Add line, britishise

pull/977/head
Andrew Morgan 5 years ago
parent 3877724774
commit 96e06b6f5f

@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ Further considered solutions are explored in
https://signal.org/blog/contact-discovery/. Signal's eventual solution of
using Software Guard Extensions (detailed in
https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/) is considered impractical
for a federated network, as it requires specialized hardware.
for a federated network, as it requires specialised hardware.
k-anonymity was considered as an alternative approach, in which the identity
server would never receive a full hash of a 3PID that it did not already know
@ -410,10 +410,12 @@ Thus the conclusion is that while k-anon is harder to attack, it's unclear
that this is actually enough of an obstacle to meaningfully stop a malicious
IS. Therefore we should KISS and go for a simple hash lookup with a rotating
pepper (which is not much harder than a static pepper, especially if our
initial implementation doesn't bother rotating the pepper). Rather than trying
to make the k-anon approach work, we'd be better off spending that time
figuring out how to store 3pids as hashes in the DB (and in 3pid bindings
etc), or how to decentralise ISes in general.
initial implementation doesn't bother rotating the pepper). Rather than
trying to make the k-anon approach work, we'd be better off spending that
time figuring out how to store 3pids as hashes in the DB (and in 3pid
bindings etc), or how to decentralise ISes in general. It's also worth noting
that a malicious server may fail to rotate the pepper, making the rotation
logic of questionable benefit.
A radical model was also considered where the first portion of the
k-anonyminity scheme was done with an identity server, and the second would

Loading…
Cancel
Save