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tailscale/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go

1475 lines
45 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package ipnlocal
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"time"
"tailscale.com/health/healthmsg"
"tailscale.com/ipn"
"tailscale.com/ipn/ipnstate"
"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/tka"
"tailscale.com/tsconst"
"tailscale.com/types/key"
"tailscale.com/types/logger"
"tailscale.com/types/netmap"
"tailscale.com/types/persist"
"tailscale.com/types/tkatype"
"tailscale.com/util/mak"
"tailscale.com/util/set"
)
// TODO(tom): RPC retry/backoff was broken and has been removed. Fix?
var (
errMissingNetmap = errors.New("missing netmap: verify that you are logged in")
errNetworkLockNotActive = errors.New("network-lock is not active")
tkaCompactionDefaults = tka.CompactionOptions{
MinChain: 24, // Keep at minimum 24 AUMs since head.
MinAge: 14 * 24 * time.Hour, // Keep 2 weeks of AUMs.
}
)
type tkaState struct {
profile ipn.ProfileID
authority *tka.Authority
storage *tka.FS
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
filtered []ipnstate.TKAPeer
}
// tkaFilterNetmapLocked checks the signatures on each node key, dropping
// nodes from the netmap whose signature does not verify.
//
// b.mu must be held.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaFilterNetmapLocked(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) {
if b.tka == nil && !b.capTailnetLock {
b.health.SetTKAHealth(nil)
return
}
if b.tka == nil {
b.health.SetTKAHealth(nil)
return // TKA not enabled.
}
tracker := rotationTracker{logf: b.logf}
var toDelete map[int]bool // peer index => true
for i, p := range nm.Peers {
if p.UnsignedPeerAPIOnly() {
// Not subject to tailnet lock.
continue
}
if p.KeySignature().Len() == 0 {
b.logf("Network lock is dropping peer %v(%v) due to missing signature", p.ID(), p.StableID())
mak.Set(&toDelete, i, true)
} else {
details, err := b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorizedWithDetails(p.Key(), p.KeySignature().AsSlice())
if err != nil {
b.logf("Network lock is dropping peer %v(%v) due to failed signature check: %v", p.ID(), p.StableID(), err)
mak.Set(&toDelete, i, true)
continue
}
if details != nil {
// Rotation details are returned when the node key is signed by a valid SigRotation signature.
tracker.addRotationDetails(p.Key(), details)
}
}
}
obsoleteByRotation := tracker.obsoleteKeys()
// nm.Peers is ordered, so deletion must be order-preserving.
if len(toDelete) > 0 || len(obsoleteByRotation) > 0 {
peers := make([]tailcfg.NodeView, 0, len(nm.Peers))
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
filtered := make([]ipnstate.TKAPeer, 0, len(toDelete)+len(obsoleteByRotation))
for i, p := range nm.Peers {
if !toDelete[i] && !obsoleteByRotation.Contains(p.Key()) {
peers = append(peers, p)
} else {
if obsoleteByRotation.Contains(p.Key()) {
b.logf("Network lock is dropping peer %v(%v) due to key rotation", p.ID(), p.StableID())
}
// Record information about the node we filtered out.
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
filtered = append(filtered, tkaStateFromPeer(p))
}
}
nm.Peers = peers
b.tka.filtered = filtered
} else {
b.tka.filtered = nil
}
// Check that we ourselves are not locked out, report a health issue if so.
if nm.SelfNode.Valid() && b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorized(nm.SelfNode.Key(), nm.SelfNode.KeySignature().AsSlice()) != nil {
b.health.SetTKAHealth(errors.New(healthmsg.LockedOut))
} else {
b.health.SetTKAHealth(nil)
}
}
// rotationTracker determines the set of node keys that are made obsolete by key
// rotation.
// - for each SigRotation signature, all previous node keys referenced by the
// nested signatures are marked as obsolete.
// - if there are multiple SigRotation signatures tracing back to the same
// wrapping pubkey of the initial SigDirect signature (e.g. if a node is
// cloned with all its keys), we keep just one of them, marking the others as
// obsolete.
type rotationTracker struct {
// obsolete is the set of node keys that are obsolete due to key rotation.
// users of rotationTracker should use the obsoleteKeys method for complete results.
obsolete set.Set[key.NodePublic]
// byWrappingKey keeps track of rotation details per wrapping pubkey.
byWrappingKey map[string][]sigRotationDetails
logf logger.Logf
}
// sigRotationDetails holds information about a node key signed by a SigRotation.
type sigRotationDetails struct {
np key.NodePublic
numPrevKeys int
}
// addRotationDetails records the rotation signature details for a node key.
func (r *rotationTracker) addRotationDetails(np key.NodePublic, d *tka.RotationDetails) {
r.obsolete.Make()
r.obsolete.AddSlice(d.PrevNodeKeys)
if d.InitialSig.SigKind != tka.SigDirect {
// Only enforce uniqueness of chains originating from a SigDirect
// signature. Chains that begin with a SigCredential can legitimately
// start from the same wrapping pubkey when multiple nodes join the
// network using the same reusable auth key.
