From 19836aa9493b58f8801c6e07f2193171e05aa204 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Will Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 15:26:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix headings for Appendices --- content/appendices.md | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/appendices.md b/content/appendices.md index 12470873..3a27abbb 100644 --- a/content/appendices.md +++ b/content/appendices.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ weight: 70 type: docs --- -# Unpadded Base64 +## Unpadded Base64 *Unpadded* Base64 refers to 'standard' Base64 encoding as defined in [RFC 4648](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648), without "=" padding. @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ When decoding Base64, implementations SHOULD accept input with or without padding characters wherever possible, to ensure maximum interoperability. -# Signing JSON +## Signing JSON Various points in the Matrix specification require JSON objects to be cryptographically signed. This requires us to encode the JSON as a @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ bytes using [Canonical JSON](#canonical-json), computing the signature for that sequence and then adding the signature to the original JSON object. -## Canonical JSON +### Canonical JSON We define the canonical JSON encoding for a value to be the shortest UTF-8 JSON encoding with dictionary keys lexicographically sorted by @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Float values are not permitted by this encoding. # Encode the resulting Unicode as UTF-8 bytes. ).encode("UTF-8") -### Grammar +#### Grammar Adapted from the grammar in removing insignificant whitespace, fractions, exponents and redundant @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ character escapes. / %x75.30.30.30 (%x30-37 / %x62 / %x65-66) ; u000X / %x75.30.30.31 (%x30-39 / %x61-66) ; u001X -### Examples +#### Examples To assist in the development of compatible implementations, the following test values may be useful for verifying the canonical @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ The following canonical JSON should be produced: {"a":null} -## Signing Details +### Signing Details JSON is signed by encoding the JSON object without `signatures` or keys grouped as `unsigned`, using the canonical encoding described above. The @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ timestamps and additional signatures. return json_object -## Checking for a Signature +### Checking for a Signature To check if an entity has signed a JSON object an implementation does the following: @@ -318,13 +318,13 @@ the following: *verification key*. If this fails then the check fails. Otherwise the check succeeds. -# Identifier Grammar +## Identifier Grammar Some identifiers are specific to given room versions, please refer to the [room versions specification](index.html#room-versions) for more information. -## Server Name +### Server Name A homeserver is uniquely identified by its server name. This value is used in a number of identifiers, as described below. @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ Some recommendations for a choice of server name follow: characters. - Server names should not use upper-case characters. -## Common Identifier Format +### Common Identifier Format The Matrix protocol uses a common format to assign unique identifiers to a number of entities, including users, events and rooms. Each identifier @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ depends on the type of identifier. For example, event IDs can sometimes be represented with a `domain` component under some conditions - see the [Event IDs](#room-ids-and-event-ids) section below for more information. -### User Identifiers +#### User Identifiers Users within Matrix are uniquely identified by their Matrix user ID. The user ID is namespaced to the homeserver which allocated the account and @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ over the actual content of the events. Matrix user IDs are sometimes informally referred to as MXIDs. -#### Historical User IDs +##### Historical User IDs Older versions of this specification were more tolerant of the characters permitted in user ID localparts. There are currently active @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ character set: extended_user_id_char = %x21-39 / %x3B-7E ; all ASCII printing chars except : -#### Mapping from other character sets +##### Mapping from other character sets In certain circumstances it will be desirable to map from a wider character set onto the limited character set allowed in a user ID @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ simple ASCII identifiers (unlike, for example, base-32), whilst still allowing representation of *any* character (unlike punycode, which provides no way to encode ASCII punctuation). -### Room IDs and Event IDs +#### Room IDs and Event IDs A room has exactly one room ID. A room ID has the format: @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ Event IDs and Room IDs are case-sensitive. They are not meant to be human-readable. They are intended to be treated as fully opaque strings by clients. -### Group Identifiers +#### Group Identifiers Groups within Matrix are uniquely identified by their group ID. The group ID is namespaced to the group server which hosts this group and @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ The complete grammar for a legal group ID is: / %x61-7A ; a-z / "-" / "." / "=" / "_" / "/" -### Room Aliases +#### Room Aliases A room may have zero or more aliases. A room alias has the format: @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ homeserver to look up the alias. Room aliases MUST NOT exceed 255 bytes (including the `#` sigil and the domain). -### matrix.to navigation +#### matrix.to navigation Note @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ extra slashes appearing due to some [room versions](index.html#room-versions). These slashes should normally be encoded when producing matrix.to