diff --git a/cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go b/cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3599ab141
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmd/tsidp/tsidp.go
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+// The tsidp command is an OpenID Connect Identity Provider server.
+//
+// See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/10263 for background.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	crand "crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
+	"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jwt"
+	"tailscale.com/client/tailscale"
+	"tailscale.com/client/tailscale/apitype"
+	"tailscale.com/envknob"
+	"tailscale.com/ipn/ipnstate"
+	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
+	"tailscale.com/tsnet"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+	"tailscale.com/types/lazy"
+	"tailscale.com/types/logger"
+	"tailscale.com/types/views"
+	"tailscale.com/util/mak"
+	"tailscale.com/util/must"
+	"tailscale.com/util/rands"
+)
+
+var (
+	flagVerbose            = flag.Bool("verbose", false, "be verbose")
+	flagPort               = flag.Int("port", 443, "port to listen on")
+	flagLocalPort          = flag.Int("local-port", -1, "allow requests from localhost")
+	flagUseLocalTailscaled = flag.Bool("use-local-tailscaled", false, "use local tailscaled instead of tsnet")
+)
+
+func main() {
+	flag.Parse()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if !envknob.UseWIPCode() {
+		log.Fatal("cmd/tsidp is a work in progress and has not been security reviewed;\nits use requires TAILSCALE_USE_WIP_CODE=1 be set in the environment for now.")
+	}
+
+	var (
+		lc  *tailscale.LocalClient
+		st  *ipnstate.Status
+		err error
+
+		lns []net.Listener
+	)
+	if *flagUseLocalTailscaled {
+		lc = &tailscale.LocalClient{}
+		st, err = lc.StatusWithoutPeers(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("getting status: %v", err)
+		}
+		portStr := fmt.Sprint(*flagPort)
+		anySuccess := false
+		for _, ip := range st.TailscaleIPs {
+			ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(ip.String(), portStr))
+			if err != nil {
+				log.Printf("failed to listen on %v: %v", ip, err)
+				continue
+			}
+			anySuccess = true
+			ln = tls.NewListener(ln, &tls.Config{
+				GetCertificate: lc.GetCertificate,
+			})
+			lns = append(lns, ln)
+		}
+		if !anySuccess {
+			log.Fatalf("failed to listen on any of %v", st.TailscaleIPs)
+		}
+	} else {
+		ts := &tsnet.Server{
+			Hostname: "idp",
+		}
+		if !*flagVerbose {
+			ts.Logf = logger.Discard
+		}
+		st, err = ts.Up(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		lc, err = ts.LocalClient()
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("getting local client: %v", err)
+		}
+		ln, err := ts.ListenTLS("tcp", fmt.Sprintf(":%d", *flagPort))
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		lns = append(lns, ln)
+	}
+
+	srv := &idpServer{
+		lc: lc,
+	}
+	if *flagPort != 443 {
+		srv.serverURL = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s:%d", strings.TrimSuffix(st.Self.DNSName, "."), *flagPort)
+	} else {
+		srv.serverURL = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s", strings.TrimSuffix(st.Self.DNSName, "."))
+	}
+
+	log.Printf("Running tsidp at %s ...", srv.serverURL)
+
+	if *flagLocalPort != -1 {
+		log.Printf("Also running tsidp at %s ...", srv.loopbackURL)
+		srv.loopbackURL = fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost:%d", *flagLocalPort)
+		ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", fmt.Sprintf("localhost:%d", *flagLocalPort))
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		lns = append(lns, ln)
+	}
+
+	for _, ln := range lns {
+		go http.Serve(ln, srv)
+	}
+	select {}
+}
+
+type idpServer struct {
+	lc          *tailscale.LocalClient
+	loopbackURL string
+	serverURL   string // "https://foo.bar.ts.net"
+
+	lazyMux        lazy.SyncValue[*http.ServeMux]
+	lazySigningKey lazy.SyncValue[*signingKey]
+	lazySigner     lazy.SyncValue[jose.Signer]
+
+	mu          sync.Mutex              // guards the fields below
+	code        map[string]*authRequest // keyed by random hex
+	accessToken map[string]*authRequest // keyed by random hex
+}
+
+type authRequest struct {
+	// localRP is true if the request is from a relying party running on the
+	// same machine as the idp server. It is mutually exclusive with rpNodeID.