return
}
rd := sigRotationDetails{
np: np,
numPrevKeys: len(d.PrevNodeKeys),
}
if r.byWrappingKey == nil {
r.byWrappingKey = make(map[string][]sigRotationDetails)
}
wp := string(d.InitialSig.WrappingPubkey)
r.byWrappingKey[wp] = append(r.byWrappingKey[wp], rd)
}
// obsoleteKeys returns the set of node keys that are obsolete due to key rotation.
func (r *rotationTracker) obsoleteKeys() set.Set[key.NodePublic] {
for _, v := range r.byWrappingKey {
// Do not consider signatures for keys that have been marked as obsolete
// by another signature.
v = slices.DeleteFunc(v, func(rd sigRotationDetails) bool {
return r.obsolete.Contains(rd.np)
})
if len(v) == 0 {
continue
}
// If there are multiple rotation signatures with the same wrapping
// pubkey, we need to decide which one is the "latest", and keep it.
// The signature with the largest number of previous keys is likely to
// be the latest.
slices.SortStableFunc(v, func(a, b sigRotationDetails) int {
// Sort by decreasing number of previous keys.
return b.numPrevKeys - a.numPrevKeys
})
// If there are several signatures with the same number of previous
// keys, we cannot determine which one is the latest, so all of them are
// rejected for safety.
if len(v) >= 2 && v[0].numPrevKeys == v[1].numPrevKeys {
r.logf("at least two nodes (%s and %s) have equally valid rotation signatures with the same wrapping pubkey, rejecting", v[0].np, v[1].np)
for _, rd := range v {
r.obsolete.Add(rd.np)
}
} else {
// The first key in v is the one with the longest chain of previous
// keys, so it must be the newest one. Mark all older keys as obsolete.
for _, rd := range v[1:] {
r.obsolete.Add(rd.np)
}
}
}
return r.obsolete
}
// tkaSyncIfNeeded examines TKA info reported from the control plane,
// performing the steps necessary to synchronize local tka state.
//
// There are 4 scenarios handled here:
// - Enablement: nm.TKAEnabled but b.tka == nil
// ∴ reach out to /machine/tka/bootstrap to get the genesis AUM, then
// initialize TKA.
// - Disablement: !nm.TKAEnabled but b.tka != nil
// ∴ reach out to /machine/tka/bootstrap to read the disablement secret,
// then verify and clear tka local state.
// - Sync needed: b.tka.Head != nm.TKAHead
// ∴ complete multi-step synchronization flow.
// - Everything up to date: All other cases.
// ∴ no action necessary.
//
// tkaSyncIfNeeded immediately takes b.takeSyncLock which is held throughout,
// and may take b.mu as required.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaSyncIfNeeded(nm *netmap.NetworkMap, prefs ipn.PrefsView) error {
b.tkaSyncLock.Lock() // take tkaSyncLock to make this function an exclusive section.
defer b.tkaSyncLock.Unlock()
b.mu.Lock() // take mu to protect access to synchronized fields.
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil && !b.capTailnetLock {
return nil
}
if b.tka != nil || nm.TKAEnabled {
b.logf("tkaSyncIfNeeded: enabled=%v, head=%v", nm.TKAEnabled, nm.TKAHead)
}
ourNodeKey, ok := prefs.Persist().PublicNodeKeyOK()
if !ok {
return errors.New("tkaSyncIfNeeded: no node key in prefs")
}
isEnabled := b.tka != nil
wantEnabled := nm.TKAEnabled
didJustEnable := false
if isEnabled != wantEnabled {
var ourHead tka.AUMHash
if b.tka != nil {
ourHead = b.tka.authority.Head()
}
// Regardless of whether we are moving to disabled or enabled, we
// need information from the tka bootstrap endpoint.
b.mu.Unlock()
bs, err := b.tkaFetchBootstrap(ourNodeKey, ourHead)
b.mu.Lock()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("fetching bootstrap: %w", err)
}
if wantEnabled && !isEnabled {
if err := b.tkaBootstrapFromGenesisLocked(bs.GenesisAUM, prefs.Persist()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bootstrap: %w", err)
}
isEnabled = true
didJustEnable = true
} else if !wantEnabled && isEnabled {
if err := b.tkaApplyDisablementLocked(bs.DisablementSecret); err != nil {
// We log here instead of returning an error (which itself would be
// logged), so that sync will continue even if control gives us an
// incorrect disablement secret.
b.logf("Disablement failed, leaving TKA enabled. Error: %v", err)
} else {
isEnabled = false
b.health.SetTKAHealth(nil)
}
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("[bug] unreachable invariant of wantEnabled w/ isEnabled")
}
}
// We always transmit the sync RPCs if TKA was just enabled.
