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add more crypto magic, clarify things, add examples

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Hubert Chathi 5 years ago
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proposals/1543-qr_code_key_verification.md
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@ -17,58 +17,41 @@ Proposal
When Alice and Bob meet in person to verify keys, Alice will scan a QR code
generated by Bob's device. This easily allows Alice to verify Bob's key, but
does not give Bob any information about Alice's key in order to verify it.
However, Bob's device can now send to Alice's device what it thinks is her key
(signed by his key, so that Alice can verify that the message actually came
from his device), and Alice's device can do the verification on behalf of Bob
and display the result.
does not give Bob any information about Alice's key in order to verify it. We
can add a secret key to the QR code, which Alice's device can use to MAC her
key to send to Bob. In order to ensure that an attacker, who manages to also
scan the QR code, is unable to send a false device key to Bob, Bob's device now
sends to Alice's device what it thinks is her key, signed by his key. Since
Alice has verified Bob's key via the QR code, Alice's device verifies that the
key send by Bob matches her key, and that his signature is valid.
Example flow 1:
1. Alice and Bob meet in person, and want to verify each other's keys.
2. Bob tells his device to display a QR code. Bob's device displays a
QR code as specified below.
3. Alice scans the QR code.
4. Alice's device ensures that the user ID in the QR code is the same as the
expected user ID. This can be done by prompting Alice with the user ID, or
can be done automatically if the device already knows what user ID to
expect. At this point, Alice's device has now verified Bob's key.
5. Alice's device sends a `m.key.verification.start` message with `method` set
to `m.reciprocate.v1` as a to-device message to Bob's device (using the user
ID and device ID from the QR code.)
6. Bob's device fetches Alice's public key, signs it, and sends it to Alice's
device in a `m.key.verification.check_own_key` to-device message (see
below). Bob's device displays a message saying that Alice wants him to
verify her key, and presents a button for him to press /after/ Alice's
device says that things match.
7. Alice's device receives the `m.key.verification.check_own_key` message,
checks Bob's signature, and checks that the key is the same as her device
key, as well as checking that the rest of the contents match the expected
values. Alice's device displays whether the verification was successful or
not.
8. Bob sees Alice's device confirm that the key matches, and presses the button
on his device to indicate that Alice's key is verified.
Example flow 2:
Example flow:
1. Alice and Bob meet in person, and want to verify each other's keys.
2. Alice requests a key verification through her device by sending an
`m.key.verification.request` message (see MSC1717).
3. Bob responds by sending an `m.key.verification.start` message with `method`
set to `m.qr_code.scan.v1` and `next_method` set to `m.reciprocate.v1`.
4. Bob's device displays a QR code as specified below.
5. Alice scans the QR code.
`m.key.verification.request` message (see
[MSC2241](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2241)), with
`m.qr_code.show.v1`, `m.qr_code.scan.v1`, and `m.reciprocate.v1` listed in
`methods`.
3. Alice's client displays a QR code that Bob is able to scan, and an option to
scan Bob's QR code.
4. Bob's client prompts Bob to verify Alice's key. The prompt includes a QR
code that Alice can scan (if the `m.key.verification.request` message listed
`m.qr_code.scan.v1`), and an option to scan Alice's QR code (if the
`m.key.verification.request` message listed `m.qr_code.show.v1`).
5. Alice scans Bob's QR code.
6. Alice's device ensures that the user ID in the QR code is the same as the
expected user ID (which it knows because it is the recipient of her
`m.key.verification.request` message). At this point, Alice's device has
now verified Bob's key.
7. Alice's device sends a `m.key.verification.start` message with `method` set
to `m.reciprocate.v1` to Bob's device.
8. Bob's device fetches Alice's public key, signs it, and sends it to Alice's
device in a `m.key.verification.check_own_key` to-device message (see
below). Bob's device displays a message saying that Alice wants him to
verify her key, and presents a button for him to press /after/ Alice's
device says that things match.
to `m.reciprocate.v1` to Bob (see below).
8. Bob's device fetches Alice's public key, checks it against what was received
in the `m.key.verification.start` message, signs it, and sends it to Alice
in a `m.key.verification.check_own_key` message (see below). Bob's device
displays a message saying that Alice wants him to verify her key, and
presents a button for him to press /after/ Alice's device says that things
match.
