room is added back toallow
and then the user leaves it? - Suppose a user joins a room via an allowed room (RoomA). Later, RoomB is added
to the
allow
list and RoomA is removed. What should happen when the user leaves RoomB? Are they exempt from the kick?
It is possible that completely different state should be kept, or a different
m.room.member
state could be used in a more reasonable way to track this.
Inheriting join rules
If an allowed room is a space and you make a parent space invite-only, should that (optionally?) cascade into child rooms? This would have some of the same problems as inheriting power levels, as discussed in MSC2962.
Additional allow types
Future MSCs may wish to define additional values for the type
argument, potentially
restricting access via:
- MXIDs or servers.
- A shared secret (room password).
These are just examples are not fully thought through for this MSC, but it should be possible to add these behaviors in the future.
Footnotes
- Users in the banned room could simply leave it at any time
- This functionality is already partially provided by Moderation policy lists. ↩
[2]: Note that there is nothing stopping users sending and
receiving invites in public
rooms today, and they work as you might expect.
The only difference is that you are not required to hold an invite when
joining the room. ↩
[3]: This unfortunately introduces another piece of data which must be
maintained by room administrators. It is recommended that clients initially set
this to the homeserver of the creator or the special value "*"
. ↩
[4]: This has the downside of increased centralisation, as a homeserver
that is not an authorised server but is already in the room may not issue a join
event for another user on that server. (It must go through the /make_join
/
/send_join
flow of an authorised server.) This is considered a reasonable
trade-off. ↩