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296 lines
9.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
296 lines
9.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
End-to-End Encryption
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=====================
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.. TODO-doc
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- Why is this needed.
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- Overview of process
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- Implementation
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Matrix optionally supports end-to-end encryption, allowing rooms to be created
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whose conversation contents is not decryptable or interceptable on any of the
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participating homeservers.
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End-to-end crypto is still being designed and prototyped - notes on the design
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may be found at https://lwn.net/Articles/634144/
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Overview
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========
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.. code::
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1) Bob publishes the public keys and supported algorithms for his device.
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+----------+ +--------------+
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| Bob's HS | | Bob's Device |
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+----------+ +--------------+
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|<=============|
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/keys/upload
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2) Alice requests Bob's public key and supported algorithms.
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+
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| Alice's Device | | Alice's HS | | Bob's HS |
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+
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| | |
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|=================>|==============>|
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/keys/query <federation>
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3) Alice selects an algorithm claims any one-time keys needed.
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+
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| Alice's Device | | Alice's HS | | Bob's HS |
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+
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| | |
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|=================>|==============>|
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/keys/claim <federation>
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4) Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob.
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +--------------+
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| Alice's Device | | Alice's HS | | Bob's HS | | Bob's Device |
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+----------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +--------------+
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| | | |
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|----------------->|-------------->|------------->|
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/send/ <federation> <events>
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Client Behaviour
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----------------
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Uploading Keys
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Keys are uploaded as a signed JSON object. The JSON object must include an
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ed25519 key and must be signed by that key. A device may only have one ed25519
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signing key. This key is used as the fingerprint for a device by other clients.
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The JSON object is signed using the process given by `Signing JSON`_.
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.. code:: http
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POST /_matrix/client/v2_alpha/keys/upload/<device_id> HTTP/1.1
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"device_keys": {
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"user_id": "<user_id>",
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"device_id": "<device_id>",
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"valid_after_ts": 1234567890123,
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"valid_until_ts": 2345678901234,
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"algorithms": [
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"<algorithm-name>",
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],
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"keys": {
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"<algorithm>:<device_id>": "<key_base64>",
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},
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"signatures": {
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"<user_id>": {
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"<algorithm>:<device_id>": "<signature_base64>"
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} } },
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"one_time_keys": {
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"<algorithm>:<key_id>": "<key_base64>"
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} }
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.. code:: http
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"one_time_key_counts": {
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"<algorithm>": 50
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}
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}
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Downloading Keys
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Keys are downloaded as a collection of signed JSON objects. There
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will be a JSON object per device per user. If one of the user's
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devices doesn't support end-to-end encryption then their
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homeserver must synthesise a JSON object without any device keys
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for that device.
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The JSON must be signed by both the homeserver of
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the user querying the keys and by the homeserver of the device
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being queried. This provides an audit trail if either homeserver
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lies about the keys a user owns.
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.. code:: http
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POST /keys/query HTTP/1.1
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"device_keys": {
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"<user_id>": ["<device_id>"]
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} }
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.. code:: http
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"device_keys": {
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"<user_id>": {
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"<device_id>": {
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"user_id": "<user_id>",
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"device_id": "<device_id>",
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"valid_after_ts": 1234567890123,
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"valid_until_ts": 2345678901234,
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"algorithms": [
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"<algorithm_name>",
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],
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"keys": {
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"<algorithm>:<device_id>": "<key_base64>",
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},
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"signatures": {
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"<user_id>": {
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"<algorithm>:<device_id>": "<signature_base64>"
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},
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"<local_server_name>": {
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"<algorithm>:<key_id>": "<signature_base64>"
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},
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"<remote_server_name>": {
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"<algorithm>:<key_id>": "<signature_base64>"
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} } } } } }
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Clients use ``/_matrix/client/v2_alpha/keys/query`` on their own homeservers to
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query keys for any user they wish to contact. Homeservers will respond with the
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keys for their local users and forward requests for remote users to
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``/_matrix/federation/v1/user/keys/query`` over federation to the remote
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server.
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Claiming One Time Keys
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Some algorithms require one-time keys to improve their secrecy and deniability.
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These keys are used once during session establishment, and are then thrown
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away. In order for these keys to be useful for improving deniability they
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must not be signed using the ed25519 key for a device.
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A device must generate a number of these keys and publish them onto their
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homeserver. A device must periodically check how many one-time keys their
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homeserver still has. If the number has become too small then the device must
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generate new one-time keys and upload them to the homeserver.
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Devices must store the private part of each one-time key they upload. They can
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discard the private part of the one-time key when they receive a message using
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that key. However it's possible that a one-time key given out by a homeserver
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will never be used, so the device that generates the key will never know that
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it can discard the key. Therefore a device could end up trying to store too
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many private keys. A device that is trying to store too many private keys may
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discard keys starting with the oldest.
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A homeserver should ratelimit the number of one-time keys that a given user or
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remote server can claim. A homeserver should discard the public part of a one
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time key once it has given that key to another user.
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.. code:: http
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POST /keys/claim HTTP/1.1
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"one_time_keys": {
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"<user_id>": {
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"<device_id>": "<algorithm>"
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} } }
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.. code:: http
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"one_time_keys": {
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"<user_id>": {
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"<device_id>": {
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"<algorithm>:<key_id>": "<key_base64>"
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} } } }
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Clients use ``/_matrix/client/v2_alpha/keys/claim`` on their own homeservers to
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claim keys for any user they wish to contact. Homeservers will respond with the
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keys for their local users and forward requests for remote users to
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``/_matrix/federation/v1/user/keys/claim`` over federation to the remote
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server.
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Sending a Message
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Encrypted messages are sent in the form.
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.. code:: json
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{
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"type": "m.room.encrypted",
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"content": {
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"algorithm": "<algorithm_name>"
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} }
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Using Olm
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#########
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.. code:: json
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{
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"type": "m.room.encrypted",
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"content": {
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"algorithm": "m.olm.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2",
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"sender_key": "<sender_curve25519_key>",
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"ciphertext": {
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"<device_curve25519_key>": {
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"type": 0,
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"body": "<base_64>"
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} } } }
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The ciphertext is a mapping from device curve25519 key to an encypted payload
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for that device. The ``body`` is a base64 encoded message body. The type is an
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integer indicating the type of the message body: 0 for the intial pre-key
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message, 1 for ordinary messages.
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Olm sessions will generate messages with a type of 0 until they receive a
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message. Once a session has decrypted a message it will produce messages with
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a type of 1.
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When a client receives a message with a type of 0 it must first check if it
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already has a matching session. If it does then it will use that session to
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try to decrypt the message. If there is no existing session then the client
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must create a new session and use the new session to decrypt the message. A
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client must not persist a session or remove one-time keys used by a session
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until it has sucessfully decrypted a message using that session.
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The plaintext payload is of the form:
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.. code:: json
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{
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"type": "<type of the plaintext event>",
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"content": "<content for the plaintext event>",
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"room_id": "<the room_id>",
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"fingerprint": "<sha256 hash of the currently participating keys>"
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}
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The type and content of the plaintext message event are given in the payload.
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Encyrpting state events is not supported.
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We include the room ID in the payload, because otherwise the homeserver would
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be able to change the room a message was sent in. We include a hash of the
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participating keys so that clients can detect if another device is unexpectedly
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included in the conversation.
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Clients must confirm that the ``sender_key`` belongs to the user that sent the
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message.
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