matrix-spec-proposals/specification/30_server_server_api.rst

Federation API
===============

Federation is the term used to describe how to communicate between Matrix home
servers. Federation is a mechanism by which two home servers can exchange
Matrix event messages, both as a real-time push of current events, and as a
historic fetching mechanism to synchronise past history for clients to view. It
uses HTTPS connections between each pair of servers involved as the underlying
transport. Messages are exchanged between servers in real-time by active
pushing from each server's HTTP client into the server of the other. Queries to
fetch historic data for the purpose of back-filling scrollback buffers and the
like can also be performed. Currently routing of messages between homeservers
is full mesh (like email) - however, fan-out refinements to this design are
currently under consideration.

There are three main kinds of communication that occur between home servers:

:Queries:
   These are single request/response interactions between a given pair of
   servers, initiated by one side sending an HTTPS GET request to obtain some
   information, and responded by the other. They are not persisted and contain
   no long-term significant history. They simply request a snapshot state at
   the instant the query is made.

:Ephemeral Data Units (EDUs):
   These are notifications of events that are pushed from one home server to
   another. They are not persisted and contain no long-term significant
   history, nor does the receiving home server have to reply to them.

:Persisted Data Units (PDUs):
   These are notifications of events that are broadcast from one home server to
   any others that are interested in the same "context" (namely, a Room ID).
   They are persisted to long-term storage and form the record of history for
   that context.

EDUs and PDUs are further wrapped in an envelope called a Transaction, which is
transferred from the origin to the destination home server using an HTTP PUT
request.


Transactions
------------
.. WARNING::
  This section may be misleading or inaccurate.

The transfer of EDUs and PDUs between home servers is performed by an exchange
of Transaction messages, which are encoded as JSON objects, passed over an HTTP
PUT request. A Transaction is meaningful only to the pair of home servers that
exchanged it; they are not globally-meaningful.

Each transaction has:
 - An opaque transaction ID.
 - A timestamp (UNIX epoch time in milliseconds) generated by its origin
   server.
 - An origin and destination server name.
 - A list of "previous IDs".
 - A list of PDUs and EDUs - the actual message payload that the Transaction
   carries.

``origin``
  Type:
    String
  Description:
    DNS name of homeserver making this transaction.

``ts``
  Type:
    Integer
  Description:
    Timestamp in milliseconds on originating homeserver when this transaction
    started.

``previous_ids``
  Type:
    List of strings
  Description:
    List of transactions that were sent immediately prior to this transaction.

``pdus``
  Type:
    List of Objects.
  Description:
    List of updates contained in this transaction.

::

 {
  "transaction_id":"916d630ea616342b42e98a3be0b74113",
  "ts":1404835423000,
  "origin":"red",
  "destination":"blue",
  "prev_ids":["e1da392e61898be4d2009b9fecce5325"],
  "pdus":[...],
  "edus":[...]
 }

The ``prev_ids`` field contains a list of previous transaction IDs that the
``origin`` server has sent to this ``destination``. Its purpose is to act as a
sequence checking mechanism - the destination server can check whether it has
successfully received that Transaction, or ask for a retransmission if not.

The ``pdus`` field of a transaction is a list, containing zero or more PDUs.[*]
Each PDU is itself a JSON object containing a number of keys, the exact details
of which will vary depending on the type of PDU. Similarly, the ``edus`` field
is another list containing the EDUs. This key may be entirely absent if there
are no EDUs to transfer.

(* Normally the PDU list will be non-empty, but the server should cope with
receiving an "empty" transaction.)

PDUs and EDUs
-------------

Common PDU Fields
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

All PDUs have:
 - An ID
 - A context
 - A declaration of their type
 - A list of other PDU IDs that have been seen recently on that context
   (regardless of which origin sent them)

``context``
+++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  Event context identifier


``origin``
++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  DNS name of homeserver that created this PDU.

``pdu_id``
++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  Unique identifier for PDU within the context for the originating homeserver

``ts``
++++++
Type:
  Integer
Description:
  Timestamp in milliseconds on originating homeserver when this PDU was
  created.

``pdu_type``
++++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  PDU event type.

``prev_pdus``
+++++++++++++
Type:
  List of pairs of strings
Description:
  The originating homeserver and PDU ids of the most recent PDUs the
  homeserver was aware of for this context when it made this PDU.

``depth``
+++++++++
Type:
  Integer
Description:
  The maximum depth of the previous PDUs plus one.


.. TODO-spec paul
  - Update this structure so that 'pdu_id' is a two-element [origin,ref] pair
    like the prev_pdus are

State Update PDU Fields
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For state updates:

``is_state``
++++++++++++
Type:
  Boolean
Description:
  True if this PDU is updating state.

``state_key``
+++++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  Optional key identifying the updated state within the context.

``power_level``
+++++++++++++++
Type:
  Integer
Description:
  The asserted power level of the user performing the update.

``required_power_level``
++++++++++++++++++++++++
Type:
  Integer
Description:
  The required power level needed to replace this update.

