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2829 lines
87 KiB
Go
2829 lines
87 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Package x509 parses X.509-encoded keys and certificates.
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//
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// On UNIX systems the environment variables SSL_CERT_FILE and SSL_CERT_DIR
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// can be used to override the system default locations for the SSL certificate
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// file and SSL certificate files directory, respectively.
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package x509
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/dsa"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha1"
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_ "crypto/sha1"
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_ "crypto/sha256"
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_ "crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"unicode/utf8"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
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cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
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)
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// pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo
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// in RFC 3280.
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type pkixPublicKey struct {
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Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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BitString asn1.BitString
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}
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// ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
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// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
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// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
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//
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// It returns a *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, or
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// ed25519.PublicKey. More types might be supported in the future.
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//
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// This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
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func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (pub interface{}, err error) {
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var pki publicKeyInfo
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if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil {
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pkcs1PublicKey{}); err == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse public key (use ParsePKCS1PublicKey instead for this key format)")
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}
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return nil, err
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} else if len(rest) != 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key")
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}
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algo := getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(pki.Algorithm.Algorithm)
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if algo == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
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return nil, errors.New("x509: unknown public key algorithm")
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}
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return parsePublicKey(algo, &pki)
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}
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func marshalPublicKey(pub interface{}) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
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switch pub := pub.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(pkcs1PublicKey{
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N: pub.N,
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E: pub.E,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA
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// This is a NULL parameters value which is required by
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// RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
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oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve)
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if !ok {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA
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var paramBytes []byte
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paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes
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case ed25519.PublicKey:
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publicKeyBytes = pub
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyEd25519
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default:
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub)
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}
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return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil
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}
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// MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
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// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
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// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
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//
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// The following key types are currently supported: *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey
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// and ed25519.PublicKey. Unsupported key types result in an error.
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//
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// This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
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func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
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var publicKeyBytes []byte
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var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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var err error
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if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pkix := pkixPublicKey{
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Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm,
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BitString: asn1.BitString{
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Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
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BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes),
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},
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}
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ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix)
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return ret, nil
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}
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// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.:
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type certificate struct {
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Raw asn1.RawContent
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TBSCertificate tbsCertificate
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SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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SignatureValue asn1.BitString
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}
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type tbsCertificate struct {
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Raw asn1.RawContent
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Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"`
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SerialNumber *big.Int
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SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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Issuer asn1.RawValue
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Validity validity
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Subject asn1.RawValue
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PublicKey publicKeyInfo
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UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
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SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
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Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3"`
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}
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type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct {
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P, Q, G *big.Int
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}
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type dsaSignature struct {
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R, S *big.Int
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}
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type ecdsaSignature dsaSignature
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type validity struct {
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NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time
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}
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type publicKeyInfo struct {
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Raw asn1.RawContent
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Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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PublicKey asn1.BitString
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}
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// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1
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type authKeyId struct {
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Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
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}
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type SignatureAlgorithm int
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const (
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UnknownSignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm = iota
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MD2WithRSA
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MD5WithRSA
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SHA1WithRSA
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SHA256WithRSA
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SHA384WithRSA
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SHA512WithRSA
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DSAWithSHA1
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DSAWithSHA256
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ECDSAWithSHA1
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ECDSAWithSHA256
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ECDSAWithSHA384
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ECDSAWithSHA512
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SHA256WithRSAPSS
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SHA384WithRSAPSS
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SHA512WithRSAPSS
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PureEd25519
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)
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func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) isRSAPSS() bool {
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switch algo {
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case SHA256WithRSAPSS, SHA384WithRSAPSS, SHA512WithRSAPSS:
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return true
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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func (algo SignatureAlgorithm) String() string {
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for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
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if details.algo == algo {
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return details.name
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}
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}
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return strconv.Itoa(int(algo))
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}
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type PublicKeyAlgorithm int
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const (
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UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm = iota
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RSA
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DSA
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ECDSA
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Ed25519
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)
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var publicKeyAlgoName = [...]string{
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RSA: "RSA",
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DSA: "DSA",
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ECDSA: "ECDSA",
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Ed25519: "Ed25519",
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}
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func (algo PublicKeyAlgorithm) String() string {
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if 0 < algo && int(algo) < len(publicKeyAlgoName) {
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return publicKeyAlgoName[algo]
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}
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return strconv.Itoa(int(algo))
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}
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// OIDs for signature algorithms
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//
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// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
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//
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//
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// RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms
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//
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// md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
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//
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// md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
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//
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// sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
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//
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// dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
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//
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// RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045)
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// signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)}
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//
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//
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// RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5
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//
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// sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
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//
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// sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
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//
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// sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
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//
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//
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// RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms
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//
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// dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
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// csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2}
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//
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// RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
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//
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//
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// RFC 8410 3 Curve25519 and Curve448 Algorithm Identifiers
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//
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// id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
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var (
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oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2}
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oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4}
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oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5}
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oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11}
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oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12}
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oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13}
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oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10}
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oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3}
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oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4}
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oidSignatureEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112}
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oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1}
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oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2}
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oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3}
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oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8}
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// oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA
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// but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known
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// to produce certificates with this OID.
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oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29}
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)
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var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct {
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algo SignatureAlgorithm
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name string
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oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
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pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
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hash crypto.Hash
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}{
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{MD2WithRSA, "MD2-RSA", oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */},
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{MD5WithRSA, "MD5-RSA", oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, RSA, crypto.MD5},
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{SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1},
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{SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA1},
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{SHA256WithRSA, "SHA256-RSA", oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA256},
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{SHA384WithRSA, "SHA384-RSA", oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA384},
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{SHA512WithRSA, "SHA512-RSA", oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, RSA, crypto.SHA512},
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{SHA256WithRSAPSS, "SHA256-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA256},
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{SHA384WithRSAPSS, "SHA384-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA384},
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{SHA512WithRSAPSS, "SHA512-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, RSA, crypto.SHA512},
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{DSAWithSHA1, "DSA-SHA1", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, DSA, crypto.SHA1},
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{DSAWithSHA256, "DSA-SHA256", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, DSA, crypto.SHA256},
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{ECDSAWithSHA1, "ECDSA-SHA1", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSA, crypto.SHA1},
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{ECDSAWithSHA256, "ECDSA-SHA256", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, ECDSA, crypto.SHA256},
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{ECDSAWithSHA384, "ECDSA-SHA384", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, ECDSA, crypto.SHA384},
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{ECDSAWithSHA512, "ECDSA-SHA512", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, ECDSA, crypto.SHA512},
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{PureEd25519, "Ed25519", oidSignatureEd25519, Ed25519, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */},
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}
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// pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that
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// specifies RSA PSS. See RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3.
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type pssParameters struct {
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// The following three fields are not marked as
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// optional because the default values specify SHA-1,
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// which is no longer suitable for use in signatures.
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Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
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MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"`
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SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"`
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TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"`
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}
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// rsaPSSParameters returns an asn1.RawValue suitable for use as the Parameters
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// in an AlgorithmIdentifier that specifies RSA PSS.
