// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause package tka import ( "bytes" "crypto/ed25519" "errors" "fmt" "strings" "github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2" "github.com/hdevalence/ed25519consensus" "golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s" "tailscale.com/types/key" "tailscale.com/types/tkatype" ) // SigKind describes valid NodeKeySignature types. type SigKind uint8 const ( SigInvalid SigKind = iota // SigDirect describes a signature over a specific node key, signed // by a key in the tailnet key authority referenced by the specified keyID. SigDirect // SigRotation describes a signature over a specific node key, signed // by the rotation key authorized by a nested NodeKeySignature structure. // // While it is possible to nest rotations multiple times up to the CBOR // nesting limit, it is intended that nodes simply regenerate their outer // SigRotation signature and sign it again with their rotation key. That // way, SigRotation nesting should only be 2 deep in the common case. SigRotation // SigCredential describes a signature over a specific public key, signed // by a key in the tailnet key authority referenced by the specified keyID. // In effect, SigCredential delegates the ability to make a signature to // a different public/private key pair. // // It is intended that a different public/private key pair be generated // for each different SigCredential that is created. Implementors must // take care that the private side is only known to the entity that needs // to generate the wrapping SigRotation signature, and it is immediately // discarded after use. // // SigCredential is expected to be nested in a SigRotation signature. SigCredential ) func (s SigKind) String() string { switch s { case SigInvalid: return "invalid" case SigDirect: return "direct" case SigRotation: return "rotation" case SigCredential: return "credential" default: return fmt.Sprintf("Sig?<%d>", int(s)) } } // NodeKeySignature encapsulates a signature that authorizes a specific // node key, based on verification from keys in the tailnet key authority. type NodeKeySignature struct { // SigKind identifies the variety of signature. SigKind SigKind `cbor:"1,keyasint"` // Pubkey identifies the key.NodePublic which is being authorized. // SigCredential signatures do not use this field. Pubkey []byte `cbor:"2,keyasint,omitempty"` // KeyID identifies which key in the tailnet key authority should // be used to verify this signature. Only set for SigDirect and // SigCredential signature kinds. KeyID []byte `cbor:"3,keyasint,omitempty"` // Signature is the packed (R, S) ed25519 signature over all other // fields of the structure. Signature []byte `cbor:"4,keyasint,omitempty"` // Nested describes a NodeKeySignature which authorizes the node-key // used as Pubkey. Only used for SigRotation signatures. Nested *NodeKeySignature `cbor:"5,keyasint,omitempty"` // WrappingPubkey specifies the ed25519 public key which must be used // to sign a Signature which embeds this one. // // For SigRotation signatures multiple levels deep, intermediate // signatures may omit this value, in which case the parent WrappingPubkey // is used. // // SigCredential signatures use this field to specify the public key // they are certifying, following the usual semanticsfor WrappingPubkey. WrappingPubkey []byte `cbor:"6,keyasint,omitempty"` } // String returns a human-readable representation of the NodeKeySignature, // making it easy to see nested signatures. func (s NodeKeySignature) String() string { var b strings.Builder var addToBuf func(NodeKeySignature, int) addToBuf = func(sig NodeKeySignature, depth int) { indent := strings.Repeat(" ", depth) b.WriteString(indent + "SigKind: " + sig.SigKind.String() + "\n") if len(sig.Pubkey) > 0 { var pubKey string var np key.NodePublic if err := np.UnmarshalBinary(sig.Pubkey); err != nil { pubKey = fmt.Sprintf("", err) } else { pubKey = np.ShortString() } b.WriteString(indent + "Pubkey: " + pubKey + "\n") } if len(sig.KeyID) > 0 { keyID := key.NLPublicFromEd25519Unsafe(sig.KeyID).CLIString() b.WriteString(indent + "KeyID: " + keyID + "\n") } if len(sig.WrappingPubkey) > 0 { pubKey := key.NLPublicFromEd25519Unsafe(sig.WrappingPubkey).CLIString() b.WriteString(indent + "WrappingPubkey: " + pubKey + "\n") } if sig.Nested != nil { b.WriteString(indent + "Nested:\n") addToBuf(*sig.Nested, depth+1) } } addToBuf(s, 0) return strings.TrimSpace(b.String()) } // UnverifiedWrappingPublic returns the public key which must sign a // signature which embeds this one, if any. // // See docs on NodeKeySignature.WrappingPubkey & SigRotation for documentation // about wrapping public keys. // // SAFETY: The caller MUST verify the signature using // Authority.NodeKeyAuthorized if treating this as authentic information. func (s NodeKeySignature) UnverifiedWrappingPublic() (pub ed25519.PublicKey, ok bool) { return s.wrappingPublic() } // wrappingPublic returns the public key which must sign a signature which // embeds this one, if any. func (s