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254 lines
8.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
Federation
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==========
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.. sectnum::
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.. contents:: Table of Contents
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Auth chain
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~~~~~~~~~~
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The *auth chain* for an event is the recursive list of auth events and the auth
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chain for those auth events.
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.. Note:: The auth chain for an event gives all the information a server needs
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to accept an event. However, being given an auth chain for an event
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that appears valid does not mean that the event might not later be
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rejected. For example if we discover that the sender had been banned
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between the join event listed in the auth events and the event being
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authed.
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**TODO**: Clean the above explanations up a bit.
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Auth chain resolution
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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If an auth check fails, or if we get told something we accepted should have
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been rejected, we need to try and determine who is right.
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If two servers disagree about the validity of the auth events, both should
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inform the other of what they think the current auth chain is. If either are
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missing auth events that they know are valid (through authorization and state
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resolution) they process the missing events as usual.
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If either side notice that the other has accepted an auth events we think
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should be rejected (for reasons *not* in their auth chain), that server should
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inform the other with suitable proof.
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The proofs can be:
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- An *event chain* that shows an auth event is *not* an ancestor of the event.
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This can be done by giving the full ancestor chains up to the depth of the
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invalid auth event.
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- Given an event (and event chain?) showing that authorization had been revoked.
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If a server discovers it cannot prove the other side is wrong, then it accepts
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that the other is correct; i.e. we always accept that the other side is correct
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unless we can prove otherwise.
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Constructing a new event
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------------------------
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**TODO**
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When constructing a new event, the server should insert the following fields:
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- ``prev_events``: The list of event ids of what the server believes are the
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current leaf nodes of the event graph (i.e., nodes that have been received
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but are yet to be referenced by another event).
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- ``depth``: An integer one greater than the maximum depth of the event's
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previous events.
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- ``auth_events``: The list of event ids that authorizes this event. This
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should be a subset of the current state.
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- ``origin_server_ts``: The time the server created the event.
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- ``origin``: The name of the server.
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Signing and Hashes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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**TODO**
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Validation
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----------
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**TODO**
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Domain specific string
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A string of the form ``<prefix><localpart>:<domain>``, where <prefix> is a
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single character, ``<localpart>`` is an arbitrary string that does not
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include a colon, and `<domain>` is a valid server name.
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``room_id``
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A domain specific string with prefix ``!`` that is static across all events
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in a graph and uniquely identifies it. The ``domain`` should be that of the
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homeserver that created the room (i.e., the server that generated the
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first ``m.room.create`` event).
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``sender``
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The entity that logically sent the event. This is usually a user id, but
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can also be a server name.
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User Id
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A domain specific string with prefix ``@`` representing a user account. The
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``domain`` is the homeserver of the user and is the server used to contact
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the user.
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Joining a room
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--------------
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If a user requests to join a room that the server is already in (i.e. the a
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user on that server has already joined the room) then the server can simply
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generate a join event and send it as normal.
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If the server is not already in the room it needs to will need to join via
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another server that is already in the room. This is done as a two step process.
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First, the local server requests from the remote server a skeleton of a join
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event. The remote does this as the local server does not have the event graph
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to use to fill out the ``prev_events`` key in the new event. Critically, the
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remote server does not process the event it responded with.
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Once the local server has this event, it fills it out with any extra data and
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signs it. Once ready the local server sends this event to a remote server
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(which could be the same or different from the first remote server), this
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remote server then processes the event and distributes to all the other
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participating servers in that room. The local server is told about the
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current state and complete auth chain for the join event. The local server
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can then process the join event itself.
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.. Note::
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Finding which server to use to join any particular room is not specified.
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Inviting a user
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---------------
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To invite a remote user to a room we need their homeserver to sign the invite
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event. This is done by sending the event to the remote server, which then signs
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the event, before distributing the invite to other servers.
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Handling incoming events
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------------------------
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When a server receives an event, it should:
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#. Check if it knows about the room. If it doesn't, then it should get the
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current state and auth events to determine whether the server *should* be in
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the room. If so continue, if not drop or reject the event
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#. If the server already knew about the room, check the prev events to see if
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it is missing any events. If it is, request them. Servers should limit how
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far back they will walk the event graph for missing events.
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#. If the server does not have all the prev events, then it should request the
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current state and auth events from a server.
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Failures
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--------
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A server can notify a remote server about something it thinks it has done
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wrong using the failures mechanism. For example, the remote accepted an event
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the local think it shouldn't have.
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A failure has a severity level depending on the action taken by the local
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server. These levels are:
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``FATAL``
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The local server could not parse the event, for example due to a missing
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required field.
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``ERROR``
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The local server *could* parse the event, but it was rejected. For example,
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the event may have failed an authorization check.
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``WARN``
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The local server accepted the event, but something was unexpected about it.
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For example, the event may have referenced another event the local server
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thought should be rejected.
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A failure also includes several other fields:
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``code``
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A numeric code (to be defined later) indicating a particular type of
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failure.
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``reason``
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A short string indicating what was wrong, for diagnosis purposes on the
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remote server.
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``affected``
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The event id of the event this failure is responding to. For example, if
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an accepted event referenced a rejected event, this would point to the
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accepted one.
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``source``
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The event id of the event that was the source of this unexpected behaviour.
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For example, if an accepted event referenced a rejected event, this would
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point to the rejected one.
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Appendix
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========
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**TODO**
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Example event:
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.. code::
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{
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"auth_events": [
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[
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"$14187571482fLeia:localhost:8480",
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{
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"sha256": "kiZUclzzPetHfy0rVoYKnYXnIv5VxH8a4996zVl8xbw"
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}
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],
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[
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"$14187571480odWTd:localhost:8480",
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{
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"sha256": "GqtndjviW9yPGaZ6EJfzuqVCRg5Lhoyo4YYv1NFP7fw"
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}
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],
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[
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"$14205549830rrMar:localhost:8480",
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{
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"sha256": "gZmL23QdWjNOmghEZU6YjqgHHrf2fxarKO2z5ZTbkig"
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}
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]
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],
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"content": {
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"body": "Test!",
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"msgtype": "m.text"
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},
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"depth": 250,
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"event_id": "$14207181140uTFlx:localhost:8480",
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"hashes": {
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"sha256": "k1nuafFdFvZXzhb5NeTE0Q2Jkqu3E8zkh3uH3mqwIxc"
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},
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"origin": "localhost:8480",
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"origin_server_ts": 1420718114694,
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"prev_events": [
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[
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"$142071809077XNNkP:localhost:8480",
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{
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"sha256": "xOnU1b+4LOVz5qih0dkNFrdMgUcf35fKx9sdl/gqhjY"
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}
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]
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],
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"room_id": "!dwZDafgDEFTtpPKpLy:localhost:8480",
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"sender": "@bob:localhost:8480",
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"signatures": {
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"localhost:8480": {
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"ed25519:auto": "Nzd3D+emFBJJ4LCTzQEZaKO0Sa3sSTR1fGpu8OWXYn+7XUqke9Q1jYUewrEfxb3lPxlYWm/GztVUJizLz1K5Aw"
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}
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},
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"type": "m.room.message",
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"unsigned": {
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"age": 500
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}
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}
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