// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause //go:build linux || (darwin && !ios) || freebsd || openbsd // Package tailssh is an SSH server integrated into Tailscale. package tailssh import ( "bytes" "context" "crypto/rand" "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" "io" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httptrace" "net/netip" "net/url" "os" "os/exec" "os/user" "path/filepath" "runtime" "strconv" "strings" "sync" "sync/atomic" "time" gossh "github.com/tailscale/golang-x-crypto/ssh" "tailscale.com/envknob" "tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal" "tailscale.com/logtail/backoff" "tailscale.com/net/tsaddr" "tailscale.com/net/tsdial" "tailscale.com/tailcfg" "tailscale.com/tempfork/gliderlabs/ssh" "tailscale.com/types/logger" "tailscale.com/types/netmap" "tailscale.com/util/clientmetric" "tailscale.com/util/mak" "tailscale.com/util/multierr" "tailscale.com/version/distro" ) var ( sshVerboseLogging = envknob.RegisterBool("TS_DEBUG_SSH_VLOG") ) const ( // forcePasswordSuffix is the suffix at the end of a username that forces // Tailscale SSH into password authentication mode to work around buggy SSH // clients that get confused by successful replies to auth type "none". forcePasswordSuffix = "+password" ) // ipnLocalBackend is the subset of ipnlocal.LocalBackend that we use. // It is used for testing. type ipnLocalBackend interface { GetSSH_HostKeys() ([]gossh.Signer, error) ShouldRunSSH() bool NetMap() *netmap.NetworkMap WhoIs(ipp netip.AddrPort) (n *tailcfg.Node, u tailcfg.UserProfile, ok bool) DoNoiseRequest(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) Dialer() *tsdial.Dialer } type server struct { lb ipnLocalBackend logf logger.Logf tailscaledPath string pubKeyHTTPClient *http.Client // or nil for http.DefaultClient timeNow func() time.Time // or nil for time.Now sessionWaitGroup sync.WaitGroup // mu protects the following mu sync.Mutex activeConns map[*conn]bool // set; value is always true fetchPublicKeysCache map[string]pubKeyCacheEntry // by https URL shutdownCalled bool } func (srv *server) now() time.Time { if srv != nil && srv.timeNow != nil { return srv.timeNow() } return time.Now() } func init() { ipnlocal.RegisterNewSSHServer(func(logf logger.Logf, lb *ipnlocal.LocalBackend) (ipnlocal.SSHServer, error) { tsd, err := os.Executable() if err != nil { return nil, err } srv := &server{ lb: lb, logf: logf, tailscaledPath: tsd, } return srv, nil }) } // attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown ensures that srv is not shutdown before // attaching the session to the conn. This ensures that once Shutdown is called, // new sessions are not allowed and existing ones are cleaned up. // It reports whether ss was attached to the conn. func (srv *server) attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss *sshSession) bool { srv.mu.Lock() defer srv.mu.Unlock() if srv.shutdownCalled { // Do not start any new sessions. return false } ss.conn.attachSession(ss) return true } func (srv *server) trackActiveConn(c *conn, add bool) { srv.mu.Lock() defer srv.mu.Unlock() if add { mak.Set(&srv.activeConns, c, true) return } delete(srv.activeConns, c) } // HandleSSHConn handles a Tailscale SSH connection from c. // This is the entry point for all SSH connections. // When this returns, the connection is closed. func (srv *server) HandleSSHConn(nc net.Conn) error { metricIncomingConnections.Add(1) c, err := srv.newConn() if err != nil { return err } srv.trackActiveConn(c, true) // add defer srv.trackActiveConn(c, false) // remove c.HandleConn(nc) // Return nil to signal to netstack's interception that it doesn't need to // log. If ss.HandleConn had problems, it can log itself (ideally on an // sshSession.logf). return nil } // Shutdown terminates all active sessions. func (srv *server) Shutdown() { srv.mu.Lock() srv.shutdownCalled = true for c := range srv.activeConns { c.Close() } srv.mu.Unlock() srv.sessionWaitGroup.Wait() } // OnPolicyChange terminates any active sessions that no longer match // the SSH access policy. func (srv *server) OnPolicyChange() { srv.mu.Lock() defer srv.mu.Unlock() for c := range srv.activeConns { if c.info == nil { // c.info is nil when the connection hasn't been authenticated yet. // In that case, the connection will be terminated when it is. continue } go c.checkStillValid() } } // conn represents a single SSH connection and its associated // ssh.Server. // // During the lifecycle of a connection, the following are called in order: // Setup and discover server info // - ServerConfigCallback // // Do the user auth // - NoClientAuthHandler // - PublicKeyHandler (only if NoClientAuthHandler returns errPubKeyRequired) // // Once auth is done, the conn can be multiplexed with multiple sessions and // channels concurrently. At which point any of the following can be called // in any order. // - c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth // - c.mayForwardLocalPortTo followed by ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler type conn struct { *ssh.Server srv *server insecureSkipTailscaleAuth bool // used by tests. // idH is the RFC4253 sec8 hash H. It is used to identify the connection, // and is shared among all sessions. It should not be shared outside // process. It is confusingly referred to as SessionID by the gliderlabs/ssh // library. idH string connID string // ID that's shared with control // anyPasswordIsOkay is whether the client is authorized but has requested // password-based auth to work around their buggy SSH client. When set, we // accept any password in the PasswordHandler. anyPasswordIsOkay bool // set by NoClientAuthCallback action0 *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth; first matching action currentAction *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth, updated by resolveNextAction finalAction *tailcfg.SSHAction // set by doPolicyAuth or resolveNextAction finalActionErr error // set by doPolicyAuth or resolveNextAction info *sshConnInfo // set by setInfo localUser *user.User // set by doPolicyAuth userGroupIDs []string // set by doPolicyAuth pubKey gossh.PublicKey // set by doPolicyAuth // mu protects the following fields. // // srv.mu should be acquired prior to mu. // It is safe to just acquire mu, but