``prev_state_id``
+++++++++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  PDU event type.

``prev_state_origin``
+++++++++++++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  The PDU id of the update this replaces.

``user_id``
+++++++++++
Type:
  String
Description:
  The user updating the state.

::

 {
  "pdu_id":"a4ecee13e2accdadf56c1025af232176",
  "context":"#example.green",
  "origin":"green",
  "ts":1404838188000,
  "pdu_type":"m.text",
  "prev_pdus":[["blue","99d16afbc857975916f1d73e49e52b65"]],
  "content":...
  "is_state":false
 }

In contrast to Transactions, it is important to note that the ``prev_pdus``
field of a PDU refers to PDUs that any origin server has sent, rather than
previous IDs that this ``origin`` has sent. This list may refer to other PDUs
sent by the same origin as the current one, or other origins.

Because of the distributed nature of participants in a Matrix conversation, it
is impossible to establish a globally-consistent total ordering on the events.
However, by annotating each outbound PDU at its origin with IDs of other PDUs
it has received, a partial ordering can be constructed allowing causality
relationships to be preserved. A client can then display these messages to the
end-user in some order consistent with their content and ensure that no message
that is semantically in reply of an earlier one is ever displayed before it.

PDUs fall into two main categories: those that deliver Events, and those that
synchronise State. For PDUs that relate to State synchronisation, additional
keys exist to support this:

::

 {...,
  "is_state":true,
  "state_key":TODO-doc
  "power_level":TODO-doc
  "prev_state_id":TODO-doc
  "prev_state_origin":TODO-doc}

EDUs, by comparison to PDUs, do not have an ID, a context, or a list of
"previous" IDs. The only mandatory fields for these are the type, origin and
destination home server names, and the actual nested content.

::

 {"edu_type":"m.presence",
  "origin":"blue",
  "destination":"orange",
  "content":...}


Protocol URLs
-------------
.. WARNING::
  This section may be misleading or inaccurate.

All these URLs are namespaced within a prefix of::

  /_matrix/federation/v1/...

For active pushing of messages representing live activity "as it happens"::

  PUT .../send/:transaction_id/
    Body: JSON encoding of a single Transaction
    Response: TODO-doc

The transaction_id path argument will override any ID given in the JSON body.
The destination name will be set to that of the receiving server itself. Each
embedded PDU in the transaction body will be processed.


To fetch a particular PDU::

  GET .../pdu/:origin/:pdu_id/
    Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing one PDU

Retrieves a given PDU from the server. The response will contain a single new
Transaction, inside which will be the requested PDU.


To fetch all the state of a given context::

  GET .../state/:context/
    Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing multiple PDUs

Retrieves a snapshot of the entire current state of the given context. The
response will contain a single Transaction, inside which will be a list of PDUs
that encode the state.

To backfill events on a given context::

  GET .../backfill/:context/
    Query args: v, limit
    Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing multiple PDUs

Retrieves a sliding-window history of previous PDUs that occurred on the given
context. Starting from the PDU ID(s) given in the "v" argument, the PDUs that
preceeded it are retrieved, up to a total number given by the "limit" argument.
These are then returned in a new Transaction containing all of the PDUs.


To stream events all the events::

  GET .../pull/
    Query args: origin, v
    Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction consisting of multiple PDUs

Retrieves all of the transactions later than any version given by the "v"
arguments.


To make a query::

  GET .../query/:query_type
    Query args: as specified by the individual query types
    Response: JSON encoding of a response object

Performs a single query request on the receiving home server. The Query Type
part of the path specifies the kind of query being made, and its query
arguments have a meaning specific to that kind of query. The response is a
JSON-encoded object whose meaning also depends on the kind of query.

Backfilling
-----------
.. NOTE::
  This section is a work in progress.

.. TODO-doc
  - What it is, when is it used, how is it done

SRV Records
-----------
.. NOTE::
  This section is a work in progress.

.. TODO-doc
  - Why it is needed

State Conflict Resolution
-------------------------
.. NOTE::
  This section is a work in progress.

.. TODO-doc
  - How do conflicts arise (diagrams?)
  - How are they resolved (incl tie breaks)
  - How does this work with deleting current state

Presence
--------
The server API for presence is based entirely on exchange of the following
EDUs. There are no PDUs or Federation Queries involved.

Performing a presence update and poll subscription request::

  EDU type: m.presence

  Content keys:
    push: (optional): list of push operations.
      Each should be an object with the following keys:
        user_id: string containing a User ID
        presence: "offline"|"unavailable"|"online"|"free_for_chat"
        status_msg: (optional) string of freeform text
        last_active_ago: miliseconds since the last activity by the user

    poll: (optional): list of strings giving User IDs

    unpoll: (optional): list of strings giving User IDs

The presence of this combined message is two-fold: it informs the recipient
server of the current status of one or more users on the sending server (by the
``push`` key), and it maintains the list of users on the recipient server that
the sending server is interested in receiving updates for, by adding (by the
``poll`` key) or removing them (by the ``unpoll`` key). The ``poll`` and
``unpoll`` lists apply *changes* to the implied list of users; any existing IDs
that the server sent as ``poll`` operations in a previous message are not
removed until explicitly requested by a later ``unpoll``.

