mirror of https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/
cmd/pgproxy: open-source our postgres TLS-enforcing proxy.
From the original commit that implemented it: It accepts Postgres connections over Tailscale only, dials out to the configured upstream database with TLS (using strong settings, not the swiss cheese that postgres defaults to), and proxies the client through. It also keeps an audit log of the sessions it passed through, along with the Tailscale-provided machine and user identity of the connecting client. In our other repo, this was: commit 92e5edf98e8c2be362f564a408939a5fc3f8c539, Change-Id I742959faaa9c7c302bc312c7dc0d3327e677dc28. Co-authored-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com> Signed-off-by: David Anderson <danderson@tailscale.com>pull/5834/head
David Anderson
2 years ago
committed by
Dave Anderson
parent
c5ce355756
commit
bdf3d2a63f
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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# pgproxy
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The pgproxy server is a proxy for the Postgres wire protocol.
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The proxy runs an in-process Tailscale instance, accepts postgres
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client connections over Tailscale only, and proxies them to the
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configured upstream postgres server.
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This proxy exists because postgres clients default to very insecure
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connection settings: either they "prefer" but do not require TLS; or
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they set sslmode=require, which merely requires that a TLS handshake
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took place, but don't verify the server's TLS certificate or the
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presented TLS hostname. In other words, sslmode=require enforces that
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a TLS session is created, but that session can trivially be
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machine-in-the-middled to steal credentials, data, inject malicious
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queries, and so forth.
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Because this flaw is in the client's validation of the TLS session,
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you have no way of reliably detecting the misconfiguration
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server-side. You could fix the configuration of all the clients you
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know of, but the default makes it very easy to accidentally regress.
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Instead of trying to verify client configuration over time, this proxy
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removes the need for postgres clients to be configured correctly: the
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upstream database is configured to only accept connections from the
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proxy, and the proxy is only available to clients over Tailscale.
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Therefore, clients must use the proxy to connect to the database. The
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client<>proxy connection is secured end-to-end by Tailscale, which the
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proxy enforces by verifying that the connecting client is a known
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current Tailscale peer. The proxy<>server connection is established by
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the proxy itself, using strict TLS verification settings, and the
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client is only allowed to communicate with the server once we've
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established that the upstream connection is safe to use.
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A couple side benefits: because clients can only connect via
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Tailscale, you can use Tailscale ACLs as an extra layer of defense on
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top of the postgres user/password authentication. And, the proxy can
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maintain an audit log of who connected to the database, complete with
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the strongly authenticated Tailscale identity of the client.
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@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
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// Copyright (c) 2020 Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// The pgproxy server is a proxy for the Postgres wire protocol.
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package main
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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crand "crypto/rand"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"expvar"
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"tailscale.com/client/tailscale"
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"tailscale.com/metrics"
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"tailscale.com/tsnet"
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"tailscale.com/tsweb"
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"tailscale.com/types/logger"
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)
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var (
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hostname = flag.String("hostname", "", "Tailscale hostname to serve on")
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port = flag.Int("port", 5432, "Listening port for client connections")
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debugPort = flag.Int("debug-port", 80, "Listening port for debug/metrics endpoint")
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upstreamAddr = flag.String("upstream-addr", "", "Address of the upstream Postgres server, in host:port format")
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upstreamCA = flag.String("upstream-ca-file", "", "File containing the PEM-encoded CA certificate for the upstream server")
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tailscaleDir = flag.String("state-dir", "", "Directory in which to store the Tailscale auth state")
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)
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func main() {
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flag.Parse()
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if *hostname == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --hostname")
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}
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if *upstreamAddr == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --upstream-addr")
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}
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if *upstreamCA == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --upstream-ca-file")
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}
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if *tailscaleDir == "" {
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log.Fatal("missing --state-dir")
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}
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ts := &tsnet.Server{
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Dir: *tailscaleDir,
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Hostname: *hostname,
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// Make the stdout logs a clean audit log of connections.
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Logf: logger.Discard,
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}
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if os.Getenv("TS_AUTHKEY") == "" {
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log.Print("Note: you need to run this with TS_AUTHKEY=... the first time, to join your tailnet of choice.")