unsafe to // acquire mu and then srv.mu. mu sync.Mutex // protects the following sessions []*sshSession } func (c *conn) logf(format string, args ...any) { format = fmt.Sprintf("%v: %v", c.connID, format) c.srv.logf(format, args...) } // isAuthorized walks through the action chain and returns nil if the connection // is authorized. If the connection is not authorized, it returns // gossh.ErrDenied. If the action chain resolution fails, it returns the // resolution error. func (c *conn) isAuthorized(ctx ssh.Context) error { action := c.currentAction for { if action.Accept { if c.pubKey != nil { metricPublicKeyAccepts.Add(1) } return nil } if action.Reject || action.HoldAndDelegate == "" { return gossh.ErrDenied } var err error action, err = c.resolveNextAction(ctx) if err != nil { return err } if action.Message != "" { if err := ctx.SendAuthBanner(action.Message); err != nil { return err } } } } // errPubKeyRequired is returned by NoClientAuthCallback to make the client // resort to public-key auth; not user visible. var errPubKeyRequired = errors.New("ssh publickey required") // NoClientAuthCallback implements gossh.NoClientAuthCallback and is called by // the ssh.Server when the client first connects with the "none" // authentication method. // // It is responsible for continuing policy evaluation from BannerCallback (or // starting it afresh). It returns an error if the policy evaluation fails, or // if the decision is "reject" // // It either returns nil (accept) or errPubKeyRequired or gossh.ErrDenied // (reject). The errors may be wrapped. func (c *conn) NoClientAuthCallback(ctx ssh.Context) error { if c.insecureSkipTailscaleAuth { return nil } if err := c.doPolicyAuth(ctx, nil /* no pub key */); err != nil { return err } if err := c.isAuthorized(ctx); err != nil { return err } // Let users specify a username ending in +password to force password auth. // This exists for buggy SSH clients that get confused by success from // "none" auth. if strings.HasSuffix(ctx.User(), forcePasswordSuffix) { c.anyPasswordIsOkay = true return errors.New("any password please") // not shown to users } return nil } func (c *conn) nextAuthMethodCallback(cm gossh.ConnMetadata, prevErrors []error) (nextMethod []string) { switch { case c.anyPasswordIsOkay: nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "password") case len(prevErrors) > 0 && prevErrors[len(prevErrors)-1] == errPubKeyRequired: nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "publickey") } // The fake "tailscale" method is always appended to next so OpenSSH renders // that in parens as the final failure. (It also shows up in "ssh -v", etc) nextMethod = append(nextMethod, "tailscale") return } // fakePasswordHandler is our implementation of the PasswordHandler hook that // checks whether the user's password is correct. But we don't actually use // passwords. This exists only for when the user's username ends in "+password" // to signal that their SSH client is buggy and gets confused by auth type // "none" succeeding and they want our SSH server to require a dummy password // prompt instead. We then accept any password since we've already authenticated // & authorized them. func (c *conn) fakePasswordHandler(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool { return c.anyPasswordIsOkay } // PublicKeyHandler implements ssh.PublicKeyHandler is called by the // ssh.Server when the client presents a public key. func (c *conn) PublicKeyHandler(ctx ssh.Context, pubKey ssh.PublicKey) error { if err := c.doPolicyAuth(ctx, pubKey); err != nil { // TODO(maisem/bradfitz): surface the error here. c.logf("rejecting SSH public key %s: %v", bytes.TrimSpace(gossh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pubKey)), err) return err } if err := c.isAuthorized(ctx); err != nil { return err } c.logf("accepting SSH public key %s", bytes.TrimSpace(gossh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pubKey))) return nil } // doPolicyAuth verifies that conn can proceed with the specified (optional) // pubKey. It returns nil if the matching policy action is Accept or // HoldAndDelegate. If pubKey is nil, there was no policy match but there is a // policy that might match a public key it returns errPubKeyRequired. Otherwise, // it returns gossh.ErrDenied. func (c *conn) doPolicyAuth(ctx ssh.Context, pubKey ssh.PublicKey) error { if err := c.setInfo(ctx); err != nil { c.logf("failed to get conninfo: %v", err) return gossh.ErrDenied } a, localUser, err := c.evaluatePolicy(pubKey) if err != nil { if pubKey == nil && c.havePubKeyPolicy() { return errPubKeyRequired } return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", gossh.ErrDenied, err) } c.action0 = a c.currentAction = a c.pubKey = pubKey if a.Message != "" { if err := ctx.SendAuthBanner(a.Message); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("SendBanner: %w", err) } } if a.Accept || a.HoldAndDelegate != "" { if a.Accept { c.finalAction = a } if runtime.GOOS == "linux" && distro.Get() == distro.Gokrazy { // Gokrazy is a single-user appliance with ~no userspace. // There aren't users to look up (no /etc/passwd, etc) // so rather than fail below, just hardcode root. // TODO(bradfitz): fix os/user upstream instead? c.userGroupIDs = []string{"0"} c.localUser = &user.User{Uid: "0", Gid: "0", Username: "root"} return nil } lu, err := user.Lookup(localUser) if err != nil { c.logf("failed to look up %v: %v", localUser, err) ctx.SendAuthBanner(fmt.Sprintf("failed to look up %v\r\n", localUser)) return err } gids, err := lu.GroupIds() if err != nil { c.logf("failed to look up local user's group IDs: %v", err) return err } c.userGroupIDs = gids c.localUser = lu return nil } if a.Reject { c.finalAction = a return gossh.ErrDenied } // Shouldn't get here, but: return gossh.ErrDenied } // ServerConfig implements ssh.ServerConfigCallback. func (c *conn) ServerConfig(ctx ssh.Context) *gossh.ServerConfig { return &gossh.ServerConfig{ NoClientAuth: true, // required for the NoClientAuthCallback to run NextAuthMethodCallback: c.nextAuthMethodCallback, } } func (srv *server) newConn() (*conn, error) { srv.mu.Lock() if srv.shutdownCalled { srv.mu.Unlock() // Stop accepting new connections. // Connections in the auth phase are handled in handleConnPostSSHAuth. // Existing sessions