+	localRP bool
+
+	// rpNodeID is the NodeID of the relying party (who requested the auth, such
+	// as Proxmox or Synology), not the user node who is being authenticated. It
+	// is mutually exclusive with localRP.
+	rpNodeID tailcfg.NodeID
+
+	// clientID is the "client_id" sent in the authorized request.
+	clientID string
+
+	// nonce presented in the request.
+	nonce string
+
+	// redirectURI is the redirect_uri presented in the request.
+	redirectURI string
+
+	// remoteUser is the user who is being authenticated.
+	remoteUser *apitype.WhoIsResponse
+
+	// validTill is the time until which the token is valid.
+	// As of 2023-11-14, it is 5 minutes.
+	// TODO: add routine to delete expired tokens.
+	validTill time.Time
+}
+
+func (ar *authRequest) allowRelyingParty(ctx context.Context, remoteAddr string, lc *tailscale.LocalClient) error {
+	if ar.localRP {
+		ra, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(remoteAddr)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !ra.Addr().IsLoopback() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("tsidp: request from non-loopback address")
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	who, err := lc.WhoIs(ctx, remoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tsidp: error getting WhoIs: %w", err)
+	}
+	if ar.rpNodeID != who.Node.ID {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tsidp: token for different node")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) authorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	who, err := s.lc.WhoIs(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error getting WhoIs: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	uq := r.URL.Query()
+
+	code := rands.HexString(32)
+	ar := &authRequest{
+		nonce:       uq.Get("nonce"),
+		remoteUser:  who,
+		redirectURI: uq.Get("redirect_uri"),
+		clientID:    uq.Get("client_id"),
+	}
+
+	if r.URL.Path == "/authorize/localhost" {
+		ar.localRP = true
+	} else {
+		var ok bool
+		ar.rpNodeID, ok = parseID[tailcfg.NodeID](strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/authorize/"))
+		if !ok {
+			http.Error(w, "tsidp: invalid node ID suffix after /authorize/", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	mak.Set(&s.code, code, ar)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	q := make(url.Values)
+	q.Set("code", code)
+	q.Set("state", uq.Get("state"))
+	u := uq.Get("redirect_uri") + "?" + q.Encode()
+	log.Printf("Redirecting to %q", u)
+
+	http.Redirect(w, r, u, http.StatusFound)
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) newMux() *http.ServeMux {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc(oidcJWKSPath, s.serveJWKS)
+	mux.HandleFunc(oidcConfigPath, s.serveOpenIDConfig)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/authorize/", s.authorize)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/userinfo", s.serveUserInfo)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/token", s.serveToken)
+	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path == "/" {
+			io.WriteString(w, "<html><body><h1>Tailscale OIDC IdP</h1>")
+			return
+		}
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: not found", http.StatusNotFound)
+	})
+	return mux
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	log.Printf("%v %v", r.Method, r.URL)
+	s.lazyMux.Get(s.newMux).ServeHTTP(w, r)
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) serveUserInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.Method != "GET" {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+		return
+	}
+	tk, ok := strings.CutPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer ")
+	if !ok {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: invalid Authorization header", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ar, ok := s.accessToken[tk]
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if !ok {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: invalid token", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := ar.allowRelyingParty(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr, s.lc); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error allowing relying party: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if ar.validTill.Before(time.Now()) {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: token expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		s.mu.Lock()
+		delete(s.accessToken, tk)
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+	}
+
+	ui := userInfo{}
+	if ar.remoteUser.Node.IsTagged() {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: tagged nodes not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	ui.Sub = ar.remoteUser.Node.User.String()
+	ui.Name = ar.remoteUser.UserProfile.DisplayName
+	ui.Email = ar.remoteUser.UserProfile.LoginName
+	ui.Picture = ar.remoteUser.UserProfile.ProfilePicURL
+
+	// TODO(maisem): not sure if this is the right thing to do
+	ui.UserName, _, _ = strings.Cut(ar.remoteUser.UserProfile.LoginName, "@")
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ui); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}
+}
+
+type userInfo struct {
+	Sub      string `json:"sub"`
+	Name     string `json:"name"`
+	Email    string `json:"email"`
+	Picture  string `json:"picture"`
+	UserName string `json:"username"`
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) serveToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.Method != "POST" {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+		return
+	}
+	if r.FormValue("grant_type") != "authorization_code" {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: grant_type not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	code := r.FormValue("code")
+	if code == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: code is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ar, ok := s.code[code]
+	if ok {
+		delete(s.code, code)
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if !ok {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: code not found", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := ar.allowRelyingParty(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr, s.lc); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error allowing relying party: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
+		return
+	}
+	if ar.redirectURI != r.FormValue("redirect_uri") {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: redirect_uri mismatch", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+	signer, err := s.oidcSigner()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error getting signer: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	jti := rands.HexString(32)
+	who := ar.remoteUser
+
+	// TODO(maisem): not sure if this is the right thing to do
+	userName, _, _ := strings.Cut(ar.remoteUser.UserProfile.LoginName, "@")
+	n := who.Node.View()
+	if n.IsTagged() {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: tagged nodes not supported", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	_, tcd, _ := strings.Cut(n.Name(), ".")