9. Alice's device receives the `m.key.verification.check_own_key` message,
checks Bob's signature, and checks that the key is the same as her device
key, as well as checking that the rest of the contents match the expected
@ -77,32 +60,88 @@ Example flow 2:
10. Bob sees Alice's device confirm that the key matches, and presses the button
on his device to indicate that Alice's key is verified.
### Verification methods
This proposal defines three verification methods that can be used in
`m.key.verification.request` messages (see
[MSC2241](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2241)).
- `m.qr_code.show.v1`: means that the sender of the
`m.key.verification.request` message can show a QR code that the recipient
can scan. If the recipient can scan the QR code, it should allow the user to
do so. This method is never sent as part of a `m.key.verification.start`
message.
- `m.qr_code.scan.v1`: means that the sender of the
`m.key.verification.request` message can scan a QR code displayed by the
recipient. If the recipient can display a QR code, it should allow the user
to display it so that the sender can scan it. This method is never sent as
part of a `m.key.verification.start` message.
- `m.reciprocate.v1`: means that the sender can participate in a reciprocal
verification, either as initiator or responder, as described in the [Message
types](#message-types) section below.
### QR code format
The QR codes to be displayed and scanned using this format will encode URLs of
the form:
`https://matrix.to/#/<user-id>?device=<device-id>&action=verify&key_<keyid>=<key-in-base64>...`
`https://matrix.to/#/<user-id>?request=<event-id>&action=verify&key_<keyid>=<key-in-base64>...&verification_algorithms=<algorithm>&verification_key=<random-key-in-base64>`
(when `matrix:` URLs are specced, this will be used instead).
The `request`, `verification_algorithm`, and `verification_key` parameters are
only present if this QR code is related to a key verification request event.
`verification_algorithms` is a comma-separated list of hashing algorithms that
can be used for verifying the keys of the user who scanned the QR code;
currently, only `hmac-sha256` is defined, which is HMAC using SHA-256 as the
hash. `verification_key` is a random single-use shared secret, with a length
depending on the `verification_algorithm`; for `hmac-sha256`, it must be at
least 256-bits long (43 characters when base64-encoded).
### Message types
#### `m.key.verification.start`
Begins a key verification process.
Alice's device tells Bob's device that his key is verified, and asks it to
verify her keys. The request is MAC'ed using the verification algorithm and
verification key from the QR code.
message contents:
- `method`: the verification method to use. For this method, this must be one of:
- `m.qr_code.show.v1` to request that the other device show a QR code that
can be scanned
- `m.qr_code.scan.v1` to request that the other device scan a QR code
- `m.reciprocate.v1` to tell the other device that its key has been verified,
and to request that it verify this device's key in turn
- `from_device`: the ID of the device that Alice is using
- `transaction_id`: an identifier for the transaction. Must be unique on
Alice's device.
- `next_method` (only if `method` is `m.qr_code.show.v1` or `m.qr_code.scan.v1`)
- `keys_ids`: (only if `method` is `m.reciprocate.v1`) array of key IDs to verify.
- `method`: `m.reciprocate.v1`
- `m.relates_to`: as per [key verification framework](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2241)
- `keys`: a map of key ID to key in unpadded base64
- `signatures`: MAC of the message contents, formed as in [Signing
JSON](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/appendices#signing-json), with the chosen
verification algorithm as the signing algorithm. The key ID depends on the
verification algorithm; for `hmac-sha256`, it is the SHA-256 hash of the
verification key. The MAC is calculated similarly to Signed JSON:
1. The `unsigned` and `signatures` keys are removed, and the contents are
encoded as canonical JSON.
2. The encoded object is then MAC'ed using the verification key according to the
selected algorithm, and the MAC is encoded in unpadded base64.
Example:
```json
{
"method": "m.reciprocate.v1",
"m.relates_to": {
"rel_type": "m.reference",
"event_id": "!event_id_of_verification_request"
},
"keys": {
"ed25519:ODRMFSSXPK": "5YaK7EA3HvtPWr+B0jXFXJ9UidyJ4I9PWpT03xCCJrY",
},
"signatures": {
"@alice:example.com": {
"hmac-sha256:key+id": "mac+of+message+in+unpadded+base64"
}
}
}
```
Note that this message could be sent by either Alice or Bob. That is, it can
be sent by either the sender or the recipient of the
`m.key.verification.request` message.
