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@ -55,21 +55,32 @@ Example flow:
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indicating that the code is incorrect, and sends a
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`m.key.verification.cancel` message to Bob's device.
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Otherwise, at this point, Alice's device has now verified Bob's key, and her
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device will display a message saying that all is well.
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7. Alice's device sends a `m.key.verification.start` message with `method` set
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Otherwise, at this point:
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- Alice's device has now verified Bob's key, and
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- Alice's device knows that Bob has the correct key for her.
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Thus for Bob to verify Alice's key, Alice needs to tell Bob that he has the
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right key.
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7. Alice's device displays a message saying that all is well. This message
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tells Alice that she has the right key for Bob, and tells Bob that he has
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the right key for Alice.
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8. Alice's device sends a `m.key.verification.start` message with `method` set
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to `m.reciprocate.v1` to Bob (see below). The message includes the shared
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secret from the QR code.
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8. Upon receipt of the `m.key.verification.start` message, Bob's device ensures
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that the shared secret matches, and if so, presents a button for him to press
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/after/ he has checked that Alice's device says that things match, and a
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button for him to press if Alice's device indicates that the QR code is
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invalid or if Alice has not yet scanned. If the shared secret does not
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match, it should display an error message indicating that an attack was
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attempted. (This does not affect Alice's verification of Bob's keys.)
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9. Bob sees Alice's device confirm that the key matches, and presses the button
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on his device to indicate that Alice's key is verified.
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10. Both devices send an `m.key.verification.done` message.
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secret from the QR code. This signals to Bob's device that Alice has
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scanned Bob's QR code. (This message is merely a signal for Bob's device to
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proceed to the next step, and is not used in the actual verification.)
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9. Upon receipt of the `m.key.verification.start` message, Bob's device ensures
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that the shared secret matches.
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If the shared secret does not match, it should display an error message
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indicating that an attack was attempted. (This does not affect Alice's
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verification of Bob's keys.)
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If the shared secret does match, it asks Bob to confirm that Alice
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has scanned the QR code.
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10. Bob sees Alice's device confirm that the key matches, and presses the button
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on his device to indicate that Alice's key is verified.
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11. Both devices send an `m.key.verification.done` message.
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### Verification methods
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@ -119,8 +130,7 @@ user whose QR code was scanned; bi-directional verification is not possible.
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#### `m.key.verification.start`
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Alice's device tells Bob's device that the keys are verified. The request is
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MAC'ed using the verification algorithm and verification key from the QR code.
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Alice's device tells Bob's device that the QR code has been scanned.
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message contents:
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@ -167,6 +177,14 @@ Other methods of verifying keys, which do not require scanning QR codes, are
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needed for devices that are unable to scan QR codes. One such method is
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[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267).
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Rather than embedding the keys in the QR codes directly, the two clients could
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perform an exchange similar to
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[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267), and encoding
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the Short Authentication String code in the QR code. However, this means that
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the clients must exchange several messages before they can verify each other,
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which would delay showing the QR codes. This proposal is also simpler to
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implement.
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Security Considerations
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-----------------------
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@ -176,7 +194,7 @@ able to trick Alice into verifying a key under his control, and evesdropping on
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Alice's communications with Carol.
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The security of verifying Alice's key depends on Bob not hitting the "Verified"
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button (step 9 in the example flow) until after Alice's device indicates
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button (step 10 in the example flow) until after Alice's device indicates
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success or failure. Users have a tendency to click on buttons without reading
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what the screen says, but this is partially mitigated by the fact that it is
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unlikely that Bob will be interacting with the device while Alice is scanning
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