// This informs the control plane that our TKA state is now
// initialized to the transmitted TKA head hash.
if isEnabled && (b.tka.authority.Head() != nm.TKAHead || didJustEnable) {
if err := b.tkaSyncLocked(ourNodeKey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tka sync: %w", err)
}
}
return nil
}
func toSyncOffer(head string, ancestors []string) (tka.SyncOffer, error) {
var out tka.SyncOffer
if err := out.Head.UnmarshalText([]byte(head)); err != nil {
return tka.SyncOffer{}, fmt.Errorf("head.UnmarshalText: %v", err)
}
out.Ancestors = make([]tka.AUMHash, len(ancestors))
for i, a := range ancestors {
if err := out.Ancestors[i].UnmarshalText([]byte(a)); err != nil {
return tka.SyncOffer{}, fmt.Errorf("ancestor[%d].UnmarshalText: %v", i, err)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// tkaSyncLocked synchronizes TKA state with control. b.mu must be held
// and tka must be initialized. b.mu will be stepped out of (and back into)
// during network RPCs.
//
// b.mu must be held.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaSyncLocked(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic) error {
offer, err := b.tka.authority.SyncOffer(b.tka.storage)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("offer: %w", err)
}
b.mu.Unlock()
offerResp, err := b.tkaDoSyncOffer(ourNodeKey, offer)
b.mu.Lock()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("offer RPC: %w", err)
}
controlOffer, err := toSyncOffer(offerResp.Head, offerResp.Ancestors)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("control offer: %v", err)
}
if controlOffer.Head == offer.Head {
// We are up to date.
return nil
}
// Compute missing AUMs before we apply any AUMs from the control-plane,
// so we still submit AUMs to control even if they are not part of the
// active chain.
toSendAUMs, err := b.tka.authority.MissingAUMs(b.tka.storage, controlOffer)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("computing missing AUMs: %w", err)
}
// If we got this far, then we are not up to date. Either the control-plane
// has updates for us, or we have updates for the control plane.
//
// TODO(tom): Do we want to keep processing even if the Inform fails? Need
// to think through if theres holdback concerns here or not.
if len(offerResp.MissingAUMs) > 0 {
aums := make([]tka.AUM, len(offerResp.MissingAUMs))
for i, a := range offerResp.MissingAUMs {
if err := aums[i].Unserialize(a); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("MissingAUMs[%d]: %v", i, err)
}
}
if err := b.tka.authority.Inform(b.tka.storage, aums); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("inform failed: %v", err)
}
}
// NOTE(tom): We always send this RPC so control knows what TKA
// head we landed at.
head := b.tka.authority.Head()
b.mu.Unlock()
sendResp, err := b.tkaDoSyncSend(ourNodeKey, head, toSendAUMs, false)
b.mu.Lock()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("send RPC: %v", err)
}
var remoteHead tka.AUMHash
if err := remoteHead.UnmarshalText([]byte(sendResp.Head)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("head unmarshal: %v", err)
}
if remoteHead != b.tka.authority.Head() {
b.logf("TKA desync: expected consensus after sync but our head is %v and the control plane's is %v", b.tka.authority.Head(), remoteHead)
}
return nil
}
// tkaApplyDisablementLocked checks a disablement secret and locally disables
// TKA (if correct). An error is returned if disablement failed.
//
// b.mu must be held & TKA must be initialized.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaApplyDisablementLocked(secret []byte) error {
if b.tka.authority.ValidDisablement(secret) {
if err := os.RemoveAll(b.chonkPathLocked()); err != nil {
return err
}
b.tka = nil
return nil
}
return errors.New("incorrect disablement secret")
}
// chonkPathLocked returns the absolute path to the directory in which TKA
// state (the 'tailchonk') is stored.
//
// b.mu must be held.
func (b *LocalBackend) chonkPathLocked() string {
return filepath.Join(b.TailscaleVarRoot(), "tka-profiles", string(b.pm.CurrentProfile().ID))
}
// tkaBootstrapFromGenesisLocked initializes the local (on-disk) state of the
// tailnet key authority, based on the given genesis AUM.
//
// b.mu must be held.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaBootstrapFromGenesisLocked(g tkatype.MarshaledAUM, persist persist.PersistView) error {
if err := b.CanSupportNetworkLock(); err != nil {
return err
}
var genesis tka.AUM
if err := genesis.Unserialize(g); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reading genesis: %v", err)
}
if persist.Valid() && persist.DisallowedTKAStateIDs().Len() > 0 {
if genesis.State == nil {
return errors.New("invalid genesis: missing State")
}
bootstrapStateID := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%d", genesis.State.StateID1, genesis.State.StateID2)
for i := range persist.DisallowedTKAStateIDs().Len() {
stateID := persist.DisallowedTKAStateIDs().At(i)
if stateID == bootstrapStateID {
return fmt.Errorf("TKA with stateID of %q is disallowed on this node", stateID)
}
}
}
chonkDir := b.chonkPathLocked()
if err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Dir(chonkDir), 0755); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("creating chonk root dir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Mkdir(chonkDir, 0755); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
chonk, err := tka.ChonkDir(chonkDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("chonk: %v", err)
}
authority, err := tka.Bootstrap(chonk, genesis)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tka bootstrap: %v", err)
}
b.tka = &tkaState{
profile: b.pm.CurrentProfile().ID,
authority: authority,
storage: chonk,
}
return nil
}
// CanSupportNetworkLock returns nil if tailscaled is able to operate
// a local tailnet key authority (and hence enforce network lock).
