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203 lines
9.6 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. Copyright 2018-2019 New Vector Ltd
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..
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.. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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.. you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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.. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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..
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.. http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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..
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.. Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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.. distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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.. WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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.. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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.. limitations under the License.
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Room Version 2
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==============
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This room version builds off of `version 1 <v1.html>`_ with an improved state
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resolution algorithm.
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Server implementation components
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--------------------------------
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.. WARNING::
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The information contained in this section is strictly for server implementors.
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Applications which use the Client-Server API are generally unaffected by the
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details contained here, and can safely ignore their presence.
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The algorithms defined here should only apply to version 2 rooms. Other algorithms
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may be used by other room versions, and as such servers should be aware of which
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version room they are dealing with prior to executing a given algorithm.
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State resolution
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The room state :math:`S'(E)` after an event :math:`E` is defined in terms of
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the room state :math:`S(E)` before :math:`E`, and depends on whether
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:math:`E` is a state event or a message event:
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* If :math:`E` is a message event, then :math:`S'(E) = S(E)`.
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* If :math:`E` is a state event, then :math:`S'(E)` is :math:`S(E)`, except
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that its entry corresponding to :math:`E`'s ``event_type`` and ``state_key``
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is replaced by :math:`E`'s ``event_id``.
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The room state :math:`S(E)` before :math:`E` is the *resolution* of the set of
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states :math:`\{ S'(E_1), S'(E_2), … \}` consisting of the states after each of
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:math:`E`'s ``prev_event``\s :math:`\{ E_1, E_2, … \}`, where the resolution of
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a set of states is given in the algorithm below.
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Definitions
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+++++++++++
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The state resolution algorithm for version 2 rooms uses the following
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definitions, given the set of room states :math:`\{ S_1, S_2, \ldots \}`:
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Power events
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A *power event* is a state event with type ``m.room.power_levels`` or
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``m.room.join_rules``, or a state event with type ``m.room.member`` where the
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``membership`` is ``leave`` or ``ban`` and the ``sender`` does not match the
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``state_key``. The idea behind this is that power events are events that might
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remove someone's ability to do something in the room.
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Unconflicted state map and conflicted state set
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The *unconflicted state map* is the state where the value of each key exists
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and is the same in each state :math:`S_i`. The *conflicted state set* is the
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set of all other state events. Note that the unconflicted state map only has
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one event per ``(event_type, state_key)``, whereas the conflicted state set
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may have multiple events.
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Auth difference
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The *auth difference* is calculated by first calculating the full auth chain
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for each state :math:`S_i`, that is the union of the auth chains for each
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event in :math:`S_i`, and then taking every event that doesn't appear in
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every auth chain. If :math:`C_i` is the full auth chain of :math:`S_i`, then
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the auth difference is :math:`\cup C_i - \cap C_i`.
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Full conflicted set
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The *full conflicted set* is the union of the conflicted state set and the
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auth difference.
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Reverse topological power ordering
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The *reverse topological power ordering* of a set of events is the
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lexicographically smallest topological ordering based on the DAG formed by
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auth events. The reverse topological power ordering is ordered from earliest
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event to latest. For comparing two topological orderings to determine which
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is the lexicographically smallest, the following comparison relation on
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events is used: for events :math:`x` and :math:`y`, :math:`x<y` if
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1. :math:`x`'s sender has *greater* power level than :math:`y`'s sender,
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when looking at their respective ``auth_event``\s; or
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2. the senders have the same power level, but :math:`x`'s
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``origin_server_ts`` is *less* than :math:`y`'s ``origin_server_ts``; or
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3. the senders have the same power level and the events have the same
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``origin_server_ts``, but :math:`x`'s ``event_id`` is *less* than
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:math:`y`'s ``event_id``.
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The reverse topological power ordering can be found by sorting the events
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using Kahn's algorithm for topological sorting, and at each step selecting,
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among all the candidate vertices, the smallest vertex using the above
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comparison relation.
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Mainline ordering
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Given an ``m.room.power_levels`` event :math:`P`, the *mainline of* :math:`P`
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is the list of events generated by starting with :math:`P` and recursively
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taking the ``m.room.power_levels`` events from the ``auth_events``, ordered
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such that :math:`P` is last. Given another event :math:`e`, the *closest
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mainline event to* :math:`e` is the first event encountered in the mainline
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when iteratively descending through the ``m.room.power_levels`` events in the
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``auth_events`` starting at :math:`e`. If no mainline event is encountered
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when iteratively descending through the ``m.room.power_levels`` events, then
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the closest mainline event to :math:`e` can be considered to be a dummy event
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that is before any other event in the mainline of :math:`P` for the purposes
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of condition 1 below.
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The *mainline ordering based on* :math:`P` of a set of events is the
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ordering, from smallest to largest, using the following comparision relation
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on events: for events :math:`x` and :math:`y`, :math:`x<y` if
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1. the closest mainline event to :math:`x` appears *before* the closest
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mainline event to :math:`y`; or
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2. the closest mainline events are the same, but :math:`x`\'s
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``origin_server_ts`` is *less* than :math:`y`\'s ``origin_server_ts``; or
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3. the closest mainline events are the same and the events have the same
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``origin_server_ts``, but :math:`x`\'s ``event_id`` is *less* than
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:math:`y`\'s ``event_id``.
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Iterative auth checks
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The *iterative auth checks algorithm* takes as input an initial room state
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and a sorted list of state events, and constructs a new room state by
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iterating through the event list and applying the state event to the room
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state if the state event is allowed by the `authorization rules`_. If the
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state event is not allowed by the authorization rules, then the event is
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ignored. If a ``(event_type, state_key)`` key that is required for checking
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the authorization rules is not present in the state, then the appropriate
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state event from the event's ``auth_events`` is used if the auth event is
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not rejected.
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Algorithm
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+++++++++
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The *resolution* of a set of states is obtained as follows:
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1. Take all *power events* and any events in their auth chains, recursively,
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that appear in the *full conflicted set* and order them by the *reverse
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topological power ordering*.
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2. Apply the *iterative auth checks algorithm* on the *unconflicted state map*
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and the list of events from the previous step to get a partially resolved
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state.
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3. Take all remaining events that weren't picked in step 1 and order them by
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the mainline ordering based on the power level in the partially resolved
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state obtained in step 2.
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4. Apply the *iterative auth checks algorithm* on the partial resolved
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state and the list of events from the previous step.
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5. Update the result by replacing any event with the event with the same key
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from the *unconflicted state map*, if such an event exists, to get the final
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resolved state.
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.. _`authorization rules`: ../server_server/unstable.html#authorization-rules
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Rejected events
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+++++++++++++++
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Events that have been rejected due to failing auth based on the state at the
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event (rather than based on their auth chain) are handled as usual by the
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algorithm, unless otherwise specified.
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Note that no events rejected due to failure to auth against their auth chain
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should appear in the process, as they should not appear in state (the algorithm
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only uses events that appear in either the state sets or in the auth chain of
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the events in the state sets).
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.. admonition:: Rationale
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This helps ensure that different servers' view of state is more likely to
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converge, since rejection state of an event may be different. This can happen if
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a third server gives an incorrect version of the state when a server joins a
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room via it (either due to being faulty or malicious). Convergence of state is a
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desirable property as it ensures that all users in the room have a (mostly)
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consistent view of the state of the room. If the view of the state on different
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servers diverges it can lead to bifurcation of the room due to e.g. servers
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disagreeing on who is in the room.
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Intuitively, using rejected events feels dangerous, however:
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1. Servers cannot arbitrarily make up state, since they still need to pass the
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auth checks based on the event's auth chain (e.g. they can't grant themselves
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power levels if they didn't have them before).
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2. For a previously rejected event to pass auth there must be a set of state
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that allows said event. A malicious server could therefore produce a
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fork where it claims the state is that particular set of state, duplicate the
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rejected event to point to that fork, and send the event. The
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duplicated event would then pass the auth checks. Ignoring rejected events
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would therefore not eliminate any potential attack vectors.
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Rejected auth events are deliberately excluded from use in the iterative auth
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checks, as auth events aren't re-authed (although non-auth events are) during
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the iterative auth checks.
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