Merge pull request #2893 from tailscale/aaron/programdata-perms-2

ipn, paths: ensure that the state directory for Windows has the corre…
pull/2909/head
Aaron Klotz 3 years ago committed by GitHub
commit f0aa7f70a4
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/tailscale dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/dep
tailscale.com/net/tlsdial from tailscale.com/derp/derphttp
tailscale.com/net/tsaddr from tailscale.com/net/interfaces+
💣 tailscale.com/net/tshttpproxy from tailscale.com/derp/derphttp+
tailscale.com/paths from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscale/cli+
💣 tailscale.com/paths from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscale/cli+
tailscale.com/safesocket from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscale/cli+
💣 tailscale.com/syncs from tailscale.com/net/interfaces+
tailscale.com/tailcfg from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscale/cli+

@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled dependencies: (generated by github.com/tailscale/de
tailscale.com/net/tsaddr from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal+
💣 tailscale.com/net/tshttpproxy from tailscale.com/control/controlclient+
tailscale.com/net/tstun from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled+
tailscale.com/paths from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled+
💣 tailscale.com/paths from tailscale.com/cmd/tailscaled+
tailscale.com/portlist from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnlocal
tailscale.com/safesocket from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnserver+
tailscale.com/smallzstd from tailscale.com/ipn/ipnserver+

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
"tailscale.com/atomicfile"
"tailscale.com/kube"
"tailscale.com/paths"
)
// ErrStateNotExist is returned by StateStore.ReadState when the
@ -182,7 +183,9 @@ func NewFileStore(path string) (*FileStore, error) {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
// Write out an initial file, to verify that we can write
// to the path.
os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0755) // best effort
if err := paths.MkStateDir(filepath.Dir(path)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating state directory: %w", err)
}
if err = atomicfile.WriteFile(path, []byte("{}"), 0600); err != nil {
return nil, err
}

@ -35,7 +35,11 @@ func TryConfigFileMigration(logf logger.Logf, oldFile, newFile string) string {
return newFile
}
os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(newFile), 0700)
if err = MkStateDir(filepath.Dir(newFile)); err != nil {
logf("TryConfigFileMigration failed; MkStateDir: %v", err)
return oldFile
}
err = os.WriteFile(newFile, contents, 0600)
if err != nil {
removeErr := os.Remove(newFile)

@ -59,3 +59,14 @@ func DefaultTailscaledStateFile() string {
}
return ""
}
// MkStateDir ensures that dirPath, the daemon's configurtaion directory
// containing machine keys etc, both exists and has the correct permissions.
// We want it to only be accessible to the user the daemon is running under.
func MkStateDir(dirPath string) error {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dirPath, 0700); err != nil {
return err
}
return ensureStateDirPerms(dirPath)
}

@ -61,3 +61,11 @@ func xdgDataHome() string {
}
return filepath.Join(os.Getenv("HOME"), ".local/share")
}
func ensureStateDirPerms(dirPath string) error {
// Unfortunately there are currently numerous tests that set up state files
// right off of /tmp, on which Chmod will of course fail. We should fix our
// test harnesses to not do that, at which point we can return an error.
os.Chmod(dirPath, 0700)
return nil
}

@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
// Copyright (c) 2021 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package paths
import (
"os"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
func getTokenInfo(token windows.Token, infoClass uint32) ([]byte, error) {
var desiredLen uint32
err := windows.GetTokenInformation(token, infoClass, nil, 0, &desiredLen)
if err != nil && err != windows.ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER {
return nil, err
}
buf := make([]byte, desiredLen)
actualLen := desiredLen
err = windows.GetTokenInformation(token, infoClass, &buf[0], desiredLen, &actualLen)
return buf, err
}
func getTokenUserInfo(token windows.Token) (*windows.Tokenuser, error) {
buf, err := getTokenInfo(token, windows.TokenUser)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return (*windows.Tokenuser)(unsafe.Pointer(&buf[0])), nil
}
func getTokenPrimaryGroupInfo(token windows.Token) (*windows.Tokenprimarygroup, error) {
buf, err := getTokenInfo(token, windows.TokenPrimaryGroup)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return (*windows.Tokenprimarygroup)(unsafe.Pointer(&buf[0])), nil
}
type userSids struct {
User *windows.SID
PrimaryGroup *windows.SID
}
func getCurrentUserSids() (*userSids, error) {
token, err := windows.OpenCurrentProcessToken()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer token.Close()
userInfo, err := getTokenUserInfo(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
primaryGroup, err := getTokenPrimaryGroupInfo(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &userSids{userInfo.User.Sid, primaryGroup.PrimaryGroup}, nil
}
// ensureStateDirPerms applies a restrictive ACL to the directory specified by dirPath.
// It sets the following security attributes on the directory:
// Owner: The user for the current process;
// Primary Group: The primary group for the current process;
// DACL: Full control to the current user and to the Administrators group.
// (We include Administrators so that admin users may still access logs;
// granting access exclusively to LocalSystem would require admins to use
// special tools to access the Log directory)
// Inheritance: The directory does not inherit the ACL from its parent.
// However, any directories and/or files created within this
// directory *do* inherit the ACL that we are setting.
func ensureStateDirPerms(dirPath string) error {
fi, err := os.Stat(dirPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !fi.IsDir() {
return os.ErrInvalid
}
// We need the info for our current user as SIDs
sids, err := getCurrentUserSids()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We also need the SID for the Administrators group so that admins may
// easily access logs.
adminGroupSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Munge the SIDs into the format required by EXPLICIT_ACCESS.
userTrustee := windows.TRUSTEE{nil, windows.NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE,
windows.TRUSTEE_IS_SID, windows.TRUSTEE_IS_USER,
windows.TrusteeValueFromSID(sids.User)}
adminTrustee := windows.TRUSTEE{nil, windows.NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE,
windows.TRUSTEE_IS_SID, windows.TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP,
windows.TrusteeValueFromSID(adminGroupSid)}
// We declare our access rights via this array of EXPLICIT_ACCESS structures.
// We set full access to our user and to Administrators.
// We configure the DACL such that any files or directories created within
// dirPath will also inherit this DACL.
explicitAccess := []windows.EXPLICIT_ACCESS{
windows.EXPLICIT_ACCESS{
windows.GENERIC_ALL,
windows.SET_ACCESS,
windows.SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT,
userTrustee,
},
windows.EXPLICIT_ACCESS{
windows.GENERIC_ALL,
windows.SET_ACCESS,
windows.SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT,
adminTrustee,
},
}
dacl, err := windows.ACLFromEntries(explicitAccess, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We now reset the file's owner, primary group, and DACL.
// We also must pass PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION so that our new ACL
// does not inherit any ACL entries from the parent directory.
const flags = windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
windows.GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION |
windows.PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
return windows.SetNamedSecurityInfo(dirPath, windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, flags,
sids.User, sids.PrimaryGroup, dacl, nil)
}
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