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func rsaPSSParameters(hashFunc crypto.Hash) asn1.RawValue {
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var hashOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
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switch hashFunc {
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case crypto.SHA256:
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hashOID = oidSHA256
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case crypto.SHA384:
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hashOID = oidSHA384
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case crypto.SHA512:
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hashOID = oidSHA512
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}
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params := pssParameters{
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Hash: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
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Algorithm: hashOID,
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Parameters: asn1.NullRawValue,
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},
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MGF: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
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Algorithm: oidMGF1,
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},
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SaltLength: hashFunc.Size(),
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TrailerField: 1,
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}
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mgf1Params := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
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Algorithm: hashOID,
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Parameters: asn1.NullRawValue,
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}
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var err error
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params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(mgf1Params)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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serialized, err := asn1.Marshal(params)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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return asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: serialized}
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}
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|
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func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm {
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if ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureEd25519) {
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// RFC 8410, Section 3
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// > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
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if len(ai.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 {
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return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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}
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}
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if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) {
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for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
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if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) {
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return details.algo
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}
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}
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return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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}
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|
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// RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters
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// in the Parameters.
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var params pssParameters
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil {
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return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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}
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var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil {
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return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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}
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|
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// PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces them into
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// three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash function always match the
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// message hash function (as recommended in RFC 3447, Section 8.1), that the
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// salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer field has the
|
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// default value.
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if (len(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
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!params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) ||
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!mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) ||
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(len(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
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params.TrailerField != 1 {
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return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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}
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switch {
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case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32:
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return SHA256WithRSAPSS
|
|
case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48:
|
|
return SHA384WithRSAPSS
|
|
case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64:
|
|
return SHA512WithRSAPSS
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms
|
|
//
|
|
// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
|
|
// rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
|
|
//
|
|
// rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 }
|
|
//
|
|
// id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
|
|
// x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }
|
|
//
|
|
// RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters
|
|
//
|
|
// id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
|
// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
|
|
var (
|
|
oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1}
|
|
oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1}
|
|
oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1}
|
|
oidPublicKeyEd25519 = oidSignatureEd25519
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA):
|
|
return RSA
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA):
|
|
return DSA
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA):
|
|
return ECDSA
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519):
|
|
return Ed25519
|
|
}
|
|
return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve
|
|
//
|
|
// secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
|
// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }
|
|
//
|
|
// secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
|
// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3)
|
|
// prime(1) 7 }
|
|
//
|
|
// secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
|
// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }
|
|
//
|
|
// secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
|
// iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }
|
|
//
|
|
// NB: secp256r1 is equivalent to prime256v1
|
|
var (
|
|
oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33}
|
|
oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7}
|
|
oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34}
|
|
oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224):
|
|
return elliptic.P224()
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256):
|
|
return elliptic.P256()
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384):
|
|
return elliptic.P384()
|
|
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521):
|
|
return elliptic.P521()
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) {
|
|
switch curve {
|
|
case elliptic.P224():
|
|
return oidNamedCurveP224, true
|
|
case elliptic.P256():
|
|
return oidNamedCurveP256, true
|
|
case elliptic.P384():
|
|
return oidNamedCurveP384, true
|
|
case elliptic.P521():
|
|
return oidNamedCurveP521, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's
|
|
// a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants.
|
|
type KeyUsage int
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
KeyUsageDigitalSignature KeyUsage = 1 << iota
|
|
KeyUsageContentCommitment
|
|
KeyUsageKeyEncipherment
|
|
KeyUsageDataEncipherment
|
|
KeyUsageKeyAgreement
|
|
KeyUsageCertSign
|
|
KeyUsageCRLSign
|
|
KeyUsageEncipherOnly
|
|
KeyUsageDecipherOnly
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage
|
|
//
|
|
// anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 }
|
|
//
|
|
// id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
|
|
//
|
|
// id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
|
|
// id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
|
|
// id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 }
|
|
// id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 }
|
|
// id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
|
|
// id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
|
|
var (
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 1, 22}
|
|
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 61, 1, 1}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key.
|
|
// Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action.
|
|
type ExtKeyUsage int
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
ExtKeyUsageAny ExtKeyUsage = iota
|
|
ExtKeyUsageServerAuth
|
|
ExtKeyUsageClientAuth
|
|
ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning
|
|
ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection
|
|
ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem
|
|
ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel
|
|
ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser
|
|
ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping
|
|
ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning
|
|
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto
|
|
ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto
|
|
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning
|
|
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID.
|
|
var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct {
|
|
extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage
|
|
oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
}{
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning},
|
|
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) {
|
|
for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
|
|
if oid.Equal(pair.oid) {
|
|
return pair.extKeyUsage, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) {
|
|
for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
|
|
if eku == pair.extKeyUsage {
|
|
return pair.oid, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate.
|
|
type Certificate struct {
|
|
Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (certificate, signature algorithm and signature).
|
|
RawTBSCertificate []byte // Certificate part of raw ASN.1 DER content.
|
|
RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
|
|
RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject
|
|
RawIssuer []byte // DER encoded Issuer
|
|
|
|
Signature []byte
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
|
PublicKey interface{}
|
|
|
|
Version int
|
|
SerialNumber *big.Int
|
|
Issuer pkix.Name
|
|
Subject pkix.Name
|
|
NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time // Validity bounds.
|
|
KeyUsage KeyUsage
|
|
|
|
// Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions. When parsing certificates,
|
|
// this can be used to extract non-critical extensions that are not
|
|
// parsed by this package. When marshaling certificates, the Extensions
|
|
// field is ignored, see ExtraExtensions.
|
|
Extensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
|
|
// ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any
|
|
// marshaled certificates. Values override any extensions that would
|
|
// otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The ExtraExtensions
|
|
// field is not populated when parsing certificates, see Extensions.
|
|
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
|
|
// UnhandledCriticalExtensions contains a list of extension IDs that
|
|
// were not (fully) processed when parsing. Verify will fail if this
|
|
// slice is non-empty, unless verification is delegated to an OS
|
|
// library which understands all the critical extensions.
|
|
//
|
|
// Users can access these extensions using Extensions and can remove
|
|
// elements from this slice if they believe that they have been
|
|
// handled.
|
|
UnhandledCriticalExtensions []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
|
|
ExtKeyUsage []ExtKeyUsage // Sequence of extended key usages.
|
|
UnknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier // Encountered extended key usages unknown to this package.
|
|
|
|
// BasicConstraintsValid indicates whether IsCA, MaxPathLen,
|
|
// and MaxPathLenZero are valid.
|
|
BasicConstraintsValid bool
|
|
IsCA bool
|
|
|
|
// MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero indicate the presence and
|
|
// value of the BasicConstraints' "pathLenConstraint".
|
|
//
|
|
// When parsing a certificate, a positive non-zero MaxPathLen
|
|
// means that the field was specified, -1 means it was unset,
|
|
// and MaxPathLenZero being true mean that the field was
|
|
// explicitly set to zero. The case of MaxPathLen==0 with MaxPathLenZero==false
|
|
// should be treated equivalent to -1 (unset).