#### `m.key.verification.check_own_key`
@ -110,16 +149,35 @@ Tells Alice's device what Bob's device thinks her key is.
message contents:
- `keys`: A map of key IDs to the key that Bob's device has
- `transaction_id`: the transaction ID from the `m.key.verification.start`
message
- `signatures`: signature of the keys and transaction ID, signed using Bob's
key
- `m.relates_to`: as per [key verification framework](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2241)
- `keys`: A map of key IDs to the key that Bob's device has. Must be the same
as the `keys` property from the `m.key.verification.start` event.
- `signatures`: signature of the mesage contents, signed using Bob's key
Example:
```json
{
"m.relates_to": {
"rel_type": "m.reference",
"event_id": "!event_id_of_verification_request"
},
"keys": {
"ed25519:ODRMFSSXPK": "5YaK7EA3HvtPWr+B0jXFXJ9UidyJ4I9PWpT03xCCJrY",
},
"signatures": {
"@bob:example.com": {
"ed25519:bobs+key+id": "signature+of+message"
}
}
}
```
### Cancellation
In addition to the cancellation codes specified in MSC1717, the following
cancellation codes may be used:
In addition to the cancellation codes specified in [the spec for
`m.key.verification.cancel`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.5.0#m-key-verification-cancel),
the following cancellation codes may be used:
- `m.qr_code.invalid`: The QR code is invalid (e.g. it is not a URL of the
required form)
@ -131,36 +189,33 @@ Tradeoffs/Alternatives
Other methods of verifying keys, which do not require scanning QR codes, are
needed for devices that are unable to scan QR codes. One such method is
[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267). These methods
are not exclusive to each other.
[MSC1267](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1267).
Security Considerations
-----------------------
Step 4 is to ensure that Bob does not present a QR code claiming to be Carol's
key. Without this check, Bob will be able to trick Alice into verifying a key
under his control, and evesdropping on Alice's communications with Carol.
Step 6 in the example flow is to ensure that Bob does not present a QR code
claiming to be Carol's key. Without this check, Bob will be able to trick
Alice into verifying a key under his control, and evesdropping on Alice's
communications with Carol.
The security of verifying Alice's key depends on Bob not hitting the "Verified"
button until after Alice's device indicates success. However, users have a
tendency to click on buttons without reading what the screen says. This might
be addressed by:
- allowing Bob to easily undo the verification if Alice's device subsequently
gives an error
- posing Bob a dummy question that he cannot answer until after Alice's device
displays the check results. For example: "Does Alice's device show a cat or
a dog?" Alice's device will show one or the other after it has checked the
key received from Bob, forcing Bob to wait for the check to complete.
(Whether a cat or a dog is displayed could be keyed to, for example, a bit in
the transaction ID.)
- (possibly other ways)
Other Issues
------------
Conclusion
----------
This proposal presents a method for bi-directional key verification by scanning
a QR code and a very simplified out-of-band verification.
button (step 10 in the example flow) until after Alice's device indicates
success. However, users have a tendency to click on buttons without reading
what the screen says. This is partially mitigated by having Alice's device
send her keys MAC'ed with a shared secret. But this relies on the shared
secret actually being secret, which may not be the case if an attacker is able
to view the QR code, which limits the possible attackers to people who are
physically present when Alice and Bob verify. This can also be addressed by
allowing Bob to easily undo the verification if Alice's device subsequently
gives an error.
One potential attack involves an attacker preventing the
`m.key.verification.check_own_key` message from reaching Alice, and hoping that
Bob blindly clicks on the "Verify" button without waiting for Alice's device to
check that the key is correct. In this case, Alice's device will not display
an error message saying that the key is incorrect, the users may assume that the
absence of an error message means that everything is OK. To prevent this,
Alice's device should display an error message if it does not receive a
`m.key.verification.check_own_key` message as a response to its
`m.key.verification.start` message after a reasonable amount of time.

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