NodeKeySignature) wrappingPublic() (pub ed25519.PublicKey, ok bool) { if len(s.WrappingPubkey) > 0 { return ed25519.PublicKey(s.WrappingPubkey), true } switch s.SigKind { case SigRotation: if s.Nested == nil { return nil, false } return s.Nested.wrappingPublic() default: return nil, false } } // UnverifiedAuthorizingKeyID returns the KeyID of the key which authorizes // this signature. // // SAFETY: The caller MUST verify the signature using // Authority.NodeKeyAuthorized if treating this as authentic information. func (s NodeKeySignature) UnverifiedAuthorizingKeyID() (tkatype.KeyID, error) { return s.authorizingKeyID() } // authorizingKeyID returns the KeyID of the key trusted by network-lock which authorizes // this signature. func (s NodeKeySignature) authorizingKeyID() (tkatype.KeyID, error) { switch s.SigKind { case SigDirect, SigCredential: if len(s.KeyID) == 0 { return tkatype.KeyID{}, errors.New("invalid signature: no keyID present") } return tkatype.KeyID(s.KeyID), nil case SigRotation: if s.Nested == nil { return tkatype.KeyID{}, errors.New("invalid signature: rotation signature missing nested signature") } return s.Nested.authorizingKeyID() default: return tkatype.KeyID{}, fmt.Errorf("unhandled signature type: %v", s.SigKind) } } // SigHash returns the cryptographic digest which a signature // is over. // // This is a hash of the serialized structure, sans the signature. // Without this exclusion, the hash used for the signature // would be circularly dependent on the signature. func (s NodeKeySignature) SigHash() [blake2s.Size]byte { dupe := s dupe.Signature = nil return blake2s.Sum256(dupe.Serialize()) } // Serialize returns the given NKS in a serialized format. // // We would implement encoding.BinaryMarshaler, except that would // unfortunately get called by the cbor marshaller resulting in infinite // recursion. func (s *NodeKeySignature) Serialize() tkatype.MarshaledSignature { out := bytes.NewBuffer(make([]byte, 0, 128)) // 64byte sig + 32byte keyID + 32byte headroom encoder, err := cbor.CTAP2EncOptions().EncMode() if err != nil { // Deterministic validation of encoding options, should // never fail. panic(err) } if err := encoder.NewEncoder(out).Encode(s); err != nil { // Writing to a bytes.Buffer should never fail. panic(err) } return out.Bytes() } // Unserialize decodes bytes representing a marshaled NKS. // // We would implement encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler, except that would // unfortunately get called by the cbor unmarshaller resulting in infinite // recursion. func (s *NodeKeySignature) Unserialize(data []byte) error { dec, _ := cborDecOpts.DecMode() return dec.Unmarshal(data, s) } // verifySignature checks that the NodeKeySignature is authentic & certified // by the given verificationKey. Additionally, SigDirect and SigRotation // signatures are checked to ensure they authorize the given nodeKey. func (s *NodeKeySignature) verifySignature(nodeKey key.NodePublic, verificationKey Key) error { if s.SigKind != SigCredential { nodeBytes, err := nodeKey.MarshalBinary() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("marshalling pubkey: %v", err) } if !bytes.Equal(nodeBytes, s.Pubkey) { return errors.New("signature does not authorize nodeKey") } } sigHash := s.SigHash() switch s.SigKind { case SigRotation: if s.Nested == nil { return errors.New("nested signatures must nest a signature") } // Verify the signature using the nested rotation key. verifyPub, ok := s.Nested.wrappingPublic() if !ok { return errors.New("missing rotation key") } if len(verifyPub) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { return fmt.Errorf("bad rotation key length: %d", len(verifyPub)) } if !ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(verifyPub[:]), sigHash[:], s.Signature) { return errors.New("invalid signature") } // Recurse to verify the signature on the nested structure. var nestedPub key.NodePublic // SigCredential signatures certify an indirection key rather than a node // key, so theres no need to check the node key. if s.Nested.SigKind != SigCredential { if err := nestedPub.UnmarshalBinary(s.Nested.Pubkey); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("nested pubkey: %v", err) } } if err := s.Nested.verifySignature(nestedPub, verificationKey); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("nested: %v", err) } return nil case SigDirect, SigCredential: if s.Nested != nil { return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature: signatures of type %v cannot nest another signature", s.SigKind) } switch verificationKey.Kind { case Key25519: if len(verificationKey.Public) != ed25519.PublicKeySize { return fmt.Errorf("ed25519 key has wrong length: %d", len(verificationKey.Public)) } if ed25519consensus.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(verificationKey.Public), sigHash[:], s.Signature) { return nil } return errors.New("invalid signature") default: return fmt.Errorf("unhandled key type: %v", verificationKey.Kind) } default: return fmt.Errorf("unhandled signature type: %v", s.SigKind) } }