|
|
//
|
|
// When generating a certificate, an unset pathLenConstraint
|
|
// can be requested with either MaxPathLen == -1 or using the
|
|
// zero value for both MaxPathLen and MaxPathLenZero.
|
|
MaxPathLen int
|
|
// MaxPathLenZero indicates that BasicConstraintsValid==true
|
|
// and MaxPathLen==0 should be interpreted as an actual
|
|
// maximum path length of zero. Otherwise, that combination is
|
|
// interpreted as MaxPathLen not being set.
|
|
MaxPathLenZero bool
|
|
|
|
SubjectKeyId []byte
|
|
AuthorityKeyId []byte
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1 (Authority Information Access)
|
|
OCSPServer []string
|
|
IssuingCertificateURL []string
|
|
|
|
// Subject Alternate Name values. (Note that these values may not be valid
|
|
// if invalid values were contained within a parsed certificate. For
|
|
// example, an element of DNSNames may not be a valid DNS domain name.)
|
|
DNSNames []string
|
|
EmailAddresses []string
|
|
IPAddresses []net.IP
|
|
URIs []*url.URL
|
|
|
|
// Name constraints
|
|
PermittedDNSDomainsCritical bool // if true then the name constraints are marked critical.
|
|
PermittedDNSDomains []string
|
|
ExcludedDNSDomains []string
|
|
PermittedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
|
|
ExcludedIPRanges []*net.IPNet
|
|
PermittedEmailAddresses []string
|
|
ExcludedEmailAddresses []string
|
|
PermittedURIDomains []string
|
|
ExcludedURIDomains []string
|
|
|
|
// CRL Distribution Points
|
|
CRLDistributionPoints []string
|
|
|
|
PolicyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm results from attempting to perform an operation that
|
|
// involves algorithms that are not currently implemented.
|
|
var ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm = errors.New("x509: cannot verify signature: algorithm unimplemented")
|
|
|
|
// An InsecureAlgorithmError
|
|
type InsecureAlgorithmError SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
func (e InsecureAlgorithmError) Error() string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("x509: cannot verify signature: insecure algorithm %v", SignatureAlgorithm(e))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ConstraintViolationError results when a requested usage is not permitted by
|
|
// a certificate. For example: checking a signature when the public key isn't a
|
|
// certificate signing key.
|
|
type ConstraintViolationError struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (ConstraintViolationError) Error() string {
|
|
return "x509: invalid signature: parent certificate cannot sign this kind of certificate"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool {
|
|
if c == nil || other == nil {
|
|
return c == other
|
|
}
|
|
return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Certificate) hasSANExtension() bool {
|
|
return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, c.Extensions)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature
|
|
// from parent.
|
|
func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error {
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9:
|
|
// "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3
|
|
// certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not
|
|
// asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify
|
|
// certificate signatures."
|
|
if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid ||
|
|
parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA {
|
|
return ConstraintViolationError{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 {
|
|
return ConstraintViolationError{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
|
return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(agl): don't ignore the path length constraint.
|
|
|
|
return parent.CheckSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
|
|
// c's public key.
|
|
func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error {
|
|
return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Certificate) hasNameConstraints() bool {
|
|
return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, c.Extensions)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Certificate) getSANExtension() []byte {
|
|
for _, e := range c.Extensions {
|
|
if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
|
|
return e.Value
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(expectedPubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm, pubKey interface{}) error {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("x509: signature algorithm specifies an %s public key, but have public key of type %T", expectedPubKeyAlgo.String(), pubKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
|
|
// a crypto.PublicKey.
|
|
func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey) (err error) {
|
|
var hashType crypto.Hash
|
|
var pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
|
|
if details.algo == algo {
|
|
hashType = details.hash
|
|
pubKeyAlgo = details.pubKeyAlgo
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch hashType {
|
|
case crypto.Hash(0):
|
|
if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
|
|
return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
case crypto.MD5:
|
|
return InsecureAlgorithmError(algo)
|
|
default:
|
|
if !hashType.Available() {
|
|
return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
h := hashType.New()
|
|
h.Write(signed)
|
|
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch pub := publicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if pubKeyAlgo != RSA {
|
|
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
|
}
|
|
if algo.isRSAPSS() {
|
|
return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, hashType, signed, signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash})
|
|
} else {
|
|
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashType, signed, signature)
|
|
}
|
|
case *dsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if pubKeyAlgo != DSA {
|
|
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
|
}
|
|
dsaSig := new(dsaSignature)
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, dsaSig); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA signature")
|
|
}
|
|
if dsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || dsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: DSA signature contained zero or negative values")
|
|
}
|
|
// According to FIPS 186-3, section 4.6, the hash must be truncated if it is longer
|
|
// than the key length, but crypto/dsa doesn't do it automatically.
|
|
if maxHashLen := pub.Q.BitLen() / 8; maxHashLen < len(signed) {
|
|
signed = signed[:maxHashLen]
|
|
}
|
|
if !dsa.Verify(pub, signed, dsaSig.R, dsaSig.S) {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: DSA verification failure")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if pubKeyAlgo != ECDSA {
|
|
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
|
}
|
|
ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature)
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA signature")
|
|
}
|
|
if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
|
|
}
|
|
if !ecdsa.Verify(pub, signed, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
|
if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
|
|
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
|
}
|
|
if !ed25519.Verify(pub, signed, signature) {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: Ed25519 verification failure")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
return ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c.
|
|
func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error {
|
|
algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
|
return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type UnhandledCriticalExtension struct{}
|
|
|
|
func (h UnhandledCriticalExtension) Error() string {
|
|
return "x509: unhandled critical extension"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type basicConstraints struct {
|
|
IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"`
|
|
MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280 4.2.1.4
|
|
type policyInformation struct {
|
|
Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
// policyQualifiers omitted
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
nameTypeEmail = 1
|
|
nameTypeDNS = 2
|
|
nameTypeURI = 6
|
|
nameTypeIP = 7
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1
|
|
type authorityInfoAccess struct {
|
|
Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
Location asn1.RawValue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14
|
|
type distributionPoint struct {
|
|
DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
|
|
Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
|
|
CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type distributionPointName struct {
|
|
FullName []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
|
|
RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parsePublicKey(algo PublicKeyAlgorithm, keyData *publicKeyInfo) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
asn1Data := keyData.PublicKey.RightAlign()
|
|
switch algo {
|
|
case RSA:
|
|
// RSA public keys must have a NULL in the parameters.
