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@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ Intuitively using rejected events feels dangerous, however:
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auth checks based on the events auth chain (e.g. they can't grant themselves
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power levels if they didn't have them before).
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2. For a previously rejected event to pass auth there must be a set of state
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that allows said event. At which point, a malicious server could produce a
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that allows said event. A malicious server could therefore produce a
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fork where it claims the state is that particular set of state, duplicate the
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rejected event to point to that fork, and send the event. At which point the
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duplicated event will pass auth. Therefore ignoring rejected events wouldn't
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