|
|
|
@ -326,13 +326,13 @@ Encrypted events using this algorithm should have ``sender_key``,
|
|
|
|
|
Megolm session (see `below`__), the ciphertext can be
|
|
|
|
|
decrypted by passing the ciphertext into ``olm_group_decrypt``.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__ `m.room_key`_
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In order to avoid replay attacks a client should remember the megolm
|
|
|
|
|
``message_index`` returned by ``olm_group_decrypt`` of each event they decrypt
|
|
|
|
|
for each session. If the client decrypts an event with the same
|
|
|
|
|
``message_index`` as one that it has already decrypted using that session then
|
|
|
|
|
it should fail decryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__ `m.room_key`_
|
|
|
|
|
``message_index`` as one that it has already received using that session then
|
|
|
|
|
it should treat the message as invalid.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The client should check that the sender's fingerprint key matches the
|
|
|
|
|
``keys.ed25519`` property of the event which established the Megolm session
|
|
|
|
|