|
|
// See RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA key missing NULL parameters")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p := new(pkcs1PublicKey)
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, p)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after RSA public key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.N.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA modulus is not a positive number")
|
|
}
|
|
if p.E <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: RSA public exponent is not a positive number")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub := &rsa.PublicKey{
|
|
E: p.E,
|
|
N: p.N,
|
|
}
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
case DSA:
|
|
var p *big.Int
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &p)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA public key")
|
|
}
|
|
paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes
|
|
params := new(dsaAlgorithmParameters)
|
|
rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, params)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after DSA parameters")
|
|
}
|
|
if p.Sign() <= 0 || params.P.Sign() <= 0 || params.Q.Sign() <= 0 || params.G.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: zero or negative DSA parameter")
|
|
}
|
|
pub := &dsa.PublicKey{
|
|
Parameters: dsa.Parameters{
|
|
P: params.P,
|
|
Q: params.Q,
|
|
G: params.G,
|
|
},
|
|
Y: p,
|
|
}
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
case ECDSA:
|
|
paramsData := keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes
|
|
namedCurveOID := new(asn1.ObjectIdentifier)
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(paramsData, namedCurveOID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse ECDSA parameters as named curve")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ECDSA parameters")
|
|
}
|
|
namedCurve := namedCurveFromOID(*namedCurveOID)
|
|
if namedCurve == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
|
|
}
|
|
x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(namedCurve, asn1Data)
|
|
if x == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal elliptic curve point")
|
|
}
|
|
pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
|
|
Curve: namedCurve,
|
|
X: x,
|
|
Y: y,
|
|
}
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
case Ed25519:
|
|
// RFC 8410, Section 3
|
|
// > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
|
|
if len(keyData.Algorithm.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: Ed25519 key encoded with illegal parameters")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(asn1Data) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: wrong Ed25519 public key size")
|
|
}
|
|
pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
|
|
copy(pub, asn1Data)
|
|
return ed25519.PublicKey(pub), nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func forEachSAN(extension []byte, callback func(tag int, data []byte) error) error {
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6
|
|
|
|
// SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
|
|
// otherName [0] OtherName,
|
|
// rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
|
|
// dNSName [2] IA5String,
|
|
// x400Address [3] ORAddress,
|
|
// directoryName [4] Name,
|
|
// ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
|
|
// uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
|
|
// iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
|
|
// registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
|
|
var seq asn1.RawValue
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(extension, &seq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 extension")
|
|
}
|
|
if !seq.IsCompound || seq.Tag != 16 || seq.Class != 0 {
|
|
return asn1.StructuralError{Msg: "bad SAN sequence"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rest = seq.Bytes
|
|
for len(rest) > 0 {
|
|
var v asn1.RawValue
|
|
rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(rest, &v)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := callback(v.Tag, v.Bytes); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseSANExtension(value []byte) (dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL, err error) {
|
|
err = forEachSAN(value, func(tag int, data []byte) error {
|
|
switch tag {
|
|
case nameTypeEmail:
|
|
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, string(data))
|
|
case nameTypeDNS:
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, string(data))
|
|
case nameTypeURI:
|
|
uri, err := url.Parse(string(data))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: %s", string(data), err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(uri.Host) > 0 {
|
|
if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(uri.Host); !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("x509: cannot parse URI %q: invalid domain", string(data))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
uris = append(uris, uri)
|
|
case nameTypeIP:
|
|
switch len(data) {
|
|
case net.IPv4len, net.IPv6len:
|
|
ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, data)
|
|
default:
|
|
return errors.New("x509: cannot parse IP address of length " + strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isValidIPMask reports whether mask consists of zero or more 1 bits, followed by zero bits.
|
|
func isValidIPMask(mask []byte) bool {
|
|
seenZero := false
|
|
|
|
for _, b := range mask {
|
|
if seenZero {
|
|
if b != 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch b {
|
|
case 0x00, 0x80, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0xfe:
|
|
seenZero = true
|
|
case 0xff:
|
|
default:
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseNameConstraintsExtension(out *Certificate, e pkix.Extension) (unhandled bool, err error) {
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.10
|
|
|
|
// NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
// permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
|
|
// excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
// base GeneralName,
|
|
// minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
|
|
// maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
|
|
//
|
|
// BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
|
|
|
|
outer := cryptobyte.String(e.Value)
|
|
var toplevel, permitted, excluded cryptobyte.String
|
|
var havePermitted, haveExcluded bool
|
|
if !outer.ReadASN1(&toplevel, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
!outer.Empty() ||
|
|
!toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&permitted, &havePermitted, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
|
|
!toplevel.ReadOptionalASN1(&excluded, &haveExcluded, cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed()) ||
|
|
!toplevel.Empty() {
|
|
return false, errors.New("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !havePermitted && !haveExcluded || len(permitted) == 0 && len(excluded) == 0 {
|
|
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
|
|
// “either the permittedSubtrees field
|
|
// or the excludedSubtrees MUST be
|
|
// present”
|
|
return false, errors.New("x509: empty name constraints extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getValues := func(subtrees cryptobyte.String) (dnsNames []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails, uriDomains []string, err error) {
|
|
for !subtrees.Empty() {
|
|
var seq, value cryptobyte.String
|
|
var tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag
|
|
if !subtrees.ReadASN1(&seq, cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
!seq.ReadAnyASN1(&value, &tag) {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: invalid NameConstraints extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
dnsTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific()
|
|
emailTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific()
|
|
ipTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific()
|
|
uriTag = cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
switch tag {
|
|
case dnsTag:
|
|
domain := string(value)
|
|
if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trimmedDomain := domain
|
|
if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
|
|
// constraints can have a leading
|
|
// period to exclude the domain
|
|
// itself, but that's not valid in a
|
|
// normal domain name.
|
|
trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse dnsName constraint %q", domain)
|
|
}
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, domain)
|
|
|
|
case ipTag:
|
|
l := len(value)
|
|
var ip, mask []byte
|
|
|
|
switch l {
|
|
case 8:
|
|
ip = value[:4]
|
|
mask = value[4:]
|
|
|
|
case 32:
|
|
ip = value[:16]
|
|
mask = value[16:]
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained value of length %d", l)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !isValidIPMask(mask) {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: IP constraint contained invalid mask %x", mask)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ips = append(ips, &net.IPNet{IP: net.IP(ip), Mask: net.IPMask(mask)})
|
|
|
|
case emailTag:
|
|
constraint := string(value)
|
|
if err := isIA5String(constraint); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the constraint contains an @ then
|
|
// it specifies an exact mailbox name.
|
|
if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
|
|
if _, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint); !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Otherwise it's a domain name.
|
|
domain := constraint
|
|
if len(domain) > 0 && domain[0] == '.' {
|
|
domain = domain[1:]
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain); !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse rfc822Name constraint %q", constraint)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
emails = append(emails, constraint)
|
|
|
|
case uriTag:
|
|
domain := string(value)
|
|
if err := isIA5String(domain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, errors.New("x509: invalid constraint value: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if net.ParseIP(domain) != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q: cannot be IP address", domain)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trimmedDomain := domain
|
|
if len(trimmedDomain) > 0 && trimmedDomain[0] == '.' {
|
|
// constraints can have a leading
|
|
// period to exclude the domain itself,
|
|
// but that's not valid in a normal
|
|
// domain name.