+	tsClaims := tailscaleClaims{
+		Claims: jwt.Claims{
+			Audience:  jwt.Audience{ar.clientID},
+			Expiry:    jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(5 * time.Minute)),
+			ID:        jti,
+			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
+			Issuer:    s.serverURL,
+			NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
+			Subject:   n.User().String(),
+		},
+		Nonce:     ar.nonce,
+		Key:       n.Key(),
+		Addresses: n.Addresses(),
+		NodeID:    n.ID(),
+		NodeName:  n.Name(),
+		Tailnet:   tcd,
+		UserID:    n.User(),
+		Email:     who.UserProfile.LoginName,
+		UserName:  userName,
+	}
+	if ar.localRP {
+		tsClaims.Issuer = s.loopbackURL
+	}
+
+	// Create an OIDC token using this issuer's signer.
+	token, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(tsClaims).CompactSerialize()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error getting token: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	at := rands.HexString(32)
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ar.validTill = now.Add(5 * time.Minute)
+	mak.Set(&s.accessToken, at, ar)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(oidcTokenResponse{
+		AccessToken: at,
+		TokenType:   "Bearer",
+		ExpiresIn:   5 * 60,
+		IDToken:     token,
+	}); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}
+}
+
+type oidcTokenResponse struct {
+	IDToken      string `json:"id_token"`
+	TokenType    string `json:"token_type"`
+	AccessToken  string `json:"access_token"`
+	RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
+	ExpiresIn    int    `json:"expires_in"`
+}
+
+const (
+	oidcJWKSPath   = "/.well-known/jwks.json"
+	oidcConfigPath = "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
+)
+
+func (s *idpServer) oidcSigner() (jose.Signer, error) {
+	return s.lazySigner.GetErr(func() (jose.Signer, error) {
+		sk, err := s.oidcPrivateKey()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{
+			Algorithm: jose.RS256,
+			Key:       sk.k,
+		}, &jose.SignerOptions{EmbedJWK: false, ExtraHeaders: map[jose.HeaderKey]any{
+			jose.HeaderType: "JWT",
+			"kid":           fmt.Sprint(sk.kid),
+		}})
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) oidcPrivateKey() (*signingKey, error) {
+	return s.lazySigningKey.GetErr(func() (*signingKey, error) {
+		var sk signingKey
+		b, err := os.ReadFile("oidc-key.json")
+		if err == nil {
+			if err := sk.UnmarshalJSON(b); err == nil {
+				return &sk, nil
+			} else {
+				log.Printf("Error unmarshaling key: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+		id, k := mustGenRSAKey(2048)
+		sk.k = k
+		sk.kid = id
+		b, err = sk.MarshalJSON()
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("Error marshaling key: %v", err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile("oidc-key.json", b, 0600); err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("Error writing key: %v", err)
+		}
+		return &sk, nil
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *idpServer) serveJWKS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.URL.Path != oidcJWKSPath {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: not found", http.StatusNotFound)
+		return
+	}
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	sk, err := s.oidcPrivateKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	// TODO(maisem): maybe only marshal this once and reuse?
+	// TODO(maisem): implement key rotation.
+	je := json.NewEncoder(w)
+	je.SetIndent("", "  ")
+	if err := je.Encode(jose.JSONWebKeySet{
+		Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{
+			{
+				Key:       sk.k.Public(),
+				Algorithm: string(jose.RS256),
+				Use:       "sig",
+				KeyID:     fmt.Sprint(sk.kid),
+			},
+		},
+	}); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// openIDProviderMetadata is a partial representation of
+// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderMetadata.