are terminated by Shutdown. return nil, gossh.ErrDenied } srv.mu.Unlock() c := &conn{srv: srv} now := srv.now() c.connID = fmt.Sprintf("ssh-conn-%s-%02x", now.UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5)) c.Server = &ssh.Server{ Version: "Tailscale", ServerConfigCallback: c.ServerConfig, NoClientAuthHandler: c.NoClientAuthCallback, PublicKeyHandler: c.PublicKeyHandler, PasswordHandler: c.fakePasswordHandler, Handler: c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth, LocalPortForwardingCallback: c.mayForwardLocalPortTo, SubsystemHandlers: map[string]ssh.SubsystemHandler{ "sftp": c.handleSessionPostSSHAuth, }, // Note: the direct-tcpip channel handler and LocalPortForwardingCallback // only adds support for forwarding ports from the local machine. // TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add remote port forwarding support. ChannelHandlers: map[string]ssh.ChannelHandler{ "direct-tcpip": ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler, }, RequestHandlers: map[string]ssh.RequestHandler{}, } ss := c.Server for k, v := range ssh.DefaultRequestHandlers { ss.RequestHandlers[k] = v } for k, v := range ssh.DefaultChannelHandlers { ss.ChannelHandlers[k] = v } for k, v := range ssh.DefaultSubsystemHandlers { ss.SubsystemHandlers[k] = v } keys, err := srv.lb.GetSSH_HostKeys() if err != nil { return nil, err } for _, signer := range keys { ss.AddHostKey(signer) } return c, nil } // mayForwardLocalPortTo reports whether the ctx should be allowed to port forward // to the specified host and port. // TODO(bradfitz/maisem): should we have more checks on host/port? func (c *conn) mayForwardLocalPortTo(ctx ssh.Context, destinationHost string, destinationPort uint32) bool { if c.finalAction != nil && c.finalAction.AllowLocalPortForwarding { metricLocalPortForward.Add(1) return true } return false } // havePubKeyPolicy reports whether any policy rule may provide access by means // of a ssh.PublicKey. func (c *conn) havePubKeyPolicy() bool { if c.info == nil { panic("havePubKeyPolicy called before setInfo") } // Is there any rule that looks like it'd require a public key for this // sshUser? pol, ok := c.sshPolicy() if !ok { return false } for _, r := range pol.Rules { if c.ruleExpired(r) { continue } if mapLocalUser(r.SSHUsers, c.info.sshUser) == "" { continue } for _, p := range r.Principals { if len(p.PubKeys) > 0 && c.principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p) { return true } } } return false } // sshPolicy returns the SSHPolicy for current node. // If there is no SSHPolicy in the netmap, it returns a debugPolicy // if one is defined. func (c *conn) sshPolicy() (_ *tailcfg.SSHPolicy, ok bool) { lb := c.srv.lb if !lb.ShouldRunSSH() { return nil, false } nm := lb.NetMap() if nm == nil { return nil, false } if pol := nm.SSHPolicy; pol != nil && !envknob.SSHIgnoreTailnetPolicy() { return pol, true } debugPolicyFile := envknob.SSHPolicyFile() if debugPolicyFile != "" { c.logf("reading debug SSH policy file: %v", debugPolicyFile) f, err := os.ReadFile(debugPolicyFile) if err != nil { c.logf("error reading debug SSH policy file: %v", err) return nil, false } p := new(tailcfg.SSHPolicy) if err := json.Unmarshal(f, p); err != nil { c.logf("invalid JSON in %v: %v", debugPolicyFile, err) return nil, false } return p, true } return nil, false } func toIPPort(a net.Addr) (ipp netip.AddrPort) { ta, ok := a.(*net.TCPAddr) if !ok { return } tanetaddr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ta.IP) if !ok { return } return netip.AddrPortFrom(tanetaddr.Unmap(), uint16(ta.Port)) } // connInfo returns a populated sshConnInfo from the provided arguments, // validating only that they represent a known Tailscale identity. func (c *conn) setInfo(ctx ssh.Context) error { if c.info != nil { return nil } ci := &sshConnInfo{ sshUser: strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.User(), forcePasswordSuffix), src: toIPPort(ctx.RemoteAddr()), dst: toIPPort(ctx.LocalAddr()), } if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.dst.Addr()) { return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale local address %v", ci.dst) } if !tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(ci.src.Addr()) { return fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting non-Tailscale remote address %v", ci.src) } node, uprof, ok := c.srv.lb.WhoIs(ci.src) if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("unknown Tailscale identity from src %v", ci.src) } ci.node = node ci.uprof = uprof c.idH = ctx.SessionID() c.info = ci c.logf("handling conn: %v", ci.String()) return nil } // evaluatePolicy returns the SSHAction and localUser after evaluating // the SSHPolicy for this conn. The pubKey may be nil for "none" auth. func (c *conn) evaluatePolicy(pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (_ *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, _ error) { pol, ok := c.sshPolicy() if !ok { return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting connection; no SSH policy") } a, localUser, ok := c.evalSSHPolicy(pol, pubKey) if !ok { return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("tailssh: rejecting connection; no matching policy") } return a, localUser, nil } // pubKeyCacheEntry is the cache value for an HTTPS URL of public keys (like // "https://github.com/foo.keys") type pubKeyCacheEntry struct { lines []string etag string // if sent by server at time.Time } const ( pubKeyCacheDuration = time.Minute // how long to cache non-empty public keys pubKeyCacheEmptyDuration = 15 * time.Second // how long to cache empty responses ) func (srv *server) fetchPublicKeysURLCached(url string) (ce pubKeyCacheEntry, ok bool) { srv.mu.Lock() defer srv.mu.Unlock() // Mostly don't care about the size of this cache. Clean rarely. if m := srv.fetchPublicKeysCache; len(m) > 50 { tooOld := srv.now().Add(pubKeyCacheDuration * 10) for k, ce := range m { if ce.at.Before(tooOld) { delete(m, k) } } } ce, ok = srv.fetchPublicKeysCache[url] if !ok { return ce, false } maxAge := pubKeyCacheDuration if len(ce.lines) == 0 { maxAge = pubKeyCacheEmptyDuration } return ce, srv.now().Sub(ce.at) < maxAge } func (srv *server) pubKeyClient() *http.Client { if srv.pubKeyHTTPClient != nil { return srv.pubKeyHTTPClient } return http.DefaultClient } // fetchPublicKeysURL fetches the public keys from a URL. The strings are in the // the typical public key "type base64-string [comment]" format seen at e.g. // https://github.com/USER.keys func (srv *server) fetchPublicKeysURL(url string) ([]string, error) { if !strings.HasPrefix(url, "https://") { return nil, errors.New("invalid URL scheme") } ce, ok := srv.fetchPublicKeysURLCached(url) if ok { return ce.lines, nil } ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) defer cancel() req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } if ce.etag != "" { req.Header.Add("If-None-Match", ce.etag) } res, err := srv.pubKeyClient().Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() var lines []string var etag string switch res.StatusCode { default: err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected status %v", res.Status) srv.logf("fetching public keys from %s: %v", url, err) case http.StatusNotModified: lines = ce.lines etag = ce.etag case http.StatusOK: var all []byte all, err = io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, 4<<10)) if s := strings.TrimSpace(string(all)); s != "" { lines = strings.Split(s, "\n") } etag = res.Header.Get("Etag") } srv.mu.Lock() defer srv.mu.Unlock() mak.Set(&srv.fetchPublicKeysCache, url, pubKeyCacheEntry{ at: srv.now(), lines: lines, etag: etag, }) return lines, err } // handleSessionPostSSHAuth runs an SSH session after the SSH-level authentication, // but not necessarily before all the Tailscale-level extra verification has // completed. It also handles SFTP requests. func (c *conn) handleSessionPostSSHAuth(s ssh.Session) { // Do this check after auth, but before starting the session. switch s.Subsystem() { case "sftp", "": metricSFTP.Add(1) default: fmt.Fprintf(s.Stderr(), "Unsupported subsystem %q\r\n", s.Subsystem()) s.Exit(1) return } ss := c.newSSHSession(s) ss.logf("handling new SSH connection from %v (%v) to ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.info.src.Addr(), c.localUser.Username) ss.logf("access granted to %v as ssh-user %q", c.info.uprof.LoginName, c.localUser.Username) ss.run() } // resolveNextAction starts at c.currentAction and makes it way through the // action chain one step at a time. An action without a HoldAndDelegate is // considered the final action. Once a final action is reached, this function // will keep returning that action. It updates c.currentAction to the next // action in the chain. When the final action is reached, it also sets // c.finalAction to the final action. func (c *conn) resolveNextAction(sctx ssh.Context) (action *tailcfg.SSHAction, err error) { if c.finalAction != nil || c.finalActionErr != nil { return c.finalAction, c.finalActionErr } defer func() { if action != nil { c.currentAction = action if action.Accept || action.Reject { c.finalAction = action } } if err != nil { c.finalActionErr = err } }() ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(sctx) defer cancel() // Loop processing/fetching Actions until one reaches a // terminal state (Accept, Reject, or invalid Action), or // until fetchSSHAction times out due to the context being // done (client disconnect) or its 30 minute timeout passes. // (Which is a long time for somebody to see login // instructions and go to a URL to do something.) action = c.currentAction if action.Accept || action.Reject { if action.Reject { metricTerminalReject.Add(1) } else { metricTerminalAccept.Add(1) } return action, nil } url := action.HoldAndDelegate if url == "" { metricTerminalMalformed.Add(1) return nil, errors.New("reached Action that lacked Accept, Reject, and HoldAndDelegate") } metricHolds.Add(1) url = c.expandDelegateURLLocked(url) nextAction, err := c.fetchSSHAction(ctx, url) if err != nil { metricTerminalFetchError.Add(1) return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetching SSHAction from %s: %w", url, err) } return nextAction, nil } func (c *conn) expandDelegateURLLocked(actionURL string) string { nm := c.srv.lb.NetMap() ci := c.info lu := c.localUser var dstNodeID string if nm != nil { dstNodeID = fmt.Sprint(int64(nm.SelfNode.ID)) } return strings.NewReplacer( "$SRC_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.src.Addr().String()), "$SRC_NODE_ID", fmt.Sprint(int64(ci.node.ID)), "$DST_NODE_IP", url.QueryEscape(ci.dst.Addr().String()), "$DST_NODE_ID", dstNodeID, "$SSH_USER", url.QueryEscape(ci.sshUser), "$LOCAL_USER", url.QueryEscape(lu.Username), ).Replace(actionURL) } func (c *conn) expandPublicKeyURL(pubKeyURL string) string { if !strings.Contains(pubKeyURL, "$") { return pubKeyURL } loginName := c.info.uprof.LoginName localPart, _, _ := strings.Cut(loginName, "@") return strings.NewReplacer( "$LOGINNAME_EMAIL", loginName, "$LOGINNAME_LOCALPART", localPart, ).Replace(pubKeyURL) } // sshSession is an accepted Tailscale SSH session. type sshSession struct { ssh.Session sharedID string // ID that's shared with control logf logger.Logf ctx context.Context cancelCtx context.CancelCauseFunc conn *conn agentListener net.Listener // non-nil if agent-forwarding requested+allowed // initialized by launchProcess: cmd *exec.Cmd stdin io.WriteCloser stdout io.ReadCloser stderr io.Reader // nil for pty sessions ptyReq *ssh.Pty // non-nil for pty sessions // We use this sync.Once to ensure that we only terminate the process once, // either it exits itself or is terminated exitOnce sync.Once } func (ss *sshSession) vlogf(format string, args ...any) { if sshVerboseLogging() { ss.logf(format, args...) } } func (c *conn) newSSHSession(s ssh.Session) *sshSession { sharedID := fmt.Sprintf("sess-%s-%02x", c.srv.now().UTC().Format("20060102T150405"), randBytes(5)) c.logf("starting session: %v", sharedID) ctx, cancel := context.WithCancelCause(s.Context()) return &sshSession{ Session: s, sharedID: sharedID, ctx: ctx, cancelCtx: cancel, conn: c, logf: logger.WithPrefix(c.srv.logf, "ssh-session("+sharedID+"): "), } } // isStillValid reports whether the conn is still valid. func (c *conn) isStillValid() bool { a, localUser, err := c.evaluatePolicy(c.pubKey) if err != nil { return false } if !a.Accept && a.HoldAndDelegate == "" { return false } return c.localUser.Username == localUser } // checkStillValid checks that the conn is still valid per the latest SSHPolicy. // If not, it terminates all sessions associated with the conn. func (c *conn) checkStillValid() { if c.isStillValid() { return } metricPolicyChangeKick.Add(1) c.logf("session no longer valid per new SSH policy; closing") c.mu.Lock() defer c.mu.Unlock() for _, s := range c.sessions { s.