|
|
trimmedDomain = trimmedDomain[1:]
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := domainToReverseLabels(trimmedDomain); !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: failed to parse URI constraint %q", domain)
|
|
}
|
|
uriDomains = append(uriDomains, domain)
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
unhandled = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return dnsNames, ips, emails, uriDomains, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if out.PermittedDNSDomains, out.PermittedIPRanges, out.PermittedEmailAddresses, out.PermittedURIDomains, err = getValues(permitted); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if out.ExcludedDNSDomains, out.ExcludedIPRanges, out.ExcludedEmailAddresses, out.ExcludedURIDomains, err = getValues(excluded); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
out.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = e.Critical
|
|
|
|
return unhandled, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseCertificate(in *certificate) (*Certificate, error) {
|
|
out := new(Certificate)
|
|
out.Raw = in.Raw
|
|
out.RawTBSCertificate = in.TBSCertificate.Raw
|
|
out.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo = in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Raw
|
|
out.RawSubject = in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes
|
|
out.RawIssuer = in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes
|
|
|
|
out.Signature = in.SignatureValue.RightAlign()
|
|
out.SignatureAlgorithm =
|
|
getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.TBSCertificate.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
|
|
|
out.PublicKeyAlgorithm =
|
|
getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm)
|
|
var err error
|
|
out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCertificate.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out.Version = in.TBSCertificate.Version + 1
|
|
out.SerialNumber = in.TBSCertificate.SerialNumber
|
|
|
|
var issuer, subject pkix.RDNSequence
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 subject")
|
|
}
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCertificate.Issuer.FullBytes, &issuer); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 issuer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out.Issuer.FillFromRDNSequence(&issuer)
|
|
out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject)
|
|
|
|
out.NotBefore = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotBefore
|
|
out.NotAfter = in.TBSCertificate.Validity.NotAfter
|
|
|
|
for _, e := range in.TBSCertificate.Extensions {
|
|
out.Extensions = append(out.Extensions, e)
|
|
unhandled := false
|
|
|
|
if len(e.Id) == 4 && e.Id[0] == 2 && e.Id[1] == 5 && e.Id[2] == 29 {
|
|
switch e.Id[3] {
|
|
case 15:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.3
|
|
var usageBits asn1.BitString
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &usageBits); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 KeyUsage")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var usage int
|
|
for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
|
|
if usageBits.At(i) != 0 {
|
|
usage |= 1 << uint(i)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
out.KeyUsage = KeyUsage(usage)
|
|
|
|
case 19:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9
|
|
var constraints basicConstraints
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &constraints); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 BasicConstraints")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out.BasicConstraintsValid = true
|
|
out.IsCA = constraints.IsCA
|
|
out.MaxPathLen = constraints.MaxPathLen
|
|
out.MaxPathLenZero = out.MaxPathLen == 0
|
|
// TODO: map out.MaxPathLen to 0 if it has the -1 default value? (Issue 19285)
|
|
case 17:
|
|
out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(e.Value)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(out.DNSNames) == 0 && len(out.EmailAddresses) == 0 && len(out.IPAddresses) == 0 && len(out.URIs) == 0 {
|
|
// If we didn't parse anything then we do the critical check, below.
|
|
unhandled = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case 30:
|
|
unhandled, err = parseNameConstraintsExtension(out, e)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case 31:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13
|
|
|
|
// CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint
|
|
//
|
|
// DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
// distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
|
|
// reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
|
|
// cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }
|
|
//
|
|
// DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE {
|
|
// fullName [0] GeneralNames,
|
|
// nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName }
|
|
|
|
var cdp []distributionPoint
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &cdp); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 CRL distribution point")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, dp := range cdp {
|
|
// Per RFC 5280, 4.2.1.13, one of distributionPoint or cRLIssuer may be empty.
|
|
if len(dp.DistributionPoint.FullName) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, fullName := range dp.DistributionPoint.FullName {
|
|
if fullName.Tag == 6 {
|
|
out.CRLDistributionPoints = append(out.CRLDistributionPoints, string(fullName.Bytes))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case 35:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1
|
|
var a authKeyId
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &a); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority key-id")
|
|
}
|
|
out.AuthorityKeyId = a.Id
|
|
|
|
case 37:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
|
|
|
|
// id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 }
|
|
//
|
|
// ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
|
|
//
|
|
// KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
|
|
|
|
var keyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyUsage); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 ExtendedKeyUsage")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, u := range keyUsage {
|
|
if extKeyUsage, ok := extKeyUsageFromOID(u); ok {
|
|
out.ExtKeyUsage = append(out.ExtKeyUsage, extKeyUsage)
|
|
} else {
|
|
out.UnknownExtKeyUsage = append(out.UnknownExtKeyUsage, u)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case 14:
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.2
|
|
var keyid []byte
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &keyid); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 key-id")
|
|
}
|
|
out.SubjectKeyId = keyid
|
|
|
|
case 32:
|
|
// RFC 5280 4.2.1.4: Certificate Policies
|
|
var policies []policyInformation
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &policies); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 certificate policies")
|
|
}
|
|
out.PolicyIdentifiers = make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(policies))
|
|
for i, policy := range policies {
|
|
out.PolicyIdentifiers[i] = policy.Policy
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
// Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
|
|
unhandled = true
|
|
}
|
|
} else if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess) {
|
|
// RFC 5280 4.2.2.1: Authority Information Access
|
|
var aia []authorityInfoAccess
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(e.Value, &aia); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 authority information")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range aia {
|
|
// GeneralName: uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String
|
|
if v.Location.Tag != 6 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp) {
|
|
out.OCSPServer = append(out.OCSPServer, string(v.Location.Bytes))
|
|
} else if v.Method.Equal(oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers) {
|
|
out.IssuingCertificateURL = append(out.IssuingCertificateURL, string(v.Location.Bytes))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Unknown extensions are recorded if critical.
|
|
unhandled = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if e.Critical && unhandled {
|
|
out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions = append(out.UnhandledCriticalExtensions, e.Id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParseCertificate parses a single certificate from the given ASN.1 DER data.
|
|
func ParseCertificate(asn1Data []byte) (*Certificate, error) {
|
|
var cert certificate
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) > 0 {
|
|
return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parseCertificate(&cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParseCertificates parses one or more certificates from the given ASN.1 DER
|
|
// data. The certificates must be concatenated with no intermediate padding.
|
|
func ParseCertificates(asn1Data []byte) ([]*Certificate, error) {
|
|
var v []*certificate
|
|
|
|
for len(asn1Data) > 0 {
|
|
cert := new(certificate)
|
|
var err error
|
|
asn1Data, err = asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
v = append(v, cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret := make([]*Certificate, len(v))
|
|
for i, ci := range v {
|
|
cert, err := parseCertificate(ci)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
ret[i] = cert
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte {
|
|
b1 := in>>4 | in<<4
|
|
b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc
|
|
b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa
|
|
return b3
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the
|
|
// most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention
|
|
// matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else.
|
|
func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int {
|
|
bitLen := len(bitString) * 8
|
|
|
|
for i := range bitString {
|
|
b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1]
|
|
|
|
for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ {
|
|
if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 {
|
|
return bitLen
|
|
}
|
|
bitLen--
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14}
|
|
oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15}
|
|
oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37}
|
|
oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35}
|
|
oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
|
|
oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17}
|
|
oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32}
|
|
oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30}
|
|
oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31}
|
|
oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1}
|
|
oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1}
|
|
oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// oidNotInExtensions reports whether an extension with the given oid exists in
|
|
// extensions.
|
|
func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
|
|
for _, e := range extensions {
|
|
if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509
|
|
// SubjectAlternativeName extension.
|
|
func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) (derBytes []byte, err error) {
|
|
var rawValues []asn1.RawValue
|
|
for _, name := range dnsNames {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, email := range emailAddresses {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses {
|
|
// If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes.
|
|
ip := rawIP.To4()
|
|
if ip == nil {
|
|
ip = rawIP
|
|
}
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, uri := range uris {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uri.String())})
|
|
}
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(rawValues)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isIA5String(s string) error {
|
|
for _, r := range s {
|
|
if r >= utf8.RuneSelf {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("x509: %q cannot be encoded as an IA5String", s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func buildExtensions(template *Certificate, subjectIsEmpty bool, authorityKeyId []byte, subjectKeyId []byte) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) {
|
|
ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */)
|
|
n := 0
|
|
|
|
if template.KeyUsage != 0 &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionKeyUsage
|
|
ret[n].Critical = true
|
|
|
|
var a [2]byte
|
|
a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage))
|
|
a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(template.KeyUsage >> 8))
|
|
|
|
l := 1
|
|
if a[1] != 0 {
|
|
l = 2
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bitString := a[:l]
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage
|
|
|
|
var oids []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
for _, u := range template.ExtKeyUsage {
|
|
if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok {
|
|
oids = append(oids, oid)
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic("internal error")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oids = append(oids, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage...)
|
|
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
// Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path
|
|
// length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of
|
|
// -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired.
|
|
maxPathLen := template.MaxPathLen
|
|
if maxPathLen == 0 && !template.MaxPathLenZero {
|
|
maxPathLen = -1
|
|
}
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionBasicConstraints
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{template.IsCA, maxPathLen})
|
|
ret[n].Critical = true
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(subjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(subjectKeyId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(authorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{authorityKeyId})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess
|
|
var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess
|
|
for _, name := range template.OCSPServer {
|
|
aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
|
|
Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp,
|
|
Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL {
|
|
aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
|
|
Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers,
|
|
Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName
|
|
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.6:
|
|
// “If the subject field contains an empty sequence ... then
|
|
// subjectAltName extension ... is marked as critical”
|
|
ret[n].Critical = subjectIsEmpty
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0 &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCertificatePolicies
|
|
policies := make([]policyInformation, len(template.PolicyIdentifiers))
|
|
for i, policy := range template.PolicyIdentifiers {
|
|
policies[i].Policy = policy
|
|
}
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(policies)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedDNSDomains) > 0 ||
|
|
len(template.PermittedIPRanges) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedIPRanges) > 0 ||
|
|
len(template.PermittedEmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedEmailAddresses) > 0 ||
|
|
len(template.PermittedURIDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedURIDomains) > 0) &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints
|
|
ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
|
|
|
|
ipAndMask := func(ipNet *net.IPNet) []byte {
|
|
maskedIP := ipNet.IP.Mask(ipNet.Mask)
|
|
ipAndMask := make([]byte, 0, len(maskedIP)+len(ipNet.Mask))
|
|
ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, maskedIP...)
|
|
ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, ipNet.Mask...)
|
|
return ipAndMask
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
serialiseConstraints := func(dns []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails []string, uriDomains []string) (der []byte, err error) {
|
|
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
|
|
|
for _, name := range dns {
|
|
if err = isIA5String(name); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes([]byte(name))
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, ipNet := range ips {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes(ipAndMask(ipNet))
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, email := range emails {
|
|
if err = isIA5String(email); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes([]byte(email))
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, uriDomain := range uriDomains {
|
|
if err = isIA5String(uriDomain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes([]byte(uriDomain))
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return b.Bytes()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
permitted, err := serialiseConstraints(template.PermittedDNSDomains, template.PermittedIPRanges, template.PermittedEmailAddresses, template.PermittedURIDomains)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
excluded, err := serialiseConstraints(template.ExcludedDNSDomains, template.ExcludedIPRanges, template.ExcludedEmailAddresses, template.ExcludedURIDomains)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
if len(permitted) > 0 {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes(permitted)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(excluded) > 0 {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes(excluded)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = b.Bytes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints
|
|
|
|
var crlDp []distributionPoint
|
|
for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints {
|
|
dp := distributionPoint{
|
|
DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{
|
|
FullName: []asn1.RawValue{
|
|
{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
crlDp = append(crlDp, dp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number
|
|
// of elements in the make() at the top of the function and the list of
|
|
// template fields used in CreateCertificate documentation.
|
|
|
|
return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func subjectBytes(cert *Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 {
|
|
return cert.RawSubject, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// signingParamsForPublicKey returns the parameters to use for signing with
|
|
// priv. If requestedSigAlgo is not zero then it overrides the default
|
|
// signature algorithm.
|
|
func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc crypto.Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
|
|
var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
switch pub := pub.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
pubType = RSA
|
|
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA
|
|
sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue
|
|
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
pubType = ECDSA
|
|
|
|
switch pub.Curve {
|
|
case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256():
|
|
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256
|
|
case elliptic.P384():
|
|
hashFunc = crypto.SHA384
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384
|
|
case elliptic.P521():
|
|
hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512
|
|
default:
|
|
err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
|
pubType = Ed25519
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureEd25519
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
err = errors.New("x509: only RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 keys supported")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if requestedSigAlgo == 0 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found := false
|
|
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
|
|
if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo {
|
|
if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType {
|
|
err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash
|
|
if hashFunc == 0 && pubType != Ed25519 {
|
|
err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if requestedSigAlgo.isRSAPSS() {
|
|
sigAlgo.Parameters = rsaPSSParameters(hashFunc)
|
|
}
|
|
found = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// emptyASN1Subject is the ASN.1 DER encoding of an empty Subject, which is
|
|
// just an empty SEQUENCE.
|
|
var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCertificate creates a new X.509v3 certificate based on a template.
|
|
// The following members of template are used:
|
|
//
|
|
// - AuthorityKeyId
|
|
// - BasicConstraintsValid
|
|
// - CRLDistributionPoints
|
|
// - DNSNames
|
|
// - EmailAddresses
|
|
// - ExcludedDNSDomains
|
|
// - ExcludedEmailAddresses
|
|
// - ExcludedIPRanges
|
|
// - ExcludedURIDomains
|
|
// - ExtKeyUsage
|
|
// - ExtraExtensions
|
|
// - IPAddresses
|
|
// - IsCA
|
|
// - IssuingCertificateURL
|
|
// - KeyUsage
|
|
// - MaxPathLen
|
|
// - MaxPathLenZero
|
|
// - NotAfter
|
|
// - NotBefore
|
|
// - OCSPServer
|
|
// - PermittedDNSDomains
|
|
// - PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
|
|
// - PermittedEmailAddresses
|
|
// - PermittedIPRanges
|
|
// - PermittedURIDomains
|
|
// - PolicyIdentifiers
|
|
// - SerialNumber
|
|
// - SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
// - Subject
|
|
// - SubjectKeyId
|
|
// - URIs
|
|
// - UnknownExtKeyUsage
|
|
//
|
|
// The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the
|
|
// certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the
|
|
// signee and priv is the private key of the signer.
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding.
|
|
//
|
|
// The currently supported key types are *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey and
|
|
// ed25519.PublicKey. pub must be a supported key type, and priv must be a
|
|
// crypto.Signer with a supported public key.
|
|
//
|
|
// The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any,
|
|
// unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from
|
|
// template will be used.
|
|
//
|
|
// If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId
|
|
// will be generated from the hash of the public key.
|
|
func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *Certificate, pub, priv interface{}) (cert []byte, err error) {
|
|
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if template.SerialNumber == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: no SerialNumber given")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !template.IsCA && (template.MaxPathLen != 0 || template.MaxPathLenZero) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: only CAs are allowed to specify MaxPathLen")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(pub)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(parent)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(template)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authorityKeyId := template.AuthorityKeyId
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(parent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
|
|
authorityKeyId = parent.SubjectKeyId
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes}
|
|
pki := publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey}
|
|
subjectKeyId := template.SubjectKeyId
|
|
if len(subjectKeyId) == 0 && template.IsCA {
|
|
// SubjectKeyId generated using method 1 in RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.2
|
|
b, err := asn1.Marshal(pki)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
h := sha1.Sum(b)
|
|
subjectKeyId = h[:]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extensions, err := buildExtensions(template, bytes.Equal(asn1Subject, emptyASN1Subject), authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := tbsCertificate{
|
|
Version: 2,
|
|
SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber,
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer},
|
|
Validity: validity{template.NotBefore.UTC(), template.NotAfter.UTC()},
|
|
Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
|
|
PublicKey: pki,
|
|
Extensions: extensions,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
c.Raw = tbsCertContents
|
|
|
|
signed := tbsCertContents
|
|
if hashFunc != 0 {
|
|
h := hashFunc.New()
|
|
h.Write(signed)
|
|
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
|
|
if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() {
|
|
signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
|
|
SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
|
|
Hash: hashFunc,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var signature []byte
|
|
signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, signerOpts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(certificate{
|
|
nil,
|
|
c,
|
|
signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pemCRLPrefix is the magic string that indicates that we have a PEM encoded
|
|
// CRL.
|
|
var pemCRLPrefix = []byte("-----BEGIN X509 CRL")
|
|
|
|
// pemType is the type of a PEM encoded CRL.
|
|
var pemType = "X509 CRL"
|
|
|
|
// ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM
|
|
// encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function
|
|
// will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading
|
|
// garbage.
|
|
func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
|
|
if bytes.HasPrefix(crlBytes, pemCRLPrefix) {
|
|
block, _ := pem.Decode(crlBytes)
|
|
if block != nil && block.Type == pemType {
|
|
crlBytes = block.Bytes
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ParseDERCRL(crlBytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes.
|
|
func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
|
|
certList := new(pkix.CertificateList)
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, certList); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after CRL")
|
|
}
|
|
return certList, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that
|
|
// contains the given list of revoked certificates.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL.
|
|
// To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead.
|
|
func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv interface{}, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) {
|
|
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), 0)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
|
|
revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts))
|
|
for i, rc := range revokedCerts {
|
|
rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
|
|
revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{
|
|
Version: 1,
|
|
Signature: signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(),
|
|
ThisUpdate: now.UTC(),
|
|
NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(),
|
|
RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Authority Key Id
|
|
if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
|
|
var aki pkix.Extension
|
|
aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
|
|
aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signed := tbsCertListContents
|
|
if hashFunc != 0 {
|
|
h := hashFunc.New()
|
|
h.Write(signed)
|
|
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var signature []byte
|
|
signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{
|
|
TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request.
|
|
type CertificateRequest struct {
|
|
Raw []byte // Complete ASN.1 DER content (CSR, signature algorithm and signature).
|
|
RawTBSCertificateRequest []byte // Certificate request info part of raw ASN.1 DER content.
|
|
RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo []byte // DER encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
|
|
RawSubject []byte // DER encoded Subject.
|
|
|
|
Version int
|
|
Signature []byte
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
PublicKeyAlgorithm PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
|
PublicKey interface{}
|
|
|
|
Subject pkix.Name
|
|
|
|
// Attributes contains the CSR attributes that can parse as
|
|
// pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET.
|
|
//
|
|
// Deprecated: Use Extensions and ExtraExtensions instead for parsing and
|
|
// generating the requestedExtensions attribute.
|
|
Attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
|
|
|
// Extensions contains all requested extensions, in raw form. When parsing
|
|
// CSRs, this can be used to extract extensions that are not parsed by this
|
|
// package.
|
|
Extensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
|
|
// ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any CSR
|
|
// marshaled by CreateCertificateRequest. Values override any extensions
|
|
// that would otherwise be produced based on the other fields but are
|
|
// overridden by any extensions specified in Attributes.
|
|
//
|
|
// The ExtraExtensions field is not populated by ParseCertificateRequest,
|
|
// see Extensions instead.
|
|
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
|
|
// Subject Alternate Name values.
|
|
DNSNames []string
|
|
EmailAddresses []string
|
|
IPAddresses []net.IP
|
|
URIs []*url.URL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate
|
|
// signature requests (see RFC 2986):
|
|
|
|
type tbsCertificateRequest struct {
|
|
Raw asn1.RawContent
|
|
Version int
|
|
Subject asn1.RawValue
|
|
PublicKey publicKeyInfo
|
|
RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type certificateRequest struct {
|
|
Raw asn1.RawContent
|
|
TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
|
SignatureValue asn1.BitString
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS#9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested
|
|
// extensions in a CSR.
|
|
var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14}
|
|
|
|
// newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template
|
|
// CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes.
|
|
func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) {
|
|
var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue
|
|
b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes")
|
|
}
|
|
return rawAttributes, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes into AttributeTypeAndValueSETs.
|
|
func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET {
|
|
var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
|
for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
|
|
var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr)
|
|
// Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
|
// (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName).
|
|
if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 {
|
|
attributes = append(attributes, attr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return attributes
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any
|
|
// requested extensions.
|
|
func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) {
|
|
// pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from RFC 2986, Section 4.1.
|
|
type pkcs10Attribute struct {
|
|
Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var ret []pkix.Extension
|
|
for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
|
|
var attr pkcs10Attribute
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 {
|
|
// Ignore attributes that don't parse.