func (b *LocalBackend) CanSupportNetworkLock() error {
if b.tka != nil {
// If the TKA is being used, it is supported.
return nil
}
if b.TailscaleVarRoot() == "" {
return errors.New("network-lock is not supported in this configuration, try setting --statedir")
}
// There's a var root (aka --statedir), so if network lock gets
// initialized we have somewhere to store our AUMs. That's all
// we need.
return nil
}
// NetworkLockStatus returns a structure describing the state of the
// tailnet key authority, if any.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockStatus() *ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
var (
nodeKey *key.NodePublic
nlPriv key.NLPrivate
)
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
nkp := p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
nodeKey = &nkp
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
if nlPriv.IsZero() {
return &ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus{
Enabled: false,
NodeKey: nodeKey,
}
}
if b.tka == nil {
return &ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus{
Enabled: false,
NodeKey: nodeKey,
PublicKey: nlPriv.Public(),
}
}
var head [32]byte
h := b.tka.authority.Head()
copy(head[:], h[:])
var selfAuthorized bool
cmd/tailscale/cli: print node signature in `tailscale lock status` - Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`; - Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part of `tailscale lock status`. Examples: ``` $ tailscale lock status Tailnet lock is ENABLED. This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [OTB3a] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 Trusted signing keys: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self) tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59) ``` For a node created via a signed auth key: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [e3nAO] Nested: SigKind: credential KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a ``` For a node that rotated its key a few times: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [DOzL4] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [S/9yU] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [9E9v4] Nested: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [3QHTJ] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0 ``` Updates tailscale/corp#19764 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
5 months ago
nodeKeySignature := &tka.NodeKeySignature{}
if b.netMap != nil {
selfAuthorized = b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorized(b.netMap.SelfNode.Key(), b.netMap.SelfNode.KeySignature().AsSlice()) == nil
cmd/tailscale/cli: print node signature in `tailscale lock status` - Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`; - Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part of `tailscale lock status`. Examples: ``` $ tailscale lock status Tailnet lock is ENABLED. This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [OTB3a] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 Trusted signing keys: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self) tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59) ``` For a node created via a signed auth key: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [e3nAO] Nested: SigKind: credential KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a ``` For a node that rotated its key a few times: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [DOzL4] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [S/9yU] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [9E9v4] Nested: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [3QHTJ] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0 ``` Updates tailscale/corp#19764 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
5 months ago
if err := nodeKeySignature.Unserialize(b.netMap.SelfNode.KeySignature().AsSlice()); err != nil {
b.logf("failed to decode self node key signature: %v", err)
}
}
keys := b.tka.authority.Keys()
outKeys := make([]ipnstate.TKAKey, len(keys))
for i, k := range keys {
outKeys[i] = ipnstate.TKAKey{
Key: key.NLPublicFromEd25519Unsafe(k.Public),
Metadata: k.Meta,
Votes: k.Votes,
}
}
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
filtered := make([]*ipnstate.TKAPeer, len(b.tka.filtered))
for i := range len(filtered) {
filtered[i] = b.tka.filtered[i].Clone()
}
var visible []*ipnstate.TKAPeer
if b.netMap != nil {
visible = make([]*ipnstate.TKAPeer, len(b.netMap.Peers))
for i, p := range b.netMap.Peers {
s := tkaStateFromPeer(p)
visible[i] = &s
}
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
}
stateID1, _ := b.tka.authority.StateIDs()
return &ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus{
cmd/tailscale/cli: print node signature in `tailscale lock status` - Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`; - Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part of `tailscale lock status`. Examples: ``` $ tailscale lock status Tailnet lock is ENABLED. This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [OTB3a] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 Trusted signing keys: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self) tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59) ``` For a node created via a signed auth key: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [e3nAO] Nested: SigKind: credential KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a ``` For a node that rotated its key a few times: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [DOzL4] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [S/9yU] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [9E9v4] Nested: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [3QHTJ] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0 ``` Updates tailscale/corp#19764 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
5 months ago
Enabled: true,
Head: &head,
PublicKey: nlPriv.Public(),
NodeKey: nodeKey,
NodeKeySigned: selfAuthorized,
NodeKeySignature: nodeKeySignature,
TrustedKeys: outKeys,
FilteredPeers: filtered,
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
VisiblePeers: visible,
cmd/tailscale/cli: print node signature in `tailscale lock status` - Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`; - Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part of `tailscale lock status`. Examples: ``` $ tailscale lock status Tailnet lock is ENABLED. This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [OTB3a] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 Trusted signing keys: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self) tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59) ``` For a node created via a signed auth key: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [e3nAO] Nested: SigKind: credential KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a ``` For a node that rotated its key a few times: ``` This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [DOzL4] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [S/9yU] Nested: SigKind: rotation Pubkey: [9E9v4] Nested: SigKind: direct Pubkey: [3QHTJ] KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0 ``` Updates tailscale/corp#19764 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
5 months ago
StateID: stateID1,
}
}
cmd/tl-longchain: tool to re-sign nodes with long rotation signatures In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long. This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for rotation signatures. Example output: ``` 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures: 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing 2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2 ``` To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`. Updates #13185 Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
2 months ago
func tkaStateFromPeer(p tailcfg.NodeView) ipnstate.TKAPeer {
fp := ipnstate.TKAPeer{
Name: p.Name(),
ID: p.ID(),
StableID: p.StableID(),
TailscaleIPs: make([]netip.Addr, 0, p.Addresses().Len()),
NodeKey: p.Key(),
}
for i := range p.Addresses().Len() {
addr := p.Addresses().At(i)
if addr.IsSingleIP() && tsaddr.IsTailscaleIP(addr.Addr()) {
fp.TailscaleIPs = append(fp.TailscaleIPs, addr.Addr())
}
}
var decoded tka.NodeKeySignature
if err := decoded.Unserialize(p.KeySignature().AsSlice()); err == nil {
fp.NodeKeySignature = decoded
}
return fp
}
// NetworkLockInit enables network-lock for the tailnet, with the tailnets'
// key authority initialized to trust the provided keys.
