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@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ look like:
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If Bob replaces his Dynabook without re-verifying with Alice, this will split
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the graph and Alice will not be able to verify Bob's other devices. In
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contrast, in this proposal, Alice and Bob sign each other's self-signing key
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contrast, in this proposal, Alice and Bob sign each other's master keys
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with their user-signing keys, and the attestation graph would look like:
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![](images/1756-graph2.dot.png)
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@ -543,7 +543,9 @@ devices, as there may be stale attestations and revocations lingering around.
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the signature created previously by the device making the attestation, or
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whether it should be a statement that the device should not be trusted at all.)
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In contrast, with this proposal, if a device is stolen, then only the
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user-signing key must be re-issued.
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keys for which the device had access to the private keys must be re-issued,
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along with any associated signatures. When the new keys are distributed, the
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old keys and their signatures will no longer be part of the attestation graph.
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## Security considerations
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