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var extensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
ret = append(ret, extensions...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a
|
|
// template. The following members of template are used:
|
|
//
|
|
// - SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
// - Subject
|
|
// - DNSNames
|
|
// - EmailAddresses
|
|
// - IPAddresses
|
|
// - URIs
|
|
// - ExtraExtensions
|
|
// - Attributes (deprecated)
|
|
//
|
|
// priv is the private key to sign the CSR with, and the corresponding public
|
|
// key will be included in the CSR. It must implement crypto.Signer and its
|
|
// Public() method must return a *rsa.PublicKey or a *ecdsa.PublicKey or a
|
|
// ed25519.PublicKey. (A *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey or
|
|
// ed25519.PrivateKey satisfies this.)
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding.
|
|
func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *CertificateRequest, priv interface{}) (csr []byte, err error) {
|
|
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
|
|
var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
|
hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var publicKeyBytes []byte
|
|
var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
|
publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(key.Public())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var extensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
|
|
if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
|
|
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
|
sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extensions = append(extensions, pkix.Extension{
|
|
Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName,
|
|
Value: sanBytes,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extensions = append(extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...)
|
|
|
|
// Make a copy of template.Attributes because we may alter it below.
|
|
attributes := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET, 0, len(template.Attributes))
|
|
for _, attr := range template.Attributes {
|
|
values := make([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, len(attr.Value))
|
|
copy(values, attr.Value)
|
|
attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{
|
|
Type: attr.Type,
|
|
Value: values,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extensionsAppended := false
|
|
if len(extensions) > 0 {
|
|
// Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible.
|
|
for _, atvSet := range attributes {
|
|
if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we
|
|
// found specified via template.Attributes.
|
|
specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool)
|
|
|
|
for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value {
|
|
for _, atv := range atvs {
|
|
specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newValue := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(atvSet.Value[0])+len(extensions))
|
|
newValue = append(newValue, atvSet.Value[0]...)
|
|
|
|
for _, e := range extensions {
|
|
if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] {
|
|
// Attributes already contained a value for
|
|
// this extension and it takes priority.
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newValue = append(newValue, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{
|
|
// There is no place for the critical
|
|
// flag in an AttributeTypeAndValue.
|
|
Type: e.Id,
|
|
Value: e.Value,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
atvSet.Value[0] = newValue
|
|
extensionsAppended = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If not included in attributes, add a new attribute for the
|
|
// extensions.
|
|
if len(extensions) > 0 && !extensionsAppended {
|
|
attr := struct {
|
|
Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
Value [][]pkix.Extension `asn1:"set"`
|
|
}{
|
|
Type: oidExtensionRequest,
|
|
Value: [][]pkix.Extension{extensions},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b, err := asn1.Marshal(attr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to serialise extensions attribute: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var rawValue asn1.RawValue
|
|
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawValue); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawAttributes = append(rawAttributes, rawValue)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asn1Subject := template.RawSubject
|
|
if len(asn1Subject) == 0 {
|
|
asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{
|
|
Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986
|
|
Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
|
|
PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{
|
|
Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm,
|
|
PublicKey: asn1.BitString{
|
|
Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
|
|
BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
RawAttributes: rawAttributes,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents
|
|
|
|
signed := tbsCSRContents
|
|
if hashFunc != 0 {
|
|
h := hashFunc.New()
|
|
h.Write(signed)
|
|
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var signature []byte
|
|
signature, err = key.Sign(rand, signed, hashFunc)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{
|
|
TBSCSR: tbsCSR,
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo,
|
|
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{
|
|
Bytes: signature,
|
|
BitLength: len(signature) * 8,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the
|
|
// given ASN.1 DER data.
|
|
func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
|
|
var csr certificateRequest
|
|
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parseCertificateRequest(&csr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
|
|
out := &CertificateRequest{
|
|
Raw: in.Raw,
|
|
RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw,
|
|
RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw,
|
|
RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes,
|
|
|
|
Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(),
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm),
|
|
|
|
PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm),
|
|
|
|
Version: in.TBSCSR.Version,
|
|
Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(out.PublicKeyAlgorithm, &in.TBSCSR.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var subject pkix.RDNSequence
|
|
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject)
|
|
|
|
if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, extension := range out.Extensions {
|
|
if extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
|
|
out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid.
|
|
func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error {
|
|
return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevocationList contains the fields used to create an X.509 v2 Certificate
|
|
// Revocation list with CreateRevocationList.
|
|
type RevocationList struct {
|
|
// SignatureAlgorithm is used to determine the signature algorithm to be
|
|
// used when signing the CRL. If 0 the default algorithm for the signing
|
|
// key will be used.
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithm
|
|
|
|
// RevokedCertificates is used to populate the revokedCertificates
|
|
// sequence in the CRL, it may be empty. RevokedCertificates may be nil,
|
|
// in which case an empty CRL will be created.
|
|
RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate
|
|
|
|
// Number is used to populate the X.509 v2 cRLNumber extension in the CRL,
|
|
// which should be a monotonically increasing sequence number for a given
|
|
// CRL scope and CRL issuer.
|
|
Number *big.Int
|
|
// ThisUpdate is used to populate the thisUpdate field in the CRL, which
|
|
// indicates the issuance date of the CRL.
|
|
ThisUpdate time.Time
|
|
// NextUpdate is used to populate the nextUpdate field in the CRL, which
|
|
// indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. NextUpdate
|
|
// must be greater than ThisUpdate.
|
|
NextUpdate time.Time
|
|
// ExtraExtensions contains any additional extensions to add directly to
|
|
// the CRL.
|
|
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List,
|
|
// according to RFC 5280, based on template.
|
|
//
|
|
// The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with
|
|
// the public key in the issuer certificate.
|
|
//
|
|
// The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in KeyUsage in
|
|
// order to use it as a CRL issuer.
|
|
//
|
|
// The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier
|
|
// extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have
|
|
// SubjectKeyId set.
|
|
func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if template == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
if issuer == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier")
|
|
}
|
|
if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate")
|
|
}
|
|
if template.Number == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
|
|
revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates))
|
|
for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates {
|
|
rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
|
|
revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{
|
|
Version: 1, // v2
|
|
Signature: signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
Issuer: issuer.Subject.ToRDNSequence(),
|
|
ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(),
|
|
NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(),
|
|
Extensions: []pkix.Extension{
|
|
{
|
|
Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId,
|
|
Value: aki,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber,
|
|
Value: crlNum,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if len(revokedCertsUTC) > 0 {
|
|
tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCertsUTC
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 {
|
|
tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
input := tbsCertListContents
|
|
if hashFunc != 0 {
|
|
h := hashFunc.New()
|
|
h.Write(tbsCertListContents)
|
|
input = h.Sum(nil)
|
|
}
|
|
var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
|
|
if template.SignatureAlgorithm.isRSAPSS() {
|
|
signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
|
|
SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
|
|
Hash: hashFunc,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signature, err := priv.Sign(rand, input, signerOpts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{
|
|
TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
|
|
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|