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@ -12,20 +12,24 @@ scanning a QR code; by doing this twice, both parties can verify each other.
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In this proposal, we present a method for both parties to verify each other by
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only scanning one QR code.
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Other methods exist for making it easier to verify keys. In Matrix,
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[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267) proposes
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another method, which is useful when neither party is able to scan a QR code.
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Proposal
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--------
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When Alice and Bob meet in person to verify keys, Alice will scan a QR code
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generated by Bob's device. This easily allows Alice to verify Bob's key, but
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does not give Bob any information about Alice's key in order to verify it.
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However, Bob's device can now send to Alice's device what it thinks is her key
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(signed by his key, so that Alice can verify that the message actually came
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from his device), and Alice's device can do the verification on behalf of Bob
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and display the result.
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Example flow:
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1. Alice and Bob meet in person, and want to verify each other's keys.
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2. Bob tells his device to display a QR code. Bob's device displays a
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byte-encoded QR code using UTF-8 of the string `/verify <user-id>
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<device-id> <device-signing-public-key>`. (This format matches the
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`/verify` command in Riot.)
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QR code that encodes the URL
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`https://matrix.to/#/<user-id>?device=<device-id>&action=verify&pubkey=<device-signing-public-key-in-base64>`
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(when `mx:` URLs are specced, this will be used instead).
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3. Alice scans the QR code.
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4. Alice's device ensures that the user ID in the QR code is the same as the
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expected user ID. This can be done by prompting Alice with the user ID, or
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@ -41,7 +45,9 @@ Example flow:
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device says that things match.
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7. Alice's device receives the `m.key.verification.check_own_key` message,
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checks Bob's signature, and checks that the key is the same as her device
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key. Alice's device displays the result of the checks.
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key, as well as checking that the rest of the contents match the expected
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values. Alice's device displays whether the verification was successful or
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not.
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8. Bob sees Alice's device confirm that the key matches, and presses the button
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on his device to indicate that Alice's key is verified.
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@ -55,7 +61,10 @@ Alice's key in turn.
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message contents:
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- `device_id`: the ID of the device that Alice is using
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- `transaction_id`: a unique identifier for the transaction (is this needed?)
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- `transaction_id`: an identifier for the transaction. Must be unique on
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Alice's device.
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FIXME: Alice's device should be allowed to expire verification requests.
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#### `m.key.verification.check_own_key`
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@ -71,10 +80,10 @@ message contents:
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Tradeoffs/Alternatives
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----------------------
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The exact format for the QR code is not nailed down. Another possibility is
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that it could be a URL, so that a user can scan the code in any QR code
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scanner, and have it automatically open the user's Matrix client to begin the
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verification.
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Other methods of verifying keys, which do not require scanning QR codes, are
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needed for devices that are unable to scan QR codes. One such method is
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[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267). These methods
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are not exclusive to each other.
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Security Considerations
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-----------------------
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