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}
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tsclient, err := ts.LocalClient()
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("getting tsnet API client: %v", err)
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}
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p, err := newProxy(*upstreamAddr, *upstreamCA, tsclient)
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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expvar.Publish("pgproxy", p.Expvar())
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if *debugPort != 0 {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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tsweb.Debugger(mux)
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srv := &http.Server{
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Handler: mux,
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}
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dln, err := ts.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", *debugPort))
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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go func() {
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log.Fatal(srv.Serve(dln))
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}()
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}
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ln, err := ts.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", *port))
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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log.Printf("serving access to %s on port %d", *upstreamAddr, *port)
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log.Fatal(p.Serve(ln))
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}
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// proxy is a postgres wire protocol proxy, which strictly enforces
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// the security of the TLS connection to its upstream regardless of
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// what the client's TLS configuration is.
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type proxy struct {
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upstreamAddr string // "my.database.com:5432"
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upstreamHost string // "my.database.com"
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upstreamCertPool *x509.CertPool
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downstreamCert []tls.Certificate
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client *tailscale.LocalClient
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activeSessions expvar.Int
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startedSessions expvar.Int
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errors metrics.LabelMap
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}
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// newProxy returns a proxy that forwards connections to
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// upstreamAddr. The upstream's TLS session is verified using the CA
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// cert(s) in upstreamCAPath.
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func newProxy(upstreamAddr, upstreamCAPath string, client *tailscale.LocalClient) (*proxy, error) {
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bs, err := os.ReadFile(upstreamCAPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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upstreamCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
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if !upstreamCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(bs) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CA cert in %q", upstreamCAPath)
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}
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h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(upstreamAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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downstreamCert, err := mkSelfSigned(h)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &proxy{
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upstreamAddr: upstreamAddr,
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upstreamHost: h,
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upstreamCertPool: upstreamCertPool,
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downstreamCert: []tls.Certificate{downstreamCert},
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client: client,
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errors: metrics.LabelMap{Label: "kind"},
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}, nil
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}
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// Expvar returns p's monitoring metrics.
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func (p *proxy) Expvar() expvar.Var {
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ret := &metrics.Set{}
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ret.Set("sessions_active", &p.activeSessions)
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ret.Set("sessions_started", &p.startedSessions)
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ret.Set("session_errors", &p.errors)
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return ret
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}
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// Serve accepts postgres client connections on ln and proxies them to
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// the configured upstream. ln can be any net.Listener, but all client
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// connections must originate from tailscale IPs that can be verified
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// with WhoIs.
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func (p *proxy) Serve(ln net.Listener) error {
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var lastSessionID int64
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for {
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c, err := ln.Accept()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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id := time.Now().UnixNano()
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if id == lastSessionID {
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// Bluntly enforce SID uniqueness, even if collisions are
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// fantastically unlikely (but OSes vary in how much timer
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// precision they expose to the OS, so id might be rounded
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// e.g. to the same millisecond)
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id++
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}
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lastSessionID = id
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go func(sessionID int64) {
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if err := p.serve(sessionID, c); err != nil {
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log.Printf("%d: session ended with error: %v", sessionID, err)
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}
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}(id)
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}
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}
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var (
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// sslStart is the magic bytes that postgres clients use to indicate
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// that they want to do a TLS handshake. Servers should respond with
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// the single byte "S" before starting a normal TLS handshake.
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sslStart = [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 8, 0x04, 0xd2, 0x16, 0x2f}
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// plaintextStart is the magic bytes that postgres clients use to
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// indicate that they're starting a plaintext authentication
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// handshake.
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plaintextStart = [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 86, 0, 3, 0, 0}
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)
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// serve proxies the postgres client on c to the proxy's upstream,
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// enforcing strict TLS to the upstream.
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func (p *proxy) serve(sessionID int64, c net.Conn) error {
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defer c.Close()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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whois, err := p.client.WhoIs(ctx, c.RemoteAddr().String())
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if err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("whois-failed", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("getting client identity: %v", err)
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}
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// Before anything else, log the connection attempt.
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user, machine := "", ""
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if whois.Node != nil {
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if whois.Node.Hostinfo.ShareeNode() {
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machine = "external-device"
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} else {
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machine = strings.TrimSuffix(whois.Node.Name, ".")