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{ fmt.Sprintf("Access revoked.\r\n"), context.Canceled, }) } } func (c *conn) fetchSSHAction(ctx context.Context, url string) (*tailcfg.SSHAction, error) { ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Minute) defer cancel() bo := backoff.NewBackoff("fetch-ssh-action", c.logf, 10*time.Second) for { if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { return nil, err } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } res, err := c.srv.lb.DoNoiseRequest(req) if err != nil { bo.BackOff(ctx, err) continue } if res.StatusCode != 200 { body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body) res.Body.Close() if len(body) > 1<<10 { body = body[:1<<10] } c.logf("fetch of %v: %s, %s", url, res.Status, body) bo.BackOff(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status: %v", res.Status)) continue } a := new(tailcfg.SSHAction) err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(a) res.Body.Close() if err != nil { c.logf("invalid next SSHAction JSON from %v: %v", url, err) bo.BackOff(ctx, err) continue } return a, nil } } // killProcessOnContextDone waits for ss.ctx to be done and kills the process, // unless the process has already exited. func (ss *sshSession) killProcessOnContextDone() { <-ss.ctx.Done() // Either the process has already exited, in which case this does nothing. // Or, the process is still running in which case this will kill it. ss.exitOnce.Do(func() { err := context.Cause(ss.ctx) if serr, ok := err.(SSHTerminationError); ok { msg := serr.SSHTerminationMessage() if msg != "" { io.WriteString(ss.Stderr(), "\r\n\r\n"+msg+"\r\n\r\n") } } ss.logf("terminating SSH session from %v: %v", ss.conn.info.src.Addr(), err) // We don't need to Process.Wait here, sshSession.run() does // the waiting regardless of termination reason. // TODO(maisem): should this be a SIGTERM followed by a SIGKILL? ss.cmd.Process.Kill() }) } // attachSession registers ss as an active session. func (c *conn) attachSession(ss *sshSession) { c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Add(1) if ss.sharedID == "" { panic("empty sharedID") } c.mu.Lock() defer c.mu.Unlock() c.sessions = append(c.sessions, ss) } // detachSession unregisters s from the list of active sessions. func (c *conn) detachSession(ss *sshSession) { defer c.srv.sessionWaitGroup.Done() c.mu.Lock() defer c.mu.Unlock() for i, s := range c.sessions { if s == ss { c.sessions = append(c.sessions[:i], c.sessions[i+1:]...) break } } } var errSessionDone = errors.New("session is done") // handleSSHAgentForwarding starts a Unix socket listener and in the background // forwards agent connections between the listener and the ssh.Session. // On success, it assigns ss.agentListener. func (ss *sshSession) handleSSHAgentForwarding(s ssh.Session, lu *user.User) error { if !ssh.AgentRequested(ss) || !ss.conn.finalAction.AllowAgentForwarding { return nil } ss.logf("ssh: agent forwarding requested") ln, err := ssh.NewAgentListener() if err != nil { return err } defer func() { if err != nil && ln != nil { ln.Close() } }() uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Uid, 10, 32) if err != nil { return err } gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(lu.Gid, 10, 32) if err != nil { return err } socket := ln.Addr().String() dir := filepath.Dir(socket) // Make sure the socket is accessible only by the user. if err := os.Chmod(socket, 0600); err != nil { return err } if err := os.Chown(socket, int(uid), int(gid)); err != nil { return err } // Make sure the dir is also accessible. if err := os.Chmod(dir, 0755); err != nil { return err } go ssh.ForwardAgentConnections(ln, s) ss.agentListener = ln return nil } // run is the entrypoint for a newly accepted SSH session. // // It handles ss once it's been accepted and determined // that it should run. func (ss *sshSession) run() { metricActiveSessions.Add(1) defer metricActiveSessions.Add(-1) defer ss.cancelCtx(errSessionDone) if attached := ss.conn.srv.attachSessionToConnIfNotShutdown(ss); !attached { fmt.Fprintf(ss, "Tailscale SSH is shutting down\r\n") ss.Exit(1) return } defer ss.conn.detachSession(ss) lu := ss.conn.localUser logf := ss.logf if ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration != 0 { t := time.AfterFunc(ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration, func() { ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{ fmt.Sprintf("Session timeout of %v elapsed.", ss.conn.finalAction.SessionDuration), context.DeadlineExceeded, }) }) defer t.Stop() } if euid := os.Geteuid(); euid != 0 { if lu.Uid != fmt.Sprint(euid) { ss.logf("can't switch to user %q from process euid %v", lu.Username, euid) fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't switch user\r\n") ss.Exit(1) return } } // Take control of the PTY so that we can configure it below. // See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/4146 ss.DisablePTYEmulation() var rec *recording // or nil if disabled if ss.Subsystem() != "sftp" { if err := ss.handleSSHAgentForwarding(ss, lu); err != nil { ss.logf("agent forwarding failed: %v", err) } else if ss.agentListener != nil { // TODO(maisem/bradfitz): add a way to close all session resources defer ss.agentListener.Close() } if ss.shouldRecord() { var err error rec, err = ss.startNewRecording() if err != nil { var uve userVisibleError if errors.As(err, &uve) { fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve.SSHTerminationMessage()) } else { fmt.Fprintf(ss, "can't start new recording\r\n") } ss.logf("startNewRecording: %v", err) ss.Exit(1) return } if rec != nil { defer rec.Close() } } } err := ss.launchProcess() if err != nil { logf("start failed: %v", err.Error()) if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) { err := context.Cause(ss.ctx) var uve userVisibleError if errors.As(err, &uve) { fmt.Fprintf(ss, "%s\r\n", uve) } } ss.Exit(1) return } go ss.killProcessOnContextDone() go func() { defer ss.stdin.Close() if _, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("i", ss.stdin), ss); err != nil { logf("stdin copy: %v", err) ss.cancelCtx(err) } }() var openOutputStreams atomic.Int32 if ss.stderr != nil { openOutputStreams.Store(2) } else { openOutputStreams.Store(1) } go func() { defer ss.stdout.Close() _, err := io.Copy(rec.writer("o", ss), ss.stdout) if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) { logf("stdout copy: %v", err) ss.cancelCtx(err) } if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 { ss.CloseWrite() } }() // stderr is nil for ptys. if ss.stderr != nil { go func() { _, err := io.Copy(ss.Stderr(), ss.stderr) if err != nil { logf("stderr copy: %v", err) } if openOutputStreams.Add(-1) == 0 { ss.CloseWrite() } }() } err = ss.cmd.Wait() // This will either make the SSH Termination goroutine be a no-op, // or itself will be a no-op because the process was killed by the // aforementioned goroutine. ss.exitOnce.Do(func() {}) if err == nil { ss.logf("Session complete") ss.Exit(0) return } if ee, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok { code := ee.ProcessState.ExitCode() ss.logf("Wait: code=%v", code) ss.Exit(code) return } ss.logf("Wait: %v", err) ss.Exit(1) return } // recorders returns the list of recorders to use for this session. // If the final action has a non-empty list of recorders, that list is // returned. Otherwise, the list of recorders from the initial action // is returned. func (ss *sshSession) recorders() ([]netip.AddrPort, *tailcfg.SSHRecorderFailureAction) { if len(ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders) > 0 { return ss.conn.finalAction.Recorders, ss.conn.finalAction.OnRecordingFailure } return ss.conn.action0.Recorders, ss.conn.action0.OnRecordingFailure } func (ss *sshSession) shouldRecord() bool { recs, _ := ss.recorders() return len(recs) > 0 } type sshConnInfo struct { // sshUser is the requested local SSH username ("root", "alice", etc). sshUser string // src is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came from. src netip.AddrPort // dst is the Tailscale IP and port that the connection came for. dst netip.AddrPort // node is srcIP's node. node *tailcfg.Node // uprof is node's UserProfile. uprof tailcfg.UserProfile } func (ci *sshConnInfo) String() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%v->%v@%v", ci.src, ci.sshUser, ci.dst) } func (c *conn) ruleExpired(r *tailcfg.SSHRule) bool { if r.RuleExpires == nil { return false } return r.RuleExpires.Before(c.srv.now()) } func (c *conn) evalSSHPolicy(pol *tailcfg.SSHPolicy, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, ok bool) { for _, r := range pol.Rules { if a, localUser, err := c.matchRule(r, pubKey); err == nil { return a, localUser, true } } return nil, "", false } // internal errors for testing; they don't escape to callers or logs. var ( errNilRule = errors.New("nil rule") errNilAction = errors.New("nil action") errRuleExpired = errors.New("rule expired") errPrincipalMatch = errors.New("principal didn't match") errUserMatch = errors.New("user didn't match") errInvalidConn = errors.New("invalid connection state") ) func (c *conn) matchRule(r *tailcfg.SSHRule, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (a *tailcfg.SSHAction, localUser string, err error) { if c == nil { return nil, "", errInvalidConn } if c.info == nil { c.logf("invalid connection state") return nil, "", errInvalidConn } if r == nil { return nil, "", errNilRule } if r.Action == nil { return nil, "", errNilAction } if c.ruleExpired(r) { return nil, "", errRuleExpired } if !r.Action.Reject { // For all but Reject rules, SSHUsers is required. // If SSHUsers is nil or empty, mapLocalUser will return an // empty string anyway. localUser = mapLocalUser(r.SSHUsers, c.info.sshUser) if localUser == "" { return nil, "", errUserMatch } } if ok, err := c.anyPrincipalMatches(r.Principals, pubKey); err != nil { return nil, "", err } else if !ok { return nil, "", errPrincipalMatch } return r.Action, localUser, nil } func mapLocalUser(ruleSSHUsers map[string]string, reqSSHUser string) (localUser string) { v, ok := ruleSSHUsers[reqSSHUser] if !ok { v = ruleSSHUsers["*"] } if v == "=" { return reqSSHUser } return v } func (c *conn) anyPrincipalMatches(ps []*tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) { for _, p := range ps { if p == nil { continue } if ok, err := c.principalMatches(p, pubKey); err != nil { return false, err } else if ok { return true, nil } } return false, nil } func (c *conn) principalMatches(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, pubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) { if !c.principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p) { return false, nil } return c.principalMatchesPubKey(p, pubKey) } // principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity reports whether one of p's four fields // that match the Tailscale identity match (Node, NodeIP, UserLogin, Any). // This function does not consider PubKeys. func (c *conn) principalMatchesTailscaleIdentity(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal) bool { ci := c.info if p.Any { return true } if !p.Node.IsZero() && ci.node != nil && p.Node == ci.node.StableID { return true } if p.NodeIP != "" { if ip, _ := netip.ParseAddr(p.NodeIP); ip == ci.src.Addr() { return true } } if p.UserLogin != "" && ci.uprof.LoginName == p.UserLogin { return true } return false } func (c *conn) principalMatchesPubKey(p *tailcfg.SSHPrincipal, clientPubKey gossh.PublicKey) (bool, error) { if len(p.PubKeys) == 0 { return true, nil } if clientPubKey == nil { return false, nil } knownKeys := p.PubKeys if len(knownKeys) == 1 && strings.HasPrefix(knownKeys[0], "https://") { var err error knownKeys, err = c.srv.fetchPublicKeysURL(c.expandPublicKeyURL(knownKeys[0])) if err != nil { return false, err } } for _, knownKey := range knownKeys { if pubKeyMatchesAuthorizedKey(clientPubKey, knownKey) { return true, nil } } return false, nil } func pubKeyMatchesAuthorizedKey(pubKey ssh.PublicKey, wantKey string) bool { wantKeyType, rest, ok := strings.Cut(wantKey, " ") if !ok { return false } if pubKey.Type() != wantKeyType { return false } wantKeyB64, _, _ := strings.Cut(rest, " ") wantKeyData, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(wantKeyB64) return len(wantKeyData) > 0 && bytes.Equal(pubKey.Marshal(), wantKeyData) } func randBytes(n int) []byte { b := make([]byte, n) if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil { panic(err) } return b } // CastHeader is the header of an asciinema file. type CastHeader struct { // Version is the asciinema file format version. Version int `json:"version"` // Width is the terminal width in characters. // It is non-zero for Pty sessions. Width int `json:"width"` // Height is the terminal height in characters. // It is non-zero for Pty sessions. Height int `json:"height"` // Timestamp is the unix timestamp of when the recording started. Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"` // Env is the environment variables of the session. // Only "TERM" is set (2023-03-22). Env map[string]string `json:"env"` // Command is the command that was executed. // Typically empty for shell sessions. Command string `json:"command,omitempty"` // Tailscale-specific fields: // SrcNode is the FQDN of the node originating the connection. // It is also the MagicDNS name for the node. // It does not have a trailing dot. // e.g. "host.tail-scale.ts.net" SrcNode string `json:"srcNode"` // SrcNodeID is the node ID of the node originating the connection. SrcNodeID tailcfg.StableNodeID `json:"srcNodeID"` // SrcNodeTags is the list of tags on the node originating the connection (if any). SrcNodeTags []string `json:"srcNodeTags,omitempty"` // SrcNodeUserID is the user ID of the node originating the connection (if not tagged). SrcNodeUserID tailcfg.UserID `json:"srcNodeUserID,omitempty"` // if not tagged // SrcNodeUser is the LoginName of the node originating the connection (if not tagged). SrcNodeUser string `json:"srcNodeUser,omitempty"` // SSHUser is the username as presented by the client. SSHUser string `json:"sshUser"` // as presented by the client // LocalUser is the effective username on the server. LocalUser string `json:"localUser"` } // sessionRecordingClient returns an http.Client that uses srv.lb.Dialer() to // dial connections. This is used to make requests to the session recording // server to upload session recordings. // It uses the provided dialCtx to dial connections, and limits a single dial // to 5 seconds. func (ss *sshSession) sessionRecordingClient(dialCtx context.Context) (*http.Client, error) { dialer := ss.conn.srv.lb.Dialer() if dialer == nil { return nil, errors.New("no peer API transport") } tr := dialer.PeerAPITransport().Clone() dialContextFn := tr.DialContext tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { perAttemptCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second) defer cancel() go func() { select { case <-perAttemptCtx.Done(): case <-dialCtx.Done(): cancel() } }() return dialContextFn(perAttemptCtx, network, addr) } return &http.Client{ Transport: tr, }, nil } // connectToRecorder connects to the recorder at any of the provided addresses. // It returns the first successful response, or a multierr if all attempts fail. // // On success, it returns a WriteCloser that can be used to upload the // recording, and a channel that will be sent an error (or nil) when the upload // fails or completes. func (ss *sshSession) connectToRecorder(ctx context.Context, recs []netip.AddrPort) (io.WriteCloser, <-chan error, error) { if len(recs) == 0 { return nil, nil, errors.New("no recorders configured") } // We use a special context for dialing the recorder, so that we can // limit the time we spend dialing to 30 seconds and still have an // unbounded context for the upload. dialCtx, dialCancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second) defer dialCancel() hc, err := ss.sessionRecordingClient(dialCtx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } var errs []error for _, ap := range recs { // We dial the recorder and wait for it to send a 100-continue // response before returning from this function. This ensures that // the recorder is ready to accept the recording. // got100 is closed when we receive the 100-continue response. got100 := make(chan struct{}) ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{ Got100Continue: func() { close(got100) }, }) pr, pw := io.Pipe() req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%d/record", ap.Addr(), ap.Port()), pr) if err != nil { errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("recording: error starting recording: %w", err)) continue } // We set the Expect header to 100-continue, so that the recorder // will send a 100-continue response before it starts reading the // request body. req.Header.Set("Expect", "100-continue") // errChan is used to indicate the result of the request. errChan := make(chan error, 1) go func() { resp, err := hc.Do(req) if err != nil { errChan <- fmt.Errorf("recording: error starting recording: %w", err) return } if resp.StatusCode != 200 { errChan <- fmt.Errorf("recording: unexpected status: %v", resp.Status) return } errChan <- nil }() select { case <-got100: case err := <-errChan: // If we get an error before we get the 100-continue response, // we need to try another recorder. if err == nil { // If the error is nil, we got a 200 response, which // is unexpected as we haven't sent any data yet. err = errors.New("recording: unexpected EOF") } errs = append(errs, err) continue } return pw, errChan, nil } return nil, nil, multierr.New(errs...) } // startNewRecording starts a new SSH session recording. // It may return a nil recording if recording is not available. func (ss *sshSession) startNewRecording() (_ *recording, err error) { recorders, onFailure := ss.recorders() if len(recorders) == 0 { return nil, errors.New("no recorders configured") } var w ssh.Window if ptyReq, _, isPtyReq := ss.Pty(); isPtyReq { w = ptyReq.Window } term := envValFromList(ss.Environ(), "TERM") if term == "" { term = "xterm-256color" // something non-empty } now := time.Now() rec := &recording{ ss: ss, start: now, failOpen: onFailure == nil || onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage == "", } // We want to use a background context for uploading and not ss.ctx. // ss.ctx is closed when the session closes, but we don't want to break the upload at that time. // Instead we want to wait for the session to close the writer when it finishes. ctx := context.Background() wc, errChan, err := ss.connectToRecorder(ctx, recorders) if