//
// Initialization involves two RPCs with control, termed 'begin' and 'finish'.
// The Begin RPC transmits the genesis Authority Update Message, which
// encodes the initial state of the authority, and the list of all nodes
// needing signatures is returned as a response.
// The Finish RPC submits signatures for all these nodes, at which point
// Control has everything it needs to atomically enable network lock.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockInit(keys []tka.Key, disablementValues [][]byte, supportDisablement []byte) error {
if err := b.CanSupportNetworkLock(); err != nil {
return err
}
var ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
var nlPriv key.NLPrivate
b.mu.Lock()
if !b.capTailnetLock {
b.mu.Unlock()
return errors.New("not permitted to enable tailnet lock")
}
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
b.mu.Unlock()
if ourNodeKey.IsZero() || nlPriv.IsZero() {
return errors.New("no node-key: is tailscale logged in?")
}
var entropy [16]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(entropy[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
// Generates a genesis AUM representing trust in the provided keys.
// We use an in-memory tailchonk because we don't want to commit to
// the filesystem until we've finished the initialization sequence,
// just in case something goes wrong.
_, genesisAUM, err := tka.Create(&tka.Mem{}, tka.State{
Keys: keys,
// TODO(tom): s/tka.State.DisablementSecrets/tka.State.DisablementValues
// This will center on consistent nomenclature:
// - DisablementSecret: value needed to disable.
// - DisablementValue: the KDF of the disablement secret, a public value.
DisablementSecrets: disablementValues,
StateID1: binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(entropy[:8]),
StateID2: binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(entropy[8:]),
}, nlPriv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tka.Create: %v", err)
}
b.logf("Generated genesis AUM to initialize network lock, trusting the following keys:")
for i, k := range genesisAUM.State.Keys {
b.logf(" - key[%d] = tlpub:%x with %d votes", i, k.Public, k.Votes)
}
// Phase 1/2 of initialization: Transmit the genesis AUM to Control.
initResp, err := b.tkaInitBegin(ourNodeKey, genesisAUM)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tka init-begin RPC: %w", err)
}
// Our genesis AUM was accepted but before Control turns on enforcement of
// node-key signatures, we need to sign keys for all the existing nodes.
// If we don't get these signatures ahead of time, everyone will loose
// connectivity because control won't have any signatures to send which
// satisfy network-lock checks.
sigs := make(map[tailcfg.NodeID]tkatype.MarshaledSignature, len(initResp.NeedSignatures))
for _, nodeInfo := range initResp.NeedSignatures {
nks, err := signNodeKey(nodeInfo, nlPriv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("generating signature: %v", err)
}
sigs[nodeInfo.NodeID] = nks.Serialize()
}
// Finalize enablement by transmitting signature for all nodes to Control.
_, err = b.tkaInitFinish(ourNodeKey, sigs, supportDisablement)
return err
}
// Only use is in tests.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockVerifySignatureForTest(nks tkatype.MarshaledSignature, nodeKey key.NodePublic) error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return errNetworkLockNotActive
}
return b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorized(nodeKey, nks)
}
// Only use is in tests.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockKeyTrustedForTest(keyID tkatype.KeyID) bool {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
panic("network lock not initialized")
}
return b.tka.authority.KeyTrusted(keyID)
}
// NetworkLockForceLocalDisable shuts down TKA locally, and denylists the current
// TKA from being initialized locally in future.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockForceLocalDisable() error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return errNetworkLockNotActive
}
id1, id2 := b.tka.authority.StateIDs()
stateID := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%d", id1, id2)
newPrefs := b.pm.CurrentPrefs().AsStruct().Clone() // .Persist should always be initialized here.
newPrefs.Persist.DisallowedTKAStateIDs = append(newPrefs.Persist.DisallowedTKAStateIDs, stateID)
if err := b.pm.SetPrefs(newPrefs.View(), ipn.NetworkProfile{
MagicDNSName: b.netMap.MagicDNSSuffix(),
DomainName: b.netMap.DomainName(),
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("saving prefs: %w", err)
}
if err := os.RemoveAll(b.chonkPathLocked()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting TKA state: %w", err)
}
b.tka = nil
return nil
}
// NetworkLockSign signs the given node-key and submits it to the control plane.