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}
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}
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if whois.UserProfile != nil {
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user = whois.UserProfile.LoginName
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if user == "tagged-devices" && whois.Node != nil {
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user = strings.Join(whois.Node.Tags, ",")
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}
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}
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if user == "" || machine == "" {
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p.errors.Add("no-ts-identity", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("couldn't identify source user and machine (user %q, machine %q)", user, machine)
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}
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log.Printf("%d: session start, from %s (machine %s, user %s)", sessionID, c.RemoteAddr(), machine, user)
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start := time.Now()
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defer func() {
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elapsed := time.Since(start)
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log.Printf("%d: session end, from %s (machine %s, user %s), lasted %s", sessionID, c.RemoteAddr(), machine, user, elapsed.Round(time.Millisecond))
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}()
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// Read the client's opening message, to figure out if it's trying
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// to TLS or not.
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var buf [8]byte
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, buf[:len(sslStart)]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("initial magic read: %v", err)
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}
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var clientIsTLS bool
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switch {
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case buf == sslStart:
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clientIsTLS = true
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case buf == plaintextStart:
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clientIsTLS = false
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default:
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p.errors.Add("client-bad-protocol", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("unrecognized initial packet = % 02x", buf)
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}
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// Dial & verify upstream connection.
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var d net.Dialer
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d.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
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upc, err := d.Dial("tcp", p.upstreamAddr)
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if err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream dial: %v", err)
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}
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defer upc.Close()
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if _, err := upc.Write(sslStart[:]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream write of start-ssl magic: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(upc, buf[:1]); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("reading upstream start-ssl response: %v", err)
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}
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if buf[0] != 'S' {
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p.errors.Add("upstream-bad-protocol", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream didn't acknowldge start-ssl, said %q", buf[0])
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}
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tlsConf := &tls.Config{
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ServerName: p.upstreamHost,
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RootCAs: p.upstreamCertPool,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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}
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uptc := tls.Client(upc, tlsConf)
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if err = uptc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("upstream-tls", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("upstream TLS handshake: %v", err)
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}
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// Accept the client conn and set it up the way the client wants.
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var clientConn net.Conn
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if clientIsTLS {
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io.WriteString(c, "S") // yeah, we're good to speak TLS
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s := tls.Server(c, &tls.Config{
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ServerName: p.upstreamHost,
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Certificates: p.downstreamCert,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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})
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if err = uptc.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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p.errors.Add("client-tls", 1)
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return fmt.Errorf("client TLS handshake: %v", err)
|
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}
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clientConn = s
|
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} else {
|
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// Repeat the header we read earlier up to the server.
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if _, err := uptc.Write(plaintextStart[:]); err != nil {
|
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p.errors.Add("network-error", 1)
|
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return fmt.Errorf("sending initial client bytes to upstream: %v", err)
|
||||
}
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||||
clientConn = c
|
||||
}
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||||
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||||
// Finally, proxy the client to the upstream.
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errc := make(chan error, 1)
|
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go func() {
|
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_, err := io.Copy(uptc, clientConn)
|
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errc <- err
|
||||
}()
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
_, err := io.Copy(clientConn, uptc)
|
||||
errc <- err
|
||||
}()
|
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if err := <-errc; err != nil {
|
||||
// Don't increment error counts here, because the most common
|
||||
// cause of termination is client or server closing the
|
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// connection normally, and it'll obscure "interesting"
|
||||
// handshake errors.
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("session terminated with error: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mkSelfSigned creates and returns a self-signed TLS certificate for
|
||||
// hostname.
|
||||
func mkSelfSigned(hostname string) (tls.Certificate, error) {
|
||||
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), crand.Reader)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return tls.Certificate{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub := priv.Public()
|
||||
template := x509.Certificate{
|
||||
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
|
||||
Subject: pkix.Name{
|
||||
Organization: []string{"pgproxy"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
DNSNames: []string{hostname},
|
||||
NotBefore: time.Now(),
|
||||
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour),
|
||||
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
|
||||
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
||||
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(crand.Reader, &template, &template, pub, priv)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return tls.Certificate{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return tls.Certificate{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return tls.Certificate{
|
||||
Certificate: [][]byte{derBytes},
|
||||
PrivateKey: priv,
|
||||
Leaf: cert,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue