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@ -35,8 +35,35 @@ func serveConnect(s *derp.Server, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if port != "443" {
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return fmt.Errorf("only port 443 is allowed")
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if port != "443" && port != "80" {
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// There are only two types of CONNECT requests the client makes
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// via ACE: requests for /key (port 443) and requests to upgrade
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// to the bidirectional ts2021 Noise protocol.
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//
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// The ts2021 layer can bootstrap over port 80 (http) or port
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// 443 (https).
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//
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// Without ACE, we prefer port 80 to avoid unnecessary double
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// encryption. But enough places require TLS+port 443 that we do
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// support that double encryption path as a fallback.
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//
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// But ACE adds its own TLS layer (ACE is always CONNECT over
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// https). If we don't permit port 80 here as a target, we'd
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// have three layers of encryption (TLS + TLS + Noise) which is
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// even more silly than two.
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//
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// So we permit port 80 such that we can only have two layers of
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// encryption, varying by the request type:
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//
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// 1. TLS from client to ACE proxy (CONNECT)
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// 2a. TLS from ACE proxy to https://controlplane.tailscale.com/key (port 443)
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// 2b. ts2021 Noise from ACE proxy to http://controlplane.tailscale.com/ts2021 (port 80)
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//
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// But nothing's stopping the client from doing its ts2021
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// upgrade over https anyway and having three layers of
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// encryption. But we can at least permit the client to do a
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// "CONNECT controlplane.tailscale.com:80 HTTP/1.1" if it wants.
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return fmt.Errorf("only ports 443 and 80 are allowed")
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}
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// TODO(bradfitz): make policy configurable from flags and/or come
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// from local tailscaled nodeAttrs
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