// rotationPublic, if specified, must be an ed25519 public key.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockSign(nodeKey key.NodePublic, rotationPublic []byte) error {
ourNodeKey, sig, err := func(nodeKey key.NodePublic, rotationPublic []byte) (key.NodePublic, tka.NodeKeySignature, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
var nlPriv key.NLPrivate
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() {
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
if nlPriv.IsZero() {
return key.NodePublic{}, tka.NodeKeySignature{}, errMissingNetmap
}
if b.tka == nil {
return key.NodePublic{}, tka.NodeKeySignature{}, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
if !b.tka.authority.KeyTrusted(nlPriv.KeyID()) {
return key.NodePublic{}, tka.NodeKeySignature{}, errors.New(tsconst.TailnetLockNotTrustedMsg)
}
p, err := nodeKey.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return key.NodePublic{}, tka.NodeKeySignature{}, err
}
sig := tka.NodeKeySignature{
SigKind: tka.SigDirect,
KeyID: nlPriv.KeyID(),
Pubkey: p,
WrappingPubkey: rotationPublic,
}
sig.Signature, err = nlPriv.SignNKS(sig.SigHash())
if err != nil {
return key.NodePublic{}, tka.NodeKeySignature{}, fmt.Errorf("signature failed: %w", err)
}
return b.pm.CurrentPrefs().Persist().PublicNodeKey(), sig, nil
}(nodeKey, rotationPublic)
if err != nil {
return err
}
b.logf("Generated network-lock signature for %v, submitting to control plane", nodeKey)
if _, err := b.tkaSubmitSignature(ourNodeKey, sig.Serialize()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// NetworkLockModify adds and/or removes keys in the tailnet's key authority.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockModify(addKeys, removeKeys []tka.Key) (err error) {
defer func() {
if err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("modify network-lock keys: %w", err)
}
}()
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
var ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
}
if ourNodeKey.IsZero() {
return errors.New("no node-key: is tailscale logged in?")
}
var nlPriv key.NLPrivate
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() {
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
if nlPriv.IsZero() {
return errMissingNetmap
}
if b.tka == nil {
return errNetworkLockNotActive
}
if !b.tka.authority.KeyTrusted(nlPriv.KeyID()) {
return errors.New("this node does not have a trusted tailnet lock key")
}
updater := b.tka.authority.NewUpdater(nlPriv)
for _, addKey := range addKeys {
if err := updater.AddKey(addKey); err != nil {
return err
}
}
for _, removeKey := range removeKeys {
keyID, err := removeKey.ID()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := updater.RemoveKey(keyID); err != nil {
return err
}
}
aums, err := updater.Finalize(b.tka.storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(aums) == 0 {
return nil
}
head := b.tka.authority.Head()
b.mu.Unlock()
resp, err := b.tkaDoSyncSend(ourNodeKey, head, aums, true)
b.mu.Lock()
if err != nil {
return err
}
var controlHead tka.AUMHash
if err := controlHead.UnmarshalText([]byte(resp.Head)); err != nil {
return err
}
lastHead := aums[len(aums)-1].Hash()
if controlHead != lastHead {
return errors.New("central tka head differs from submitted AUM, try again")
}
return nil
}
// NetworkLockDisable disables network-lock using the provided disablement secret.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockDisable(secret []byte) error {
var (
ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
head tka.AUMHash
err error
)
b.mu.Lock()
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
}
if b.tka == nil {
err = errNetworkLockNotActive
} else {
head = b.tka.authority.Head()
if !b.tka.authority.ValidDisablement(secret) {
err = errors.New("incorrect disablement secret")
}
}
b.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if ourNodeKey.IsZero() {
return errors.New("no node-key: is tailscale logged in?")
}
_, err = b.tkaDoDisablement(ourNodeKey, head, secret)
return err
}
// NetworkLockLog returns the changelog of TKA state up to maxEntries in size.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockLog(maxEntries int) ([]ipnstate.NetworkLockUpdate, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
var out []ipnstate.NetworkLockUpdate
cursor := b.tka.authority.Head()
for range maxEntries {
aum, err := b.tka.storage.AUM(cursor)
if err != nil {
if err == os.ErrNotExist {
break
}
return out, fmt.Errorf("reading AUM: %w", err)
}
update := ipnstate.NetworkLockUpdate{
Hash: cursor,
Change: aum.MessageKind.String(),
Raw: aum.Serialize(),
}
out = append(out, update)
parent, hasParent := aum.Parent()
if !hasParent {
break
}
cursor = parent
}
return out, nil
}
// NetworkLockAffectedSigs returns the signatures which would be invalidated
// by removing trust in the specified KeyID.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockAffectedSigs(keyID tkatype.KeyID) ([]tkatype.MarshaledSignature, error) {
var (
ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
err error
)
b.mu.Lock()
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
}
if b.tka == nil {
err = errNetworkLockNotActive
}
b.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := b.tkaReadAffectedSigs(ourNodeKey, keyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
// Confirm for ourselves tha the signatures would actually be invalidated
// by removal of trusted in the specified key.