+type openIDProviderMetadata struct {
+	Issuer                           string              `json:"issuer"`
+	AuthorizationEndpoint            string              `json:"authorization_endpoint,omitempty"`
+	TokenEndpoint                    string              `json:"token_endpoint,omitempty"`
+	UserInfoEndpoint                 string              `json:"userinfo_endpoint,omitempty"`
+	JWKS_URI                         string              `json:"jwks_uri"`
+	ScopesSupported                  views.Slice[string] `json:"scopes_supported"`
+	ResponseTypesSupported           views.Slice[string] `json:"response_types_supported"`
+	SubjectTypesSupported            views.Slice[string] `json:"subject_types_supported"`
+	ClaimsSupported                  views.Slice[string] `json:"claims_supported"`
+	IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported views.Slice[string] `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
+	// TODO(maisem): maybe add other fields?
+	// Currently we fill out the REQUIRED fields, scopes_supported and claims_supported.
+}
+
+type tailscaleClaims struct {
+	jwt.Claims `json:",inline"`
+	Nonce      string                    `json:"nonce,omitempty"` // the nonce from the request
+	Key        key.NodePublic            `json:"key"`             // the node public key
+	Addresses  views.Slice[netip.Prefix] `json:"addresses"`       // the Tailscale IPs of the node
+	NodeID     tailcfg.NodeID            `json:"nid"`             // the stable node ID
+	NodeName   string                    `json:"node"`            // name of the node
+	Tailnet    string                    `json:"tailnet"`         // tailnet (like tail-scale.ts.net)
+
+	// Email is the "emailish" value with an '@' sign. It might not be a valid email.
+	Email  string         `json:"email,omitempty"` // user emailish (like "alice@github" or "bob@example.com")
+	UserID tailcfg.UserID `json:"uid,omitempty"`
+
+	// UserName is the local part of Email (without '@' and domain).
+	// It is a temporary (2023-11-15) hack during development.
+	// We should probably let this be configured via grants.
+	UserName string `json:"username,omitempty"`
+}
+
+var (
+	openIDSupportedClaims = views.SliceOf([]string{
+		// Standard claims, these correspond to fields in jwt.Claims.
+		"sub", "aud", "exp", "iat", "iss", "jti", "nbf", "username", "email",
+
+		// Tailscale claims, these correspond to fields in tailscaleClaims.
+		"key", "addresses", "nid", "node", "tailnet", "tags", "user", "uid",
+	})
+
+	// As defined in the OpenID spec this should be "openid".
+	openIDSupportedScopes = views.SliceOf([]string{"openid", "email", "profile"})
+
+	// We only support getting the id_token.
+	openIDSupportedReponseTypes = views.SliceOf([]string{"id_token", "code"})
+
+	// The type of the "sub" field in the JWT, which means it is globally unique identifier.
+	// The other option is "pairwise", which means the identifier is different per receiving 3p.
+	openIDSupportedSubjectTypes = views.SliceOf([]string{"public"})
+
+	// The algo used for signing. The OpenID spec says "The algorithm RS256 MUST be included."
+	// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderMetadata
+	openIDSupportedSigningAlgos = views.SliceOf([]string{string(jose.RS256)})
+)
+
+func (s *idpServer) serveOpenIDConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if r.URL.Path != oidcConfigPath {
+		http.Error(w, "tsidp: not found", http.StatusNotFound)
+		return
+	}
+	ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Error parsing remote addr: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	var authorizeEndpoint string
+	rpEndpoint := s.serverURL
+	if who, err := s.lc.WhoIs(r.Context(), r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
+		authorizeEndpoint = fmt.Sprintf("%s/authorize/%d", s.serverURL, who.Node.ID)
+	} else if ap.Addr().IsLoopback() {
+		rpEndpoint = s.loopbackURL
+		authorizeEndpoint = fmt.Sprintf("%s/authorize/localhost", s.serverURL)
+	} else {
+		log.Printf("Error getting WhoIs: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	je := json.NewEncoder(w)
+	je.SetIndent("", "  ")
+	if err := je.Encode(openIDProviderMetadata{
+		AuthorizationEndpoint:            authorizeEndpoint,
+		Issuer:                           rpEndpoint,
+		JWKS_URI:                         rpEndpoint + oidcJWKSPath,
+		UserInfoEndpoint:                 rpEndpoint + "/userinfo",
+		TokenEndpoint:                    rpEndpoint + "/token",
+		ScopesSupported:                  openIDSupportedScopes,
+		ResponseTypesSupported:           openIDSupportedReponseTypes,
+		SubjectTypesSupported:            openIDSupportedSubjectTypes,
+		ClaimsSupported:                  openIDSupportedClaims,
+		IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported: openIDSupportedSigningAlgos,
+	}); err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}
+}
+
+const (
+	minimumRSAKeySize = 2048
+)
+
+// mustGenRSAKey generates a new RSA key with the provided number of bits. It
+// panics on failure. bits must be at least minimumRSAKeySizeBytes * 8.
