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# MS4299: Trusted Users
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> TODO: *trusted* is misleading and conflicting
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Currently, Matrix has a way to assign specific users as "ignored", declaring to both your client and server that you
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would not like to interact with a given user, and in some situations would not like them to interact with you.
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However, there is no mechanism to do the inverse - assign specific users as "trusted", even more so define what
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"trusted" even means. This proposal will aim to tackle both of these issues, while allowing for plenty of
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expansion in the future as needs of the protocol change.
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## Proposal
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For clarity's sake, the following words are used with the associated context throughout this proposal:
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- Entity/Entities: something that matches an entity that can be trusted (i.e. user ID, room ID, server name, glob pattern)
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- Ignored: [entities that are ignored OR blocked][4283]
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- Non-trusted: entities who are neither trusted nor ignored (the default state)
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- Trusted: entities who are explicitly added to the trusted users account data object
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> TODO: users -> entities
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While this proposal does not aim to tackle what to *do* with user trust (that's for followup MSCs to define), it lays
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the foundations for defining that an entity can be "trusted" at all.
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Currently, we already have [the ignored users list][1], which allows you to define which users you never want to see.
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This proposal introduces a "trusted users list", which behaves semantically similarly to the ignored users list,
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but the inverse. Clients and servers may wish to give "trusted" users special treatment, like they currently do
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with ignored users. Examples include (but are not limited to) servers filtering invites to only allow trusted users to
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send them, clients disabling media previews and only enabling them by default for trusted users, only allowing
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users to initiate calls that reach the recipient if the recipient trusts them, and preventing profile fields
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(display name, avatar, custom fields) being sent to non-trusted users. However, these capabilities are not defined in
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this proposal itself.
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Clients can create an account data entry with the type `m.trusted_users`, with the following format:
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```json5
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{
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"trusted_users": {
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"@user1:example.com": {}, // specific user
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"@*:example.com": {}, // all users matching the glob pattern
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"example.com": {}, // all users on the homeserver example.com
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"!roomid:example.com": {}, // all members of the specified room
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}
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}
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```
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> TODO: restrict globs to server names (i.e. wildcard domains) and user IDs?
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This event's content should be an object, whose keys are generic strings that are intended to represent an entity.
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Note that here, the objects following the trusted entities (hereon referenced as the "trust configuration") are
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empty objects - this is to allow for namespaced fields to be added by later MSCs to further extend the capabilities
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of trust (such as aforementioned examples).
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An **example** of an extended trust configuration could be:
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```json
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{
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"trusted_users": {
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"@user1:example.com": {
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"com.example.allow_custom_colours": true
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},
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"@*:example.com": {}
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}
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}
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```
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If a user does not trust any users, their account data would look like `{"trusted_users": {}}`.
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A user **must not** be ignored *and* trusted, they are mutually exclusive states.
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In the event that there is a desynchronisation between the ignored users account data, and the trusted users
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account data, the ignored users should take priority over trusted users.
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Servers *should not* automatically remove trust from users when the client asks to ignore them, nor vice versa.
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Clients *should*, consequently, attempt to atomically remove trust before attempting to ignore
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## Potential issues
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As this MSC aims to target functionality both in clients and in servers, there are likely to be inconsistencies in
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the implementations. Hopefully, by not defining any actual uses for trust in this MSC, and instead relying on them
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being proposed in followup proposals, servers will be able to advertise support for their individual functionalities,
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and clients will be able to feature-gate appropriately.
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This proposal also has potentially overlapping behaviour with other proposals, see the alternatives section below.
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Due to ignores and trusts being mutually exclusive, there is the risk that they will become desynchronised, and
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have overlapping entries. As defined above, ignores should take priority over trusts.
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## Alternatives
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- [MSC4155][4155] implements invite filtering by defining allowed/ignored/blocked users & servers. The allow function
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of that proposal has potentially overlapping functionality and semantics with this one, although lacks the future
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extensibility that this one aims to provide. Contrarily, 4155 could be used to build on top of this one.
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- Doing away with ignores, and instead only using trusts, and adding the ability to mark a trust as an ignore/untrust,
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or some other semantically similar meaning. This would be complicated and just generally expensive
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## Security Considerations
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- Server-side manipulation: a homeserver's administrators are able to modify account data without notice, which could
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be used to cause unexpected client/server behaviour. The aforementioned URL preview example
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[was already a CVE in matrix-react-sdk][CVE-2024-42347], so additional care must be taken when considering followup
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capabilities.
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## Unstable prefix
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Until this proposal is accepted, implementations should make use of the account data event type
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`uk.timedout.msc4299.trusted_users`, instead of `m.trusted_users`.
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[1]: https://spec.matrix.org/unstable/client-server-api/#mignored_user_list
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[4283]: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4283
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[4155]: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4155
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[CVE-2024-42347]: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-react-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-f83w-wqhc-cfp4
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## Dependencies
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None.
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