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matrix-spec-proposals/specification/4-server_server_api.rst

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Federation API
==============
Matrix home servers use the Federation APIs (also known as server-server APIs)
to communicate with each other. Home servers use these APIs to push messages to
each other in real-time, to request historic messages from each other, and to
query profile and presence information about users on each other's servers.
The APIs are implemented using HTTPS GETs and PUTs between each of the
servers. These HTTPS requests are strongly authenticated using public key
signatures at the TLS transport layer and using public key signatures in
HTTP Authorization headers at the HTTP layer.
There are three main kinds of communication that occur between home servers:
Persisted Data Units (PDUs):
These events are broadcast from one home server to any others that have
joined the same "context" (namely, a Room ID). They are persisted in
long-term storage and record the history of messages and state for a
context.
Like email, it is the responsibility of the originating server of a PDU
to deliver that event to its recipient servers. However PDUs are signed
using the originating server's public key so that it is possible to
deliver them through third-party servers.
Ephemeral Data Units (EDUs):
These events are pushed between pairs of home servers. They are not
persisted and are not part of the history of a "context", nor does the
receiving home server have to reply to them.
Queries:
These are single request/response interactions between a given pair of
servers, initiated by one side sending an HTTPS GET request to obtain some
information, and responded by the other. They are not persisted and contain
no long-term significant history. They simply request a snapshot state at
the instant the query is made.
EDUs and PDUs are further wrapped in an envelope called a Transaction, which is
transferred from the origin to the destination home server using an HTTPS PUT
request.
Server Discovery
----------------
Resolving Server Names
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Each matrix home server is identified by a server name consisting of a DNS name
and an optional TLS port.
.. code::
server_name = dns_name [ ":" tls_port]
dns_name = <host, see [RFC 3986], Section 3.2.2>
tls_port = *DIGIT
.. **
If the port is present then the server is discovered by looking up an AAAA or
A record for the DNS name and connecting to the specified TLS port.
If the port is absent then the server is discovered by looking up a
``_matrix._tcp`` SRV record for the DNS name. If this record does not exist
then the server is discovered by looking up an AAAA or A record on the DNS
name and taking the default fallback port number of 8448.
Home servers may use SRV records to load balance requests between multiple TLS
endpoints or to failover to another endpoint if an endpoint fails.
Retrieving Server Keys
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Version 2
+++++++++
Each home server publishes its public keys under ``/_matrix/key/v2/server/``.
Home servers query for keys by either getting ``/_matrix/key/v2/server/``
directly or by querying an intermediate notary server using a
``/_matrix/key/v2/query`` API. Intermediate notary servers query the
``/_matrix/key/v2/server/`` API on behalf of another server and sign the
response with their own key. A server may query multiple notary servers to
ensure that they all report the same public keys.
This approach is borrowed from the `Perspectives Project`_, but modified to
include the NACL keys and to use JSON instead of XML. It has the advantage of
avoiding a single trust-root since each server is free to pick which notary
servers they trust and can corroborate the keys returned by a given notary
server by querying other servers.
.. _Perspectives Project: http://perspectives-project.org/
Publishing Keys
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Home servers publish the allowed TLS fingerprints and signing keys in a JSON
object at ``/_matrix/key/v2/server/{key_id}``. The response contains a list of
``verify_keys`` that are valid for signing federation requests made by the
server and for signing events. It contains a list of ``old_verify_keys``
which are only valid for signing events. Finally the response contains a list
of TLS certificate fingerprints to validate any connection made to the server.
A server may have multiple keys active at a given time. A server may have any
number of old keys. It is recommended that servers return a single JSON
response listing all of its keys whenever any ``key_id`` is requested to reduce
the number of round trips needed to discover the relevant keys for a server.
However a server may return a different responses for a different ``key_id``.
The ``tls_certificates`` contain a list of hashes of the X.509 TLS certificates
currently used by the server. The list must include SHA-256 hashes for every
certificate currently in use by the server. These fingerprints are valid until
the millisecond POSIX timestamp in ``valid_until_ts``.
The ``verify_keys`` can be used to sign requests and events made by the server
until the millisecond POSIX timestamp in ``valid_until_ts``. If a Home Server
receives an event with a ``origin_server_ts`` after the ``valid_until_ts`` then
it should request that ``key_id`` for the originating server to check whether
the key has expired.
The ``old_verify_keys`` can be used to sign events with an ``origin_server_ts``
before the ``expired_ts``. The ``expired_ts`` is a millisecond POSIX timestamp
of when the originating server stopped using that key.
Intermediate notary servers should cache a response for half of its remaining
life time to avoid serving a stale response. Originating servers should avoid
returning responses that expire in less than an hour to avoid repeated requests
for an about to expire certificate. Requesting servers should limit how
frequently they query for certificates to avoid flooding a server with requests.
If a server goes offline intermediate notary servers should continue to return
the last response they received from that server so that the signatures of old
events sent by that server can still be checked.
==================== =================== ======================================
Key Type Description
==================== =================== ======================================
``server_name`` String DNS name of the home server.
``verify_keys`` Object Public keys of the home server for
verifying digital signatures.
``old_verify_keys`` Object The public keys that the server used
to use and when it stopped using them.
``signatures`` Object Digital signatures for this object
signed using the ``verify_keys``.
``tls_fingerprints`` Array of Objects Hashes of X.509 TLS certificates used
by this this server encoded as base64.
``valid_until_ts`` Integer POSIX timestamp when the list of valid
keys should be refreshed.
==================== =================== ======================================
.. code:: json
{
"old_verify_keys": {
"ed25519:auto1": {
"expired_ts": 922834800000,
"key": "Base+64+Encoded+Old+Verify+Key"
}
},
"server_name": "example.org",
"signatures": {
"example.org": {
"ed25519:auto2": "Base+64+Encoded+Signature"
}
},
"tls_fingerprints": [
{
"sha256": "Base+64+Encoded+SHA-256-Fingerprint"
}
],
"valid_until_ts": 1052262000000,
"verify_keys": {
"ed25519:auto2": {
"key": "Base+64+Encoded+Signature+Verification+Key"
}
}
}
Querying Keys Through Another Server
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Servers may offer a query API ``_matrix/key/v2/query/`` for getting the keys
for another server. This API can be used to GET at list of JSON objects for a
given server or to POST a bulk query for a number of keys from a number of
servers. Either way the response is a list of JSON objects containing the
JSON published by the server under ``_matrix/key/v2/server/`` signed by
both the originating server and by this server.
The ``minimum_valid_until_ts`` is a millisecond POSIX timestamp indicating
when the returned certificate will need to be valid until to be useful to the
requesting server. This can be set using the maximum ``origin_server_ts`` of
an batch of events that a requesting server is trying to validate. This allows
an intermediate notary server to give a prompt cached response even if the
originating server is offline.
This API can return keys for servers that are offline be using cached responses
taken from when the server was online. Keys can be queried from multiple
servers to mitigate against DNS spoofing.
Requests:
.. code::
GET /_matrix/key/v2/query/${server_name}/${key_id}/?minimum_valid_until_ts=${minimum_valid_until_ts} HTTP/1.1
POST /_matrix/key/v2/query HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{
"server_keys": {
"$server_name": {
"$key_id": {
"minimum_valid_until_ts": $posix_timestamp
}
}
}
}
Response:
.. code::
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"server_keys": [
# List of responses with same format as /_matrix/key/v2/server
# signed by both the originating server and this server.
]
}
Version 1
+++++++++
.. WARNING::
Version 1 of key distribution is obsolete
Home servers publish their TLS certificates and signing keys in a JSON object
at ``/_matrix/key/v1``.
==================== =================== ======================================
Key Type Description
==================== =================== ======================================
``server_name`` String DNS name of the home server.
``verify_keys`` Object Public keys of the home server for
verifying digital signatures.
``signatures`` Object Digital signatures for this object
signed using the ``verify_keys``.
``tls_certificate`` String The X.509 TLS certificate used by this
this server encoded as base64.
==================== =================== ======================================
.. code:: json
{
"server_name": "example.org",
"signatures": {
"example.org": {
"ed25519:auto": "Base+64+Encoded+Signature"
}
},
"tls_certificate": "Base+64+Encoded+DER+Encoded+X509+TLS+Certificate"
"verify_keys": {
"ed25519:auto": "Base+64+Encoded+Signature+Verification+Key"
}
}
When fetching the keys for a server the client should check that the TLS
certificate in the JSON matches the TLS server certificate for the connection
and should check that the JSON signatures are correct for the supplied
``verify_keys``
Transactions
------------
.. WARNING::
This section may be misleading or inaccurate.
The transfer of EDUs and PDUs between home servers is performed by an exchange
of Transaction messages, which are encoded as JSON objects, passed over an HTTP
PUT request. A Transaction is meaningful only to the pair of home servers that
exchanged it; they are not globally-meaningful.
Each transaction has:
- An opaque transaction ID.
- A timestamp (UNIX epoch time in milliseconds) generated by its origin
server.
- An origin and destination server name.
- A list of "previous IDs".
- A list of PDUs and EDUs - the actual message payload that the Transaction
carries.
Transaction Fields
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
==================== =================== ======================================
Key Type Description
==================== =================== ======================================
``origin`` String DNS name of homeserver making this
transaction.
``origin_server_ts`` Integer Timestamp in milliseconds on
originating homeserver when this
transaction started.
``previous_ids`` List of Strings List of transactions that were sent
immediately prior to this transaction.
``pdus`` List of Objects List of persistent updates to rooms.
``edus`` List of Objects List of ephemeral messages.
==================== =================== ======================================
.. code:: json
{
"transaction_id":"916d630ea616342b42e98a3be0b74113",
"ts":1404835423000,
"origin":"red",
"prev_ids":["e1da392e61898be4d2009b9fecce5325"],
"pdus":[...],
"edus":[...]
}
The ``prev_ids`` field contains a list of previous transaction IDs that the
``origin`` server has sent to this ``destination``. Its purpose is to act as a
sequence checking mechanism - the destination server can check whether it has
successfully received that Transaction, or ask for a re-transmission if not.
The ``pdus`` field of a transaction is a list, containing zero or more PDUs.[*]
Each PDU is itself a JSON object containing a number of keys, the exact details
of which will vary depending on the type of PDU. Similarly, the ``edus`` field
is another list containing the EDUs. This key may be entirely absent if there
are no EDUs to transfer.
(* Normally the PDU list will be non-empty, but the server should cope with
receiving an "empty" transaction, as this is useful for informing peers of other
transaction IDs they should be aware of. This effectively acts as a push
mechanism to encourage peers to continue to replicate content.)
PDUs
----
All PDUs have:
- An ID
- A context
- A declaration of their type
- A list of other PDU IDs that have been seen recently on that context
(regardless of which origin sent them)
Required PDU Fields
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
==================== ================== =======================================
Key Type Description
==================== ================== =======================================
``context`` String Event context identifier
``user_id`` String The ID of the user sending the PDU
``origin`` String DNS name of homeserver that created
this PDU
``pdu_id`` String Unique identifier for PDU on the
originating homeserver
``origin_server_ts`` Integer Timestamp in milliseconds on origin
homeserver when this PDU was created.
``pdu_type`` String PDU event type
``content`` Object The content of the PDU.
``prev_pdus`` List of (String, The originating homeserver, PDU ids and
String, Object) hashes of the most recent PDUs the
Triplets homeserver was aware of for the context
when it made this PDU
``depth`` Integer The maximum depth of the previous PDUs
plus one
``is_state`` Boolean True if this PDU is updating room state
==================== ================== =======================================
.. code:: json
{
"context":"#example:green.example.com",
"origin":"green.example.com",
"pdu_id":"a4ecee13e2accdadf56c1025af232176",
"origin_server_ts":1404838188000,
"pdu_type":"m.room.message",
"prev_pdus":[
["blue.example.com","99d16afbc8",
{"sha256":"abase64encodedsha256hashshouldbe43byteslong"}]
],
"hashes":{"sha256":"thishashcoversallfieldsincasethisisredacted"},
"signatures":{
"green.example.com":{
"ed25519:key_version:":"these86bytesofbase64signaturecoveressentialfieldsincludinghashessocancheckredactedpdus"
}
},
"is_state":false,
"content": {...}
}
In contrast to Transactions, it is important to note that the ``prev_pdus``
field of a PDU refers to PDUs that any origin server has sent, rather than
previous IDs that this ``origin`` has sent. This list may refer to other PDUs
sent by the same origin as the current one, or other origins.
Because of the distributed nature of participants in a Matrix conversation, it
is impossible to establish a globally-consistent total ordering on the events.
However, by annotating each outbound PDU at its origin with IDs of other PDUs
it has received, a partial ordering can be constructed allowing causality
relationships to be preserved. A client can then display these messages to the
end-user in some order consistent with their content and ensure that no message
that is semantically in reply of an earlier one is ever displayed before it.
State Update PDU Fields
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
PDUs fall into two main categories: those that deliver Events, and those that
synchronise State. For PDUs that relate to State synchronisation, additional
keys exist to support this:
======================== ============ =========================================
Key Type Description
======================== ============ =========================================
``state_key`` String Combined with the ``pdu_type`` this
identifies the which part of the room
state is updated
``required_power_level`` Integer The required power level needed to
replace this update.
``prev_state_id`` String The homeserver of the update this
replaces
``prev_state_origin`` String The PDU id of the update this replaces.
``user_id`` String The user updating the state.
======================== ============ =========================================
.. code:: json
{...,
"is_state":true,
"state_key":TODO-doc
"required_power_level":TODO-doc
"prev_state_id":TODO-doc
"prev_state_origin":TODO-doc
}
EDUs
----
EDUs, by comparison to PDUs, do not have an ID, a context, or a list of
"previous" IDs. The only mandatory fields for these are the type, origin and
destination home server names, and the actual nested content.
======================== ============ =========================================
Key Type Description
======================== ============ =========================================
``edu_type`` String The type of the ephemeral message.
``content`` Object Content of the ephemeral message.
======================== ============ =========================================
.. code:: json
{
"edu_type":"m.presence",
"origin":"blue",
"destination":"orange",
"content":{...}
}
Protocol URLs
-------------
.. WARNING::
This section may be misleading or inaccurate.
All these URLs are name-spaced within a prefix of::
/_matrix/federation/v1/...
For active pushing of messages representing live activity "as it happens"::
PUT .../send/<transaction_id>/
Body: JSON encoding of a single Transaction
Response: TODO-doc
The transaction_id path argument will override any ID given in the JSON body.
The destination name will be set to that of the receiving server itself. Each
embedded PDU in the transaction body will be processed.
To fetch a particular PDU::
GET .../pdu/<origin>/<pdu_id>/
Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing one PDU
Retrieves a given PDU from the server. The response will contain a single new
Transaction, inside which will be the requested PDU.
To fetch all the state of a given context::
GET .../state/<context>/
Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing multiple PDUs
Retrieves a snapshot of the entire current state of the given context. The
response will contain a single Transaction, inside which will be a list of PDUs
that encode the state.
To backfill events on a given context::
GET .../backfill/<context>/
Query args: v, limit
Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction containing multiple PDUs
Retrieves a sliding-window history of previous PDUs that occurred on the given
context. Starting from the PDU ID(s) given in the "v" argument, the PDUs that
preceded it are retrieved, up to a total number given by the "limit" argument.
These are then returned in a new Transaction containing all of the PDUs.
To stream events all the events::
GET .../pull/
Query args: origin, v
Response: JSON encoding of a single Transaction consisting of multiple PDUs
Retrieves all of the transactions later than any version given by the "v"
arguments.
To make a query::
GET .../query/<query_type>
Query args: as specified by the individual query types
Response: JSON encoding of a response object
Performs a single query request on the receiving home server. The Query Type
part of the path specifies the kind of query being made, and its query
arguments have a meaning specific to that kind of query. The response is a
JSON-encoded object whose meaning also depends on the kind of query.
Backfilling
-----------
.. NOTE::
This section is a work in progress.
.. TODO-doc
- What it is, when is it used, how is it done
Authentication
--------------
Request Authentication
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10 years ago
Every HTTP request made by a homeserver is authenticated using public key
digital signatures. The request method, target and body are signed by wrapping
them in a JSON object and signing it using the JSON signing algorithm. The
resulting signatures are added as an Authorization header with an auth scheme
of X-Matrix. Note that the target field should include the full path starting with
``/_matrix/...``, including the ``?`` and any query parameters if present, but
should not include the leading ``https:``, nor the destination server's
hostname.
Step 1 sign JSON:
.. code::
{
"method": "GET",
"uri": "/target",
"origin": "origin.hs.example.com",
"destintation": "destination.hs.example.com",
"content": { JSON content ... },
"signatures": {
"origin.hs.example.com": {
"ed25519:key1": "ABCDEF..."
}
}
}
Step 2 add Authorization header:
.. code::
GET /target HTTP/1.1
Authorization: X-Matrix origin=origin.example.com,key="ed25519:key1",sig="ABCDEF..."
Content-Type: application/json
{ JSON content ... }
Example python code:
.. code:: python
def authorization_headers(origin_name, origin_signing_key,
destination_name, request_method, request_target,
content_json=None):
request_json = {
"method": request_method,
"uri": request_target,
"origin": origin_name,
"destination": destination_name,
}
if content_json is not None:
request["content"] = content_json
signed_json = sign_json(request_json, origin_name, origin_signing_key)
authorization_headers = []
for key, sig in signed_json["signatures"][origin_name].items():
authorization_headers.append(bytes(
"X-Matrix origin=%s,key=\"%s\",sig=\"%s\"" % (
origin_name, key, sig,
)
))
return ("Authorization", authorization_headers)
Response Authentication
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Responses are authenticated by the TLS server certificate. A homeserver should
not send a request until it has authenticated the connected server to avoid
leaking messages to eavesdroppers.
Client TLS Certificates
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Requests are authenticated at the HTTP layer rather than at the TLS layer
because HTTP services like Matrix are often deployed behind load balancers that
handle the TLS and these load balancers make it difficult to check TLS client
certificates.
A home server may provide a TLS client certficate and the receiving home server
may check that the client certificate matches the certificate of the origin
home server.
Server-Server Authorization
---------------------------
.. TODO-doc
- PDU signing (see the Event signing section earlier)
- State conflict resolution (see below)
State Conflict Resolution
-------------------------
.. NOTE::
This section is a work in progress.
.. TODO-doc
- How do conflicts arise (diagrams?)
- How are they resolved (incl tie breaks)
- How does this work with deleting current state
- How do we reject invalid federation traffic?
[[TODO(paul): At this point we should probably have a long description of how
State management works, with descriptions of clobbering rules, power levels, etc
etc... But some of that detail is rather up-in-the-air, on the whiteboard, and
so on. This part needs refining. And writing in its own document as the details
relate to the server/system as a whole, not specifically to server-server
federation.]]
Presence
--------
The server API for presence is based entirely on exchange of the following
EDUs. There are no PDUs or Federation Queries involved.
Performing a presence update and poll subscription request::
EDU type: m.presence
Content keys:
push: (optional): list of push operations.
Each should be an object with the following keys:
user_id: string containing a User ID
presence: "offline"|"unavailable"|"online"|"free_for_chat"
status_msg: (optional) string of free-form text
last_active_ago: milliseconds since the last activity by the user
poll: (optional): list of strings giving User IDs
unpoll: (optional): list of strings giving User IDs
The presence of this combined message is two-fold: it informs the recipient
server of the current status of one or more users on the sending server (by the
``push`` key), and it maintains the list of users on the recipient server that
the sending server is interested in receiving updates for, by adding (by the
``poll`` key) or removing them (by the ``unpoll`` key). The ``poll`` and
``unpoll`` lists apply *changes* to the implied list of users; any existing IDs
that the server sent as ``poll`` operations in a previous message are not
removed until explicitly requested by a later ``unpoll``.
On receipt of a message containing a non-empty ``poll`` list, the receiving
server should immediately send the sending server a presence update EDU of its
own, containing in a ``push`` list the current state of every user that was in
the original EDU's ``poll`` list.
Sending a presence invite::
EDU type: m.presence_invite
Content keys:
observed_user: string giving the User ID of the user whose presence is
requested (i.e. the recipient of the invite)
observer_user: string giving the User ID of the user who is requesting to
observe the presence (i.e. the sender of the invite)
Accepting a presence invite::
EDU type: m.presence_accept
Content keys - as for m.presence_invite
Rejecting a presence invite::
EDU type: m.presence_deny
Content keys - as for m.presence_invite
.. TODO-doc
- Explain the timing-based round-trip reduction mechanism for presence
messages
- Explain the zero-byte presence inference logic
See also: docs/client-server/model/presence
Profiles
--------
The server API for profiles is based entirely on the following Federation
Queries. There are no additional EDU or PDU types involved, other than the
implicit ``m.presence`` and ``m.room.member`` events (see section below).
Querying profile information::
Query type: profile
Arguments:
user_id: the ID of the user whose profile to return
field: (optional) string giving a field name
Returns: JSON object containing the following keys:
displayname: string of free-form text
avatar_url: string containing an HTTP-scheme URL
If the query contains the optional ``field`` key, it should give the name of a
result field. If such is present, then the result should contain only a field
of that name, with no others present. If not, the result should contain as much
of the user's profile as the home server has available and can make public.
Directory
---------
The server API for directory queries is also based on Federation Queries.
Querying directory information::
Query type: directory
Arguments:
room_alias: the room alias to query
Returns: JSON object containing the following keys:
room_id: string giving the underlying room ID the alias maps to
servers: list of strings giving the join candidates
The list of join candidates is a list of server names that are likely to hold
the given room; these are servers that the requesting server may wish to try
joining with. This list may or may not include the server answering the query.