On receipt of a message containing a non-empty ``poll`` list, the receiving
server should immediately send the sending server a presence update EDU of its
own, containing in a ``push`` list the current state of every user that was in
the orginal EDU's ``poll`` list.

Sending a presence invite::

  EDU type: m.presence_invite

  Content keys:
    observed_user: string giving the User ID of the user whose presence is
      requested (i.e. the recipient of the invite)
    observer_user: string giving the User ID of the user who is requesting to
      observe the presence (i.e. the sender of the invite)

Accepting a presence invite::

  EDU type: m.presence_accept

  Content keys - as for m.presence_invite

Rejecting a presence invite::

  EDU type: m.presence_deny

  Content keys - as for m.presence_invite

.. TODO-doc
  - Explain the timing-based roundtrip reduction mechanism for presence
    messages
  - Explain the zero-byte presence inference logic
  See also: docs/client-server/model/presence

Profiles
--------
The server API for profiles is based entirely on the following Federation
Queries. There are no additional EDU or PDU types involved, other than the
implicit ``m.presence`` and ``m.room.member`` events (see section below).

Querying profile information::

  Query type: profile

  Arguments:
    user_id: the ID of the user whose profile to return
    field: (optional) string giving a field name

  Returns: JSON object containing the following keys:
    displayname: string of freeform text
    avatar_url: string containing an http-scheme URL

If the query contains the optional ``field`` key, it should give the name of a
result field. If such is present, then the result should contain only a field
of that name, with no others present. If not, the result should contain as much
of the user's profile as the home server has available and can make public.

Server-Server Authentication
----------------------------

.. TODO-doc
  - Why is this needed.
  - High level overview of process.
  - Transaction/PDU signing
  - How does this work with redactions? (eg hashing required keys only)



Threat Model
------------

Denial of Service
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The attacker could attempt to prevent delivery of messages to or from the
victim in order to:

* Disrupt service or marketing campaign of a commercial competitor.
* Censor a discussion or censor a participant in a discussion.
* Perform general vandalism.

Threat: Resource Exhaustion
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could cause the victims server to exhaust a particular resource
(e.g. open TCP connections, CPU, memory, disk storage)

Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable "split-brain"
state in the cluster such that the victim's servers could no longer dervive a
consistent view of the chatroom state.

Threat: Bad History
+++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could convince the victim to accept invalid messages which the
victim would then include in their view of the chatroom history. Other servers
in the chatroom would reject the invalid messages and potentially reject the
victims messages as well since they depended on the invalid messages.

.. TODO-spec
  Track trustworthiness of HS or users based on if they try to pretend they
  haven't seen recent events, and fake a splitbrain... --M

Threat: Block Network Traffic
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to firewall traffic between the victim's server and some
or all of the other servers in the chatroom.

Threat: High Volume of Messages
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could send large volumes of messages to a chatroom with the victim
making the chatroom unusable.

Threat: Banning users without necessary authorisation
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could attempt to ban a user from a chatroom with the necessary
authorisation.

Spoofing
~~~~~~~~

An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without
the victim having sent the message in order to:

* Impersonate the victim while performing illict activity.
* Obtain privileges of the victim.

Threat: Altering Message Contents
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to alter the contents of an existing message from the
victim.

Threat: Fake Message "origin" Field
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to send a new message purporting to be from the victim
with a phony "origin" field.

Spamming
~~~~~~~~

The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicicted or unsolicted
messages to the victim in order to:

* Find victims for scams.
* Market unwanted products.

Threat: Unsoliticted Messages
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to send messages to victims who do not wish to receive
them.

Threat: Abusive Messages
++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could send abusive or threatening messages to the victim

Spying
~~~~~~

The attacker could try to access message contents or metadata for messages sent
by the victim or to the victim that were not intended to reach the attacker in
order to:

* Gain sensitive personal or commercial information.
* Impersonate the victim using credentials contained in the messages.
  (e.g. password reset messages)
* Discover who the victim was talking to and when.

Threat: Disclosure during Transmission
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to expose the message contents or metadata during
transmission between the servers.

Threat: Disclosure to Servers Outside Chatroom
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An attacker could try to convince servers within a chatroom to send messages to
a server it controls that was not authorised to be within the chatroom.

Threat: Disclosure to Servers Within Chatroom
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

An attacker could take control of a server within a chatroom to expose message
contents or metadata for messages in that room.


Identity Servers
================
.. NOTE::
  This section is a work in progress.

.. TODO-doc Dave
  - 3PIDs and identity server, functions

Lawful Interception
-------------------

Key Escrow Servers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Policy Servers
==============
.. NOTE::
  This section is a work in progress.

.. TODO-spec
  We should mention them in the Architecture section at least: how they fit
  into the picture.

Enforcing policies
------------------