From 8fb2bd292726656777393eb9bb1a91414d59e8e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Erik Johnston Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2018 09:47:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo --- proposals/1442-state-resolution.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md b/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md index 02199004..97cd66ba 100644 --- a/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md +++ b/proposals/1442-state-resolution.md @@ -471,12 +471,12 @@ Intuitively, using rejected events feels dangerous, however: that allows said event. A malicious server could therefore produce a fork where it claims the state is that particular set of state, duplicate the rejected event to point to that fork, and send the event. The - duplicated event would then pass the auth checks. Ignoring rejected events would therefore not - eliminate any potential attack vectors. + duplicated event would then pass the auth checks. Ignoring rejected events + would therefore not eliminate any potential attack vectors. -Rejected auth events are deliberately excluded from use in the iterative auth checks, as -auth events aren't re-authed during the iterative auth checks (although non-auth events are.) -list. +Rejected auth events are deliberately excluded from use in the iterative auth +checks, as auth events aren't re-authed (although non-auth events are) during +the iterative auth checks. ### Attack Vectors