+func mustGenRSAKey(bits int) (kid uint64, k *rsa.PrivateKey) {
+	if bits < minimumRSAKeySize {
+		panic("request to generate a too-small RSA key")
+	}
+	kid = must.Get(readUint64(crand.Reader))
+	k = must.Get(rsa.GenerateKey(crand.Reader, bits))
+	return
+}
+
+// readUint64 reads from r until 8 bytes represent a non-zero uint64.
+func readUint64(r io.Reader) (uint64, error) {
+	for {
+		var b [8]byte
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, b[:]); err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+		if v := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:]); v != 0 {
+			return v, nil
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// rsaPrivateKeyJSONWrapper is the the JSON serialization
+// format used by RSAPrivateKey.
+type rsaPrivateKeyJSONWrapper struct {
+	Key string
+	ID  uint64
+}
+
+type signingKey struct {
+	k   *rsa.PrivateKey
+	kid uint64
+}
+
+func (sk *signingKey) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+	b := pem.Block{
+		Type:  "RSA PRIVATE KEY",
+		Bytes: x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(sk.k),
+	}
+	bts := pem.EncodeToMemory(&b)
+	return json.Marshal(rsaPrivateKeyJSONWrapper{
+		Key: base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(bts),
+		ID:  sk.kid,
+	})
+}
+
+func (sk *signingKey) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
+	var wrapper rsaPrivateKeyJSONWrapper
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wrapper); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if len(wrapper.Key) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	b64dec, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(wrapper.Key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	blk, _ := pem.Decode(b64dec)
+	k, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(blk.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	sk.k = k
+	sk.kid = wrapper.ID
+	return nil
+}
+
+// parseID takes a string input and returns a typed IntID T and true, or a zero
+// value and false if the input is unhandled syntax or out of a valid range.
+func parseID[T ~int64](input string) (_ T, ok bool) {
+	if input == "" {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	i, err := strconv.ParseInt(input, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	if i < 0 {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return T(i), true
+}
diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod
index cafe4eb24..1108df7b9 100644
--- a/go.mod
+++ b/go.mod
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ require (
 	golang.org/x/tools v0.13.0
 	golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
 	golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.5.3
+	gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 v2.6.0
 	gvisor.dev/gvisor v0.0.0-20230928000133-4fe30062272c
 	honnef.co/go/tools v0.4.6
 	inet.af/peercred v0.0.0-20210906144145-0893ea02156a
diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum
index b1b664559..fc025873f 100644
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -1406,6 +1406,8 @@ gopkg.in/inf.v0 v0.9.1 h1:73M5CoZyi3ZLMOyDlQh031Cx6N9NDJ2Vvfl76EDAgDc=
 gopkg.in/inf.v0 v0.9.1/go.mod h1:cWUDdTG/fYaXco+Dcufb5Vnc6Gp2YChqWtbxRZE0mXw=
 gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.0 h1:Dgnx+6+nfE+IfzjUEISNeydPJh9AXNNsWbGP9KzCsOA=
 gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.0/go.mod h1:pNLf8WUiyNEtQjuu5G5vTm06TEv9tsIgeAvK8hOrP4k=
+gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 v2.6.0 h1:NGk74WTnPKBNUhNzQX7PYcTLUjoq7mzKk2OKbvwk2iI=
+gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 v2.6.0/go.mod h1:M9dMgbHiYLoDGQrXy7OpJDJWiKiU//h+vD76mk0e1AI=
 gopkg.in/warnings.v0 v0.1.2 h1:wFXVbFY8DY5/xOe1ECiWdKCzZlxgshcYVNkBHstARME=
 gopkg.in/warnings.v0 v0.1.2/go.mod h1:jksf8JmL6Qr/oQM2OXTHunEvvTAsrWBLb6OOjuVWRNI=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v1 v1.0.0-20140924161607-9f9df34309c0/go.mod h1:WDnlLJ4WF5VGsH/HVa3CI79GS0ol3YnhVnKP89i0kNg=