// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause // Package web provides the Tailscale client for web. package web import ( "context" "crypto/rand" "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" "io" "log" "net/http" "net/netip" "os" "path/filepath" "slices" "strings" "sync" "time" "github.com/gorilla/csrf" "tailscale.com/client/tailscale" "tailscale.com/client/tailscale/apitype" "tailscale.com/envknob" "tailscale.com/ipn" "tailscale.com/ipn/ipnstate" "tailscale.com/licenses" "tailscale.com/net/netutil" "tailscale.com/net/tsaddr" "tailscale.com/tailcfg" "tailscale.com/types/logger" "tailscale.com/util/httpm" "tailscale.com/version/distro" ) // ListenPort is the static port used for the web client when run inside tailscaled. // (5252 are the numbers above the letters "TSTS" on a qwerty keyboard.) const ListenPort = 5252 // Server is the backend server for a Tailscale web client. type Server struct { mode ServerMode logf logger.Logf lc *tailscale.LocalClient timeNow func() time.Time // devMode indicates that the server run with frontend assets // served by a Vite dev server, allowing for local development // on the web client frontend. devMode bool cgiMode bool pathPrefix string apiHandler http.Handler // serves api endpoints; csrf-protected assetsHandler http.Handler // serves frontend assets assetsCleanup func() // called from Server.Shutdown // browserSessions is an in-memory cache of browser sessions for the // full management web client, which is only accessible over Tailscale. // // Users obtain a valid browser session by connecting to the web client // over Tailscale and verifying their identity by authenticating on the // control server. // // browserSessions get reset on every Server restart. // // The map provides a lookup of the session by cookie value // (browserSession.ID => browserSession). browserSessions sync.Map } // ServerMode specifies the mode of a running web.Server. type ServerMode string const ( // LoginServerMode serves a readonly login client for logging a // node into a tailnet, and viewing a readonly interface of the // node's current Tailscale settings. // // In this mode, API calls are authenticated via platform auth. LoginServerMode ServerMode = "login" // ManageServerMode serves a management client for editing tailscale // settings of a node. // // This mode restricts the app to only being assessible over Tailscale, // and API calls are authenticated via browser sessions associated with // the source's Tailscale identity. If the source browser does not have // a valid session, a readonly version of the app is displayed. ManageServerMode ServerMode = "manage" // LegacyServerMode serves the legacy web client, visible to users // prior to release of tailscale/corp#14335. LegacyServerMode ServerMode = "legacy" ) var ( exitNodeRouteV4 = netip.MustParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0") exitNodeRouteV6 = netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0") ) // ServerOpts contains options for constructing a new Server. type ServerOpts struct { // Mode specifies the mode of web client being constructed. Mode ServerMode // CGIMode indicates if the server is running as a CGI script. CGIMode bool // PathPrefix is the URL prefix added to requests by CGI or reverse proxy. PathPrefix string // LocalClient is the tailscale.LocalClient to use for this web server. // If nil, a new one will be created. LocalClient *tailscale.LocalClient // TimeNow optionally provides a time function. // time.Now is used as default. TimeNow func() time.Time // Logf optionally provides a logger function. // log.Printf is used as default. Logf logger.Logf } // NewServer constructs a new Tailscale web client server. // If err is empty, s is always non-nil. // ctx is only required to live the duration of the NewServer call, // and not the lifespan of the web server. func NewServer(opts ServerOpts) (s *Server, err error) { switch opts.Mode { case LoginServerMode, ManageServerMode, LegacyServerMode: // valid types case "": return nil, fmt.Errorf("must specify a Mode") default: return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid Mode provided") } if opts.LocalClient == nil { opts.LocalClient = &tailscale.LocalClient{} } s = &Server{ mode: opts.Mode, logf: opts.Logf, devMode: envknob.Bool("TS_DEBUG_WEB_CLIENT_DEV"), lc: opts.LocalClient, cgiMode: opts.CGIMode, pathPrefix: opts.PathPrefix, timeNow: opts.TimeNow, } if s.timeNow == nil { s.timeNow = time.Now } if s.logf == nil { s.logf = log.Printf } s.assetsHandler, s.assetsCleanup = assetsHandler(s.devMode) var metric string // clientmetric to report on startup // Create handler for "/api" requests with CSRF protection. // We don't require secure cookies, since the web client is regularly used // on network appliances that are served on local non-https URLs. // The client is secured by limiting the interface it listens on, // or by authenticating requests before they reach the web client. csrfProtect := csrf.Protect(s.csrfKey(), csrf.Secure(false)) if s.mode == LoginServerMode { s.apiHandler = csrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(s.serveLoginAPI)) metric = "web_login_client_initialization" } else { s.apiHandler = csrfProtect(http.HandlerFunc(s.serveAPI)) metric = "web_client_initialization" } // Don't block startup on reporting metric. // Report in separate go routine with 5 second timeout. go func() { ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) defer cancel() s.lc.IncrementCounter(ctx, metric, 1) }() return s, nil } func (s *Server) Shutdown() { s.logf("web.Server: shutting down") if s.assetsCleanup != nil { s.assetsCleanup() } } // ServeHTTP processes all requests for the Tailscale web client. func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { handler := s.serve // if path prefix is defined, strip it from requests. if s.pathPrefix != "" { handler = enforcePrefix(s.pathPrefix, handler) } handler(w, r) } func (s *Server) serve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if s.mode == ManageServerMode { // In manage mode, requests must be sent directly to the bare Tailscale IP address. // If a request comes in on any other hostname, redirect. if s.requireTailscaleIP(w, r) { return // user was redirected } // serve HTTP 204 on /ok requests as connectivity check if r.Method == httpm.GET && r.URL.Path == "/ok" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) return } if !s.devMode { w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") // TODO: use CSP nonce or hash to eliminate need for unsafe-inline w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src * data:") w.Header().Set("Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", "same-origin") } } if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") { switch { case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth" && r.Method == httpm.GET: s.serveAPIAuth(w, r) // serve auth status return case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth/session/new" && r.Method == httpm.GET: s.serveAPIAuthSessionNew(w, r) // create new session return case r.URL.Path == "/api/auth/session/wait" && r.Method == httpm.GET: s.serveAPIAuthSessionWait(w, r) // wait for session to be authorized return } if ok := s.authorizeRequest(w, r); !ok { http.Error(w, "not authorized", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } // Pass API requests through to the API handler. s.apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } if !s.devMode { s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_page_load", 1) } s.assetsHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r) } // requireTailscaleIP redirects an incoming request if the HTTP request was not made to a bare Tailscale IP address. // The request will be redirected to the Tailscale IP, port 5252, with the original request path. // This allows any custom hostname to be used to access the device, but protects against DNS rebinding attacks. // Returns true if the request has been fully handled, either be returning a redirect or an HTTP error. func (s *Server) requireTailscaleIP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (handled bool) { const ( ipv4ServiceHost = tsaddr.TailscaleServiceIPString ipv6ServiceHost = "[" + tsaddr.TailscaleServiceIPv6String + "]" ) // allow requests on quad-100 (or ipv6 equivalent) if r.Host == ipv4ServiceHost || r.Host == ipv6ServiceHost { return false } st, err := s.lc.StatusWithoutPeers(r.Context()) if err != nil { s.logf("error getting status: %v", err) http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError) return true } var ipv4 string // store the first IPv4 address we see for redirect later for _, ip := range st.Self.TailscaleIPs { if ip.Is4() { if r.Host == fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", ip, ListenPort) { return false } ipv4 = ip.String() } if ip.Is6() && r.Host == fmt.Sprintf("[%s]:%d", ip, ListenPort) { return false } } newURL := *r.URL newURL.Host = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", ipv4, ListenPort) http.Redirect(w, r, newURL.String(), http.StatusMovedPermanently) return true } // authorizeRequest reports whether the request from the web client // is authorized to be completed. // It reports true if the request is authorized, and false otherwise. // authorizeRequest manages writing out any relevant authorization // errors to the ResponseWriter itself. func (s *Server) authorizeRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (ok bool) { if s.mode == ManageServerMode { // client using tailscale auth _, err := s.lc.WhoIs(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr) switch { case err != nil: // All requests must be made over tailscale. http.Error(w, "must access over tailscale", http.StatusUnauthorized) return false case r.URL.Path == "/api/data" && r.Method == httpm.GET: // Readonly endpoint allowed without browser session. return true case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/"): // All