From f06455479d9adc6e77b11f198375dd53ad048f08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard van der Hoff <1389908+richvdh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 10:12:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Update proposals/1442-state-resolution.md Co-Authored-By: erikjohnston --- proposals/1442-state-resolution.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md b/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md index bded8e6e..891b11fc 100644 --- a/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md +++ b/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ Intuitively using rejected events feels dangerous, however: fork where it claims the state is that particular set of state, duplicate the rejected event to point to that fork, and send the event. The duplicated event would then pass the auth checks. Ignoring rejected events would therefore not - reduce any potential attack vectors + eliminate any potential attack vectors. We specifically don't use rejected auth events in the iterative auth checks, as in that case the auth events aren't re-authed like the rest of the events in the