URIs, however. -#### Routing +##### Routing Room IDs are not routable on their own as there is no reliable domain to send requests to. This is partially mitigated with the addition of a @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ unique servers based on the following criteria: specify the servers it can. For example, a room with only 2 users in it would result in maximum 2 `via` parameters. -# 3PID Types +## 3PID Types Third Party Identifiers (3PIDs) represent identifiers on other namespaces that might be associated with a particular person. They @@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ rather than `bob@Example.com`. The namespaces defined by this specification are listed below. More namespaces may be defined in future versions of this specification. -## E-Mail +### E-Mail Medium: `email` @@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ Represents E-Mail addresses. The `address` is the raw email address in `user@domain` form with the domain in lowercase. It must not contain other text such as real name, angle brackets or a mailto: prefix. -## PSTN Phone numbers +### PSTN Phone numbers Medium: `msisdn` @@ -739,9 +739,9 @@ The `address` is the telephone number represented as a MSISDN (Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number) as defined by the E.164 numbering plan. Note that MSISDNs do not include a leading '+'. -# Security Threat Model +## Security Threat Model -## Denial of Service +### Denial of Service The attacker could attempt to prevent delivery of messages to or from the victim in order to: @@ -750,18 +750,18 @@ the victim in order to: - Censor a discussion or censor a participant in a discussion. - Perform general vandalism. -### Threat: Resource Exhaustion +#### Threat: Resource Exhaustion An attacker could cause the victim's server to exhaust a particular resource (e.g. open TCP connections, CPU, memory, disk storage) -### Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations +#### Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable "split-brain" state in the cluster such that the victim's servers could no longer derive a consistent view of the chatroom state. -### Threat: Bad History +#### Threat: Bad History An attacker could convince the victim to accept invalid messages which the victim would then include in their view of the chatroom history. @@ -769,22 +769,22 @@ Other servers in the chatroom would reject the invalid messages and potentially reject the victims messages as well since they depended on the invalid messages. -### Threat: Block Network Traffic +#### Threat: Block Network Traffic An attacker could try to firewall traffic between the victim's server and some or all of the other servers in the chatroom. -### Threat: High Volume of Messages +#### Threat: High Volume of Messages An attacker could send large volumes of messages to a chatroom with the victim making the chatroom unusable. -### Threat: Banning users without necessary authorisation +#### Threat: Banning users without necessary authorisation An attacker could attempt to ban a user from a chatroom without the necessary authorisation. -## Spoofing +### Spoofing An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without the victim having sent the message in order to: @@ -792,17 +792,17 @@ without the victim having sent the message in order to: - Impersonate the victim while performing illicit activity. - Obtain privileges of the victim. -### Threat: Altering Message Contents +#### Threat: Altering Message Contents An attacker could try to alter the contents of an existing message from the victim. -### Threat: Fake Message "origin" Field +#### Threat: Fake Message "origin" Field An attacker could try to send a new message purporting to be from the victim with a phony "origin" field. -## Spamming +### Spamming The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicited or unsolicited messages to the victim in order to: @@ -810,16 +810,16 @@ messages to the victim in order to: - Find victims for scams. - Market unwanted products. -### Threat: Unsolicited Messages +#### Threat: Unsolicited Messages An attacker could try to send messages to victims who do not wish to receive them. -### Threat: Abusive Messages +#### Threat: Abusive Messages An attacker could send abusive or threatening messages to the victim -## Spying +### Spying The attacker could try to access message contents or metadata for messages sent by the victim or to the victim that were not intended to @@ -830,29 +830,29 @@ reach the attacker in order to: (e.g. password reset messages) - Discover who the victim was talking to and when. -### Threat: Disclosure during Transmission +#### Threat: Disclosure during Transmission An attacker could try to expose the message contents or metadata during transmission between the servers. -### Threat: Disclosure to Servers Outside Chatroom +#### Threat: Disclosure to Servers Outside Chatroom An attacker could try to convince servers within a chatroom to send messages to a server it controls that was not authorised to be within the chatroom. -### Threat: Disclosure to Servers Within Chatroom +#### Threat: Disclosure to Servers Within Chatroom An attacker could take control of a server within a chatroom to expose message contents or metadata for messages in that room. -# Cryptographic Test Vectors +## Cryptographic Test Vectors To assist in the development of compatible implementations, the following test values may be useful for verifying the cryptographic event signing code. -## Signing Key +### Signing Key The following test vectors all use the 32-byte value given by the following Base64-encoded string as the seed for generating the `ed25519` @@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ In each case, the server name and key ID are as follows: KEY_ID = "ed25519:1" -## JSON Signing +### JSON Signing Given an empty JSON object: @@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ The JSON signing algorithm should emit the following signed JSON: "two": "Two" } -## Event Signing +### Event Signing Given the following minimally-sized event: