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264 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
264 lines
7.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2022 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tka
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
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"tailscale.com/types/tkatype"
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)
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// ErrNoSuchKey is returned if the key referenced by a KeyID does not exist.
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var ErrNoSuchKey = errors.New("key not found")
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// State describes Tailnet Key Authority state at an instant in time.
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//
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// State is mutated by applying Authority Update Messages (AUMs), resulting
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// in a new State.
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type State struct {
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// LastAUMHash is the blake2s digest of the last-applied AUM.
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// Because AUMs are strictly ordered and form a hash chain, we
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// check the previous AUM hash in an update we are applying
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// is the same as the LastAUMHash.
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LastAUMHash *AUMHash `cbor:"1,keyasint"`
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// DisablementSecrets are KDF-derived values which can be used
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// to turn off the TKA in the event of a consensus-breaking bug.
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// An AUM of type DisableNL should contain a secret when results
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// in one of these values when run through the disablement KDF.
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//
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// TODO(tom): This is an alpha feature, remove this mechanism once
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// we have confidence in our implementation.
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DisablementSecrets [][]byte `cbor:"2,keyasint"`
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// Keys are the public keys currently trusted by the TKA.
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Keys []Key `cbor:"3,keyasint"`
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}
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// GetKey returns the trusted key with the specified KeyID.
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func (s State) GetKey(key tkatype.KeyID) (Key, error) {
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for _, k := range s.Keys {
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if bytes.Equal(k.ID(), key) {
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return k, nil
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}
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}
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return Key{}, ErrNoSuchKey
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}
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// Clone makes an independent copy of State.
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//
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// NOTE: There is a difference between a nil slice and an empty
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// slice for encoding purposes, so an implementation of Clone()
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// must take care to preserve this.
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func (s State) Clone() State {
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out := State{}
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if s.LastAUMHash != nil {
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dupe := *s.LastAUMHash
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out.LastAUMHash = &dupe
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}
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if s.DisablementSecrets != nil {
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out.DisablementSecrets = make([][]byte, len(s.DisablementSecrets))
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for i := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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out.DisablementSecrets[i] = make([]byte, len(s.DisablementSecrets[i]))
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copy(out.DisablementSecrets[i], s.DisablementSecrets[i])
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}
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}
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if s.Keys != nil {
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out.Keys = make([]Key, len(s.Keys))
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for i := range s.Keys {
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out.Keys[i] = s.Keys[i].Clone()
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// cloneForUpdate is like Clone, except LastAUMHash is set based
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// on the hash of the given update.
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func (s State) cloneForUpdate(update *AUM) State {
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out := s.Clone()
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aumHash := update.Hash()
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out.LastAUMHash = &aumHash
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return out
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}
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const disablementLength = 32
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var disablementSalt = []byte("tailscale network-lock disablement salt")
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func disablementKDF(secret []byte) []byte {
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// time = 4 (3 recommended, booped to 4 to compensate for less memory)
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// memory = 16 (32 recommended)
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// threads = 4
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// keyLen = 32 (256 bits)
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return argon2.Key(secret, disablementSalt, 4, 16*1024, 4, disablementLength)
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}
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// checkDisablement returns true for a valid disablement secret.
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func (s State) checkDisablement(secret []byte) bool {
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derived := disablementKDF(secret)
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for _, candidate := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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if bytes.Equal(derived, candidate) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// parentMatches returns true if an AUM can chain to (be applied)
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// to the current state.
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//
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// Specifically, the rules are:
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// - The last AUM hash must match (transitively, this implies that this
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// update follows the last update message applied to the state machine)
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// - Or, the state machine knows no parent (its brand new).
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func (s State) parentMatches(update AUM) bool {
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if s.LastAUMHash == nil {
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return true
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}
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return bytes.Equal(s.LastAUMHash[:], update.PrevAUMHash)
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}
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// applyVerifiedAUM computes a new state based on the update provided.
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//
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// The provided update MUST be verified: That is, the AUM must be well-formed
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// (as defined by StaticValidate()), and signatures over the AUM must have
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// been verified.
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func (s State) applyVerifiedAUM(update AUM) (State, error) {
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// Validate that the update message has the right parent.
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if !s.parentMatches(update) {
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return State{}, errors.New("parent AUMHash mismatch")
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}
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switch update.MessageKind {
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case AUMNoOp:
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out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
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return out, nil
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case AUMCheckpoint:
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return update.State.cloneForUpdate(&update), nil
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case AUMAddKey:
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if update.Key == nil {
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return State{}, errors.New("no key to add provided")
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}
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if _, err := s.GetKey(update.Key.ID()); err == nil {
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return State{}, errors.New("key already exists")
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}
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out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
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out.Keys = append(out.Keys, *update.Key)
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return out, nil
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case AUMUpdateKey:
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k, err := s.GetKey(update.KeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return State{}, err
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}
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if update.Votes != nil {
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k.Votes = *update.Votes
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}
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if update.Meta != nil {
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k.Meta = update.Meta
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}
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out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
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for i := range out.Keys {
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if bytes.Equal(out.Keys[i].ID(), update.KeyID) {
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out.Keys[i] = k
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}
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}
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return out, nil
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case AUMRemoveKey:
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idx := -1
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for i := range s.Keys {
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if bytes.Equal(update.KeyID, s.Keys[i].ID()) {
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idx = i
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break
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}
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}
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if idx < 0 {
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return State{}, ErrNoSuchKey
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}
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out := s.cloneForUpdate(&update)
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out.Keys = append(out.Keys[:idx], out.Keys[idx+1:]...)
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return out, nil
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case AUMDisableNL:
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// TODO(tom): We should handle this at a higher level than State.
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if !s.checkDisablement(update.DisablementSecret) {
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return State{}, errors.New("incorrect disablement secret")
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}
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// Valid disablement secret, lets reset
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return State{}, nil
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default:
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// TODO(tom): Instead of erroring, update lastHash and
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// continue (to preserve future compatibility).
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return State{}, fmt.Errorf("unhandled message: %v", update.MessageKind)
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}
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}
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// Upper bound on checkpoint elements, chosen arbitrarily. Intended to
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// cap out insanely large AUMs.
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const (
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maxDisablementSecrets = 32
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maxKeys = 512
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)
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// staticValidateCheckpoint validates that the state is well-formed for
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// inclusion in a checkpoint AUM.
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func (s *State) staticValidateCheckpoint() error {
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if s.LastAUMHash != nil {
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return errors.New("cannot specify a parent AUM")
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}
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if len(s.DisablementSecrets) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one disablement secret required")
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}
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if numDS := len(s.DisablementSecrets); numDS > maxDisablementSecrets {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many disablement secrets (%d, max %d)", numDS, maxDisablementSecrets)
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}
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for i, ds := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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if len(ds) != disablementLength {
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return fmt.Errorf("disablement[%d]: invalid length (got %d, want %d)", i, len(ds), disablementLength)
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}
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for j, ds2 := range s.DisablementSecrets {
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if i == j {
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continue
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}
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if bytes.Equal(ds, ds2) {
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return fmt.Errorf("disablement[%d]: duplicates disablement[%d]", i, j)
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}
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}
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}
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if len(s.Keys) == 0 {
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return errors.New("at least one key is required")
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}
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if numKeys := len(s.Keys); numKeys > maxKeys {
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return fmt.Errorf("too many keys (%d, max %d)", numKeys, maxKeys)
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}
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for i, k := range s.Keys {
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if err := k.StaticValidate(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("key[%d]: %v", i, err)
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}
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for j, k2 := range s.Keys {
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if i == j {
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continue
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}
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if bytes.Equal(k.ID(), k2.ID()) {
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return fmt.Errorf("key[%d]: duplicates key[%d]", i, j)
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}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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