other /api/ endpoints require a valid browser session. // // TODO(sonia): s.getSession calls whois again, // should try and use the above call instead of running another // localapi request. session, _, err := s.getSession(r) if err != nil || !session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()) { http.Error(w, "no valid session", http.StatusUnauthorized) return false } return true default: // No additional auth on non-api (assets, index.html, etc). return true } } // Client using system-specific auth. switch distro.Get() { case distro.Synology: resp, _ := authorizeSynology(r) return resp.OK case distro.QNAP: resp, _ := authorizeQNAP(r) return resp.OK default: return true // no additional auth for this distro } } // serveLoginAPI serves requests for the web login client. // It should only be called by Server.ServeHTTP, via Server.apiHandler, // which protects the handler using gorilla csrf. func (s *Server) serveLoginAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r)) if r.URL.Path != "/api/data" { // only endpoint allowed for login client http.Error(w, "invalid endpoint", http.StatusNotFound) return } switch r.Method { case httpm.GET: // TODO(soniaappasamy): we may want a minimal node data response here s.serveGetNodeData(w, r) return } http.Error(w, "invalid endpoint", http.StatusNotFound) return } type authType string var ( synoAuth authType = "synology" // user needs a SynoToken for subsequent API calls tailscaleAuth authType = "tailscale" // user needs to complete Tailscale check mode ) type authResponse struct { OK bool `json:"ok"` // true when user has valid auth session AuthNeeded authType `json:"authNeeded,omitempty"` // filled when user needs to complete a specific type of auth } // serverAPIAuth handles requests to the /api/auth endpoint // and returns an authResponse indicating the current auth state and any steps the user needs to take. func (s *Server) serveAPIAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { var resp authResponse session, _, err := s.getSession(r) switch { case err != nil && errors.Is(err, errNotUsingTailscale): // not using tailscale, so perform platform auth switch distro.Get() { case distro.Synology: resp, err = authorizeSynology(r) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } case distro.QNAP: resp, err = authorizeQNAP(r) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } default: resp.OK = true // no additional auth for this distro } case err != nil && (errors.Is(err, errNotOwner) || errors.Is(err, errNotUsingTailscale) || errors.Is(err, errTaggedLocalSource) || errors.Is(err, errTaggedRemoteSource)): // These cases are all restricted to the readonly view. // No auth action to take. resp = authResponse{OK: false} case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSession): // Any other error. http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return case session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()): resp = authResponse{OK: true} default: resp = authResponse{OK: false, AuthNeeded: tailscaleAuth} } writeJSON(w, resp) } type newSessionAuthResponse struct { AuthURL string `json:"authUrl,omitempty"` } // serveAPIAuthSessionNew handles requests to the /api/auth/session/new endpoint. func (s *Server) serveAPIAuthSessionNew(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { session, whois, err := s.getSession(r) if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSession) { // Source associated with request not allowed to create // a session for this web client. http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } if session == nil { // Create a new session. // If one already existed, we return that authURL rather than creating a new one. session, err = s.newSession(r.Context(), whois) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } // Set the cookie on browser. http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{ Name: sessionCookieName, Value: session.ID, Raw: session.ID, Path: "/", Expires: session.expires(), }) } writeJSON(w, newSessionAuthResponse{AuthURL: session.AuthURL}) } // serveAPIAuthSessionWait handles requests to the /api/auth/session/wait endpoint. func (s *Server) serveAPIAuthSessionWait(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { session, _, err := s.getSession(r) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } if session.isAuthorized(s.timeNow()) { return // already authorized } if err := s.awaitUserAuth(r.Context(), session); err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) return } } // serveAPI serves requests for the web client api. // It should only be called by Server.ServeHTTP, via Server.apiHandler, // which protects the handler using gorilla csrf. func (s *Server) serveAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.Header().Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf.Token(r)) path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api") switch { case path == "/data": switch r.Method { case httpm.GET: s.serveGetNodeData(w, r) case httpm.POST: s.servePostNodeUpdate(w, r) default: http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) } return case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/local/"): s.proxyRequestToLocalAPI(w, r) return } http.Error(w, "invalid endpoint", http.StatusNotFound) } type nodeData struct { ID tailcfg.StableNodeID Status string DeviceName string TailnetName string // TLS cert name IP string // IPv4 IPv6 string OS string IPNVersion string Profile tailcfg.UserProfile IsTagged bool Tags []string KeyExpiry string // time.RFC3339 KeyExpired bool TUNMode bool IsSynology bool DSMVersion int // 6 or 7, if IsSynology=true IsUnraid bool UnraidToken string URLPrefix string // if set, the URL prefix the client is served behind AdvertiseExitNode bool AdvertiseRoutes string LicensesURL string DebugMode string // empty when not running in any debug mode } func (s *Server) serveGetNodeData(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { st, err := s.lc.Status(r.Context()) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } prefs, err := s.lc.GetPrefs(r.Context()) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } var debugMode string if s.mode == ManageServerMode { debugMode = "full" } else if s.mode == LoginServerMode { debugMode = "login" } data := &nodeData{ ID: st.Self.ID, Status: st.BackendState, DeviceName: strings.Split(st.Self.DNSName, ".")[0], TailnetName: st.CurrentTailnet.MagicDNSSuffix, OS: st.Self.OS, IPNVersion: strings.Split(st.Version, "-")[0], Profile: st.User[st.Self.UserID], IsTagged: st.Self.IsTagged(), KeyExpired: st.Self.Expired, TUNMode: st.TUN, IsSynology: distro.Get() == distro.Synology || envknob.Bool("TS_FAKE_SYNOLOGY"), DSMVersion: distro.DSMVersion(), IsUnraid: distro.Get() == distro.Unraid, UnraidToken: os.Getenv("UNRAID_CSRF_TOKEN"), URLPrefix: strings.TrimSuffix(s.pathPrefix, "/"), LicensesURL: licenses.LicensesURL(), DebugMode: debugMode, // TODO(sonia,will): just pass back s.mode directly? } for _, ip := range st.TailscaleIPs { if ip.Is4() { data.IP = ip.String() } else if ip.Is6() { data.IPv6 = ip.String() } if data.IP != "" && data.IPv6 != "" { break } } if st.Self.Tags != nil { data.Tags = st.Self.Tags.AsSlice() } if st.Self.KeyExpiry != nil { data.KeyExpiry = st.Self.KeyExpiry.Format(time.RFC3339) } for _, r := range prefs.AdvertiseRoutes { if r == exitNodeRouteV4 || r == exitNodeRouteV6 { data.AdvertiseExitNode = true } else { if data.AdvertiseRoutes != "" { data.AdvertiseRoutes += "," } data.AdvertiseRoutes += r.String() } } writeJSON(w, *data) } type nodeUpdate struct { AdvertiseRoutes string AdvertiseExitNode bool Reauthenticate bool ForceLogout bool } func (s *Server) servePostNodeUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { defer r.Body.Close() st, err := s.lc.Status(r.Context()) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } var postData nodeUpdate type mi map[string]any if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&postData); err != nil { w.WriteHeader(400) json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()}) return } prefs, err := s.lc.GetPrefs(r.Context()) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } isCurrentlyExitNode := slices.Contains(prefs.AdvertiseRoutes, exitNodeRouteV4) || slices.Contains(prefs.AdvertiseRoutes, exitNodeRouteV6) if postData.AdvertiseExitNode != isCurrentlyExitNode { if postData.AdvertiseExitNode { s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_advertise_exitnode_enable", 1) } else { s.lc.IncrementCounter(r.Context(), "web_client_advertise_exitnode_disable", 1) } } routes, err := netutil.CalcAdvertiseRoutes(postData.AdvertiseRoutes, postData.AdvertiseExitNode) if err != nil { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()}) return } mp := &ipn.MaskedPrefs{ AdvertiseRoutesSet: true, WantRunningSet: true, } mp.Prefs.WantRunning = true mp.Prefs.AdvertiseRoutes = routes s.logf("Doing edit: %v", mp.Pretty()) if _, err := s.lc.EditPrefs(r.Context(), mp); err != nil { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()}) return } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") var reauth, logout bool if postData.Reauthenticate { reauth = true } if postData.ForceLogout { logout = true } s.logf("tailscaleUp(reauth=%v, logout=%v) ...", reauth, logout) url, err := s.tailscaleUp(r.Context(), st, postData) s.logf("tailscaleUp = (URL %v, %v)", url != "", err) if err != nil { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"error": err.Error()}) return } if url != "" { json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(mi{"url": url}) } else { io.WriteString(w, "{}") } } func (s *Server) tailscaleUp(ctx context.Context, st *ipnstate.Status, postData nodeUpdate) (authURL string, retErr error) { if postData.ForceLogout { if err := s.lc.Logout(ctx); err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("Logout error: %w", err) } return "", nil } origAuthURL := st.AuthURL isRunning := st.BackendState == ipn.Running.String() forceReauth := postData.Reauthenticate if !forceReauth { if origAuthURL != "" { return origAuthURL, nil } if isRunning { return "", nil } } // printAuthURL reports whether we should print out the // provided auth URL from an IPN notify. printAuthURL := func(url string) bool { return url != origAuthURL } watchCtx, cancelWatch := context.WithCancel(ctx) defer cancelWatch() watcher, err := s.lc.WatchIPNBus(watchCtx, 0) if err != nil { return "", err } defer watcher.Close() go func() { if !isRunning { s.lc.Start(ctx, ipn.Options{}) } if forceReauth { s.lc.StartLoginInteractive(ctx) } }() for { n, err := watcher.Next() if err != nil { return "", err } if n.ErrMessage != nil { msg := *n.ErrMessage return "", fmt.Errorf("backend error: %v", msg) } if url := n.BrowseToURL; url != nil && printAuthURL(*url) { return *url, nil } } } // proxyRequestToLocalAPI proxies the web API request to the localapi. // // The web API request path is expected to exactly match a localapi path, // with prefix /api/local/ rather than /localapi/. // // If the localapi path is not included in localapiAllowlist, // the request is rejected. func (s *Server) proxyRequestToLocalAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/local") if r.URL.Path == path { // missing prefix http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest) return } if !slices.Contains(localapiAllowlist, path) { http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("%s not allowed from localapi proxy", path), http.StatusForbidden) return } localAPIURL := "http://" + apitype.LocalAPIHost + "/localapi" + path req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(r.Context(), r.Method, localAPIURL, r.Body) if err != nil { http.Error(w, "failed to construct request", http.StatusInternalServerError) return } // Make request to tailscaled localapi. resp, err := s.lc.DoLocalRequest(req) if err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), resp.StatusCode) return } defer resp.Body.Close() // Send response back to web frontend. w.Header().Set("Content-Type", resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")) w.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode) if _, err := io.Copy(w, resp.Body); err != nil { http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) } } // localapiAllowlist is an allowlist of localapi endpoints the // web client is allowed to proxy to the client's localapi. // // Rather than exposing all localapi endpoints over the proxy, // this limits to just the ones actually used from the web // client frontend. // // TODO(sonia,will): Shouldn't expand this beyond the existing // localapi endpoints until the larger web client auth story // is worked out (tailscale/corp#14335). var localapiAllowlist = []string{ "/v0/logout", } // csrfKey returns a key that can be used for CSRF protection. // If an error occurs during key creation, the error is logged and the active process terminated. // If the server is running in CGI mode, the key is cached to disk and reused between requests. // If an error occurs during key storage, the error is logged and the active process terminated. func (s *Server) csrfKey() []byte { csrfFile := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "tailscale-web-csrf.key") // if running in CGI mode, try to read from disk, but ignore errors if s.cgiMode { key, _ := os.ReadFile(csrfFile) if len(key) == 32 { return key } } // create a new key key := make([]byte, 32) if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil { log.Fatalf("error generating CSRF key: %v", err) } // if running in CGI mode, try to write the newly created key to disk, and exit if it fails. if s.cgiMode { if err := os.WriteFile(csrfFile, key, 0600); err != nil { log.Fatalf("unable to store CSRF key: %v", err) } } return key } // enforcePrefix returns a HandlerFunc that enforces a given path prefix is used in requests, // then strips it before invoking h. // Unlike http.StripPrefix, it does not return a 404 if the prefix is not present. // Instead, it returns a redirect to the prefix path. func enforcePrefix(prefix string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc { if prefix == "" { return h } // ensure that prefix always has both a leading and trailing slash so // that relative links for JS and CSS assets work correctly. if !strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "/") { prefix = "/" + prefix } if !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, "/") { prefix += "/" } return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, prefix) { http.Redirect(w, r, prefix, http.StatusFound) return } prefix = strings.TrimSuffix(prefix, "/") http.StripPrefix(prefix, h).ServeHTTP(w, r) } } func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, data any) { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data); err != nil { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain") http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) return } }