for i, sigBytes := range resp.Signatures {
var sig tka.NodeKeySignature
if err := sig.Unserialize(sigBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed decoding signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
sigKeyID, err := sig.UnverifiedAuthorizingKeyID()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting SigID from signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(keyID, sigKeyID) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("got signature with keyID %X from request for %X", sigKeyID, keyID)
}
var nodeKey key.NodePublic
if err := nodeKey.UnmarshalBinary(sig.Pubkey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed decoding pubkey for signature %d: %w", i, err)
}
if err := b.tka.authority.NodeKeyAuthorized(nodeKey, sigBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature %d is not valid: %w", i, err)
}
}
return resp.Signatures, nil
}
// NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM generates an AUM which retroactively removes trust in the
// specified keys. This AUM is signed by the current node and returned.
//
// If forkFrom is specified, it is used as the parent AUM to fork from. If the zero value,
// the parent AUM is determined automatically.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM(removeKeys []tkatype.KeyID, forkFrom tka.AUMHash) (*tka.AUM, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
var nlPriv key.NLPrivate
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() {
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
if nlPriv.IsZero() {
return nil, errMissingNetmap
}
aum, err := b.tka.authority.MakeRetroactiveRevocation(b.tka.storage, removeKeys, nlPriv.KeyID(), forkFrom)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Sign it ourselves.
aum.Signatures, err = nlPriv.SignAUM(aum.SigHash())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing failed: %w", err)
}
return aum, nil
}
// NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM co-signs the provided recovery AUM and returns
// the updated structure.
//
// The recovery AUM provided should be the output from a previous call to
// NetworkLockGenerateRecoveryAUM or NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockCosignRecoveryAUM(aum *tka.AUM) (*tka.AUM, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return nil, errNetworkLockNotActive
}
var nlPriv key.NLPrivate
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() {
nlPriv = p.Persist().NetworkLockKey()
}
if nlPriv.IsZero() {
return nil, errMissingNetmap
}
for _, sig := range aum.Signatures {
if bytes.Equal(sig.KeyID, nlPriv.KeyID()) {
return nil, errors.New("this node has already signed this recovery AUM")
}
}
// Sign it ourselves.
sigs, err := nlPriv.SignAUM(aum.SigHash())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing failed: %w", err)
}
aum.Signatures = append(aum.Signatures, sigs...)
return aum, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockSubmitRecoveryAUM(aum *tka.AUM) error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return errNetworkLockNotActive
}
var ourNodeKey key.NodePublic
if p := b.pm.CurrentPrefs(); p.Valid() && p.Persist().Valid() && !p.Persist().PrivateNodeKey().IsZero() {
ourNodeKey = p.Persist().PublicNodeKey()
}
if ourNodeKey.IsZero() {
return errors.New("no node-key: is tailscale logged in?")
}
b.mu.Unlock()
_, err := b.tkaDoSyncSend(ourNodeKey, aum.Hash(), []tka.AUM{*aum}, false)
b.mu.Lock()
return err
}
var tkaSuffixEncoder = base64.RawStdEncoding
// NetworkLockWrapPreauthKey wraps a pre-auth key with information to
// enable unattended bringup in the locked tailnet.
//
// The provided trusted tailnet-lock key is used to sign
// a SigCredential structure, which is encoded along with the
// private key and appended to the pre-auth key.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockWrapPreauthKey(preauthKey string, tkaKey key.NLPrivate) (string, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return "", errNetworkLockNotActive
}
pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil) // nil == crypto/rand
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
sig := tka.NodeKeySignature{
SigKind: tka.SigCredential,
KeyID: tkaKey.KeyID(),
WrappingPubkey: pub,
}
sig.Signature, err = tkaKey.SignNKS(sig.SigHash())
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("signing failed: %w", err)
}
b.logf("Generated network-lock credential signature using %s", tkaKey.Public().CLIString())
return fmt.Sprintf("%s--TL%s-%s", preauthKey, tkaSuffixEncoder.EncodeToString(sig.Serialize()), tkaSuffixEncoder.EncodeToString(priv)), nil
}
// NetworkLockVerifySigningDeeplink asks the authority to verify the given deeplink
// URL. See the comment for ValidateDeeplink for details.