err != nil { // TODO(catzkorn): notify control here. if onFailure != nil && onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage != "" { ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (rejecting session): %v", err) return nil, userVisibleError{ error: err, msg: onFailure.RejectSessionWithMessage, } } ss.logf("recording: error starting recording (failing open): %v", err) return nil, nil } go func() { err := <-errChan if err == nil { // Success. return } // TODO(catzkorn): notify control here. if onFailure != nil && onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage != "" { ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (closing session): %v", err) ss.cancelCtx(userVisibleError{ error: err, msg: onFailure.TerminateSessionWithMessage, }) return } ss.logf("recording: error uploading recording (failing open): %v", err) }() rec.out = wc ch := CastHeader{ Version: 2, Width: w.Width, Height: w.Height, Timestamp: now.Unix(), Command: strings.Join(ss.Command(), " "), Env: map[string]string{ "TERM": term, // TODO(bradfitz): anything else important? // including all seems noisey, but maybe we should // for auditing. But first need to break // launchProcess's startWithStdPipes and // startWithPTY up so that they first return the cmd // without starting it, and then a step that starts // it. Then we can (1) make the cmd, (2) start the // recording, (3) start the process. }, SSHUser: ss.conn.info.sshUser, LocalUser: ss.conn.localUser.Username, SrcNode: strings.TrimSuffix(ss.conn.info.node.Name, "."), SrcNodeID: ss.conn.info.node.StableID, } if !ss.conn.info.node.IsTagged() { ch.SrcNodeUser = ss.conn.info.uprof.LoginName ch.SrcNodeUserID = ss.conn.info.node.User } else { ch.SrcNodeTags = ss.conn.info.node.Tags } j, err := json.Marshal(ch) if err != nil { return nil, err } j = append(j, '\n') if _, err := rec.out.Write(j); err != nil { if errors.Is(err, io.ErrClosedPipe) && ss.ctx.Err() != nil { // If we got an io.ErrClosedPipe, it's likely because // the recording server closed the connection on us. Return // the original context error instead. return nil, context.Cause(ss.ctx) } return nil, err } return rec, nil } // recording is the state for an SSH session recording. type recording struct { ss *sshSession start time.Time // failOpen specifies whether the session should be allowed to // continue if writing to the recording fails. failOpen bool mu sync.Mutex // guards writes to, close of out out io.WriteCloser } func (r *recording) Close() error { r.mu.Lock() defer r.mu.Unlock() if r.out == nil { return nil } err := r.out.Close() r.out = nil return err } // writer returns an io.Writer around w that first records the write. // // The dir should be "i" for input or "o" for output. // // If r is nil, it returns w unchanged. // // Currently (2023-03-21) we only record output, not input. func (r *recording) writer(dir string, w io.Writer) io.Writer { if r == nil { return w } if dir == "i" { // TODO: record input? Maybe not, since it might contain // passwords. return w } return &loggingWriter{r: r, dir: dir, w: w} } // loggingWriter is an io.Writer wrapper that writes first an // asciinema JSON cast format recording line, and then writes to w. type loggingWriter struct { r *recording dir string // "i" or "o" (input or output) w io.Writer // underlying Writer, after writing to r.out // recordingFailedOpen specifies whether we've failed to write to // r.out and should stop trying. It is set to true if we fail to write // to r.out and r.failOpen is set. recordingFailedOpen bool } func (w *loggingWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { if !w.recordingFailedOpen { j, err := json.Marshal([]any{ time.Since(w.r.start).Seconds(), w.dir, string(p), }) if err != nil { return 0, err } j = append(j, '\n') if err := w.writeCastLine(j); err != nil { if !w.r.failOpen { return 0, err } w.recordingFailedOpen = true } } return w.w.Write(p) } func (w loggingWriter) writeCastLine(j []byte) error { w.r.mu.Lock() defer w.r.mu.Unlock() if w.r.out == nil { return errors.New("logger closed") } _, err := w.r.out.Write(j) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("logger Write: %w", err) } return nil } func envValFromList(env []string, wantKey string) (v string) { for _, kv := range env { if thisKey, v, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "="); ok && envEq(thisKey, wantKey) { return v } } return "" } // envEq reports whether environment variable a == b for the current // operating system. func envEq(a, b string) bool { if runtime.GOOS == "windows" { return strings.EqualFold(a, b) } return a == b } var ( metricActiveSessions = clientmetric.NewGauge("ssh_active_sessions") metricIncomingConnections = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_incoming_connections") metricPublicKeyConnections = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_publickey_connections") // total metricPublicKeyAccepts = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_publickey_accepts") // accepted subset of ssh_publickey_connections metricTerminalAccept = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_accept") metricTerminalReject = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_reject") metricTerminalInterrupt = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_interrupt") metricTerminalMalformed = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_malformed") metricTerminalFetchError = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_terminalaction_fetch_error") metricHolds = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_holds") metricPolicyChangeKick = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_policy_change_kick") metricSFTP = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_sftp_requests") metricLocalPortForward = clientmetric.NewCounter("ssh_local_port_forward_requests") ) // userVisibleError is a wrapper around an error that implements // SSHTerminationError, so msg is written to their session. type userVisibleError struct { msg string error } func (ue userVisibleError) SSHTerminationMessage() string { return ue.msg } // SSHTerminationError is implemented by errors that terminate an SSH // session and should be written to user's sessions. type SSHTerminationError interface { error SSHTerminationMessage() string }