func (b *LocalBackend) NetworkLockVerifySigningDeeplink(url string) tka.DeeplinkValidationResult {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.tka == nil {
return tka.DeeplinkValidationResult{IsValid: false, Error: errNetworkLockNotActive.Error()}
}
return b.tka.authority.ValidateDeeplink(url)
}
func signNodeKey(nodeInfo tailcfg.TKASignInfo, signer key.NLPrivate) (*tka.NodeKeySignature, error) {
p, err := nodeInfo.NodePublic.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sig := tka.NodeKeySignature{
SigKind: tka.SigDirect,
KeyID: signer.KeyID(),
Pubkey: p,
WrappingPubkey: nodeInfo.RotationPubkey,
}
sig.Signature, err = signer.SignNKS(sig.SigHash())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature failed: %w", err)
}
return &sig, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaInitBegin(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, aum tka.AUM) (*tailcfg.TKAInitBeginResponse, error) {
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(tailcfg.TKAInitBeginRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
GenesisAUM: aum.Serialize(),
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/init/begin", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKAInitBeginResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 10 * 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaInitFinish(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, nks map[tailcfg.NodeID]tkatype.MarshaledSignature, supportDisablement []byte) (*tailcfg.TKAInitFinishResponse, error) {
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(tailcfg.TKAInitFinishRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
Signatures: nks,
SupportDisablement: supportDisablement,
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/init/finish", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKAInitFinishResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
// tkaFetchBootstrap sends a /machine/tka/bootstrap RPC to the control plane
// over noise. This is used to get values necessary to enable or disable TKA.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaFetchBootstrap(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, head tka.AUMHash) (*tailcfg.TKABootstrapResponse, error) {
bootstrapReq := tailcfg.TKABootstrapRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
}
if !head.IsZero() {
head, err := head.MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("head.MarshalText failed: %v", err)
}
bootstrapReq.Head = string(head)
}
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(bootstrapReq); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ctx: %w", err)
}
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/bootstrap", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKABootstrapResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
func fromSyncOffer(offer tka.SyncOffer) (head string, ancestors []string, err error) {
headBytes, err := offer.Head.MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("head.MarshalText: %v", err)
}
ancestors = make([]string, len(offer.Ancestors))
for i, ancestor := range offer.Ancestors {
hash, err := ancestor.MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("ancestor[%d].MarshalText: %v", i, err)
}
ancestors[i] = string(hash)
}
return string(headBytes), ancestors, nil
}
// tkaDoSyncOffer sends a /machine/tka/sync/offer RPC to the control plane
// over noise. This is the first of two RPCs implementing tka synchronization.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaDoSyncOffer(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, offer tka.SyncOffer) (*tailcfg.TKASyncOfferResponse, error) {
head, ancestors, err := fromSyncOffer(offer)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding offer: %v", err)
}
syncReq := tailcfg.TKASyncOfferRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
Head: head,
Ancestors: ancestors,
}
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(syncReq); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/sync/offer", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKASyncOfferResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 10 * 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
// tkaDoSyncSend sends a /machine/tka/sync/send RPC to the control plane
// over noise. This is the second of two RPCs implementing tka synchronization.
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaDoSyncSend(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, head tka.AUMHash, aums []tka.AUM, interactive bool) (*tailcfg.TKASyncSendResponse, error) {
headBytes, err := head.MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("head.MarshalText: %w", err)
}
sendReq := tailcfg.TKASyncSendRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
Head: string(headBytes),
MissingAUMs: make([]tkatype.MarshaledAUM, len(aums)),
Interactive: interactive,
}
for i, a := range aums {
sendReq.MissingAUMs[i] = a.Serialize()
}
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(sendReq); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/sync/send", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKASyncSendResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 10 * 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaDoDisablement(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, head tka.AUMHash, secret []byte) (*tailcfg.TKADisableResponse, error) {
headBytes, err := head.MarshalText()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("head.MarshalText: %w", err)
}
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(tailcfg.TKADisableRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
Head: string(headBytes),
DisablementSecret: secret,
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/disable", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKADisableResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaSubmitSignature(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, sig tkatype.MarshaledSignature) (*tailcfg.TKASubmitSignatureResponse, error) {
var req bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&req).Encode(tailcfg.TKASubmitSignatureRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
Signature: sig,
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req2, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/sign", &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
res, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
res.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKASubmitSignatureResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: res.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}
func (b *LocalBackend) tkaReadAffectedSigs(ourNodeKey key.NodePublic, key tkatype.KeyID) (*tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyResponse, error) {
var encodedReq bytes.Buffer
if err := json.NewEncoder(&encodedReq).Encode(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyRequest{
Version: tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion,
NodeKey: ourNodeKey,
KeyID: key,
}); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoding request: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", "https://unused/machine/tka/affected-sigs", &encodedReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("req: %w", err)
}
resp, err := b.DoNoiseRequest(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resp: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned (%d): %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
}
a := new(tailcfg.TKASignaturesUsingKeyResponse)
err = json.NewDecoder(&io.LimitedReader{R: resp.Body, N: 1024 * 1024}).Decode(a)
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding JSON: %w", err)
}
return a, nil
}