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---
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title: "Identity Service API"
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weight: 40
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type: docs
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---
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The Matrix client-server and server-server APIs are largely expressed in
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Matrix user identifiers. From time to time, it is useful to refer to
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users by other ("third-party") identifiers, or "3PID"s, e.g. their email
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address or phone number. This Identity Service Specification describes
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how mappings between third-party identifiers and Matrix user identifiers
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can be established, validated, and used. This description technically
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may apply to any 3PID, but in practice has only been applied
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specifically to email addresses and phone numbers.
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## General principles
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The purpose of an identity server is to validate, store, and answer
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questions about the identities of users. In particular, it stores
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associations of the form "identifier X represents the same user as
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identifier Y", where identities may exist on different systems (such as
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email addresses, phone numbers, Matrix user IDs, etc).
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The identity server has some private-public keypairs. When asked about
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an association, it will sign details of the association with its private
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key. Clients may validate the assertions about associations by verifying
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the signature with the public key of the identity server.
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In general, identity servers are treated as reliable oracles. They do
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not necessarily provide evidence that they have validated associations,
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but claim to have done so. Establishing the trustworthiness of an
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individual identity server is left as an exercise for the client.
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3PID types are described in [3PID Types](/appendices#pid-types)
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Appendix.
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## API standards
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The mandatory baseline for identity server communication in Matrix is
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exchanging JSON objects over HTTP APIs. HTTPS is required for
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communication, and all API calls use a Content-Type of
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`application/json`. In addition, strings MUST be encoded as UTF-8.
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Any errors which occur at the Matrix API level MUST return a "standard
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error response". This is a JSON object which looks like:
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```json
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{
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"errcode": "<error code>",
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"error": "<error message>"
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}
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```
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The `error` string will be a human-readable error message, usually a
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sentence explaining what went wrong. The `errcode` string will be a
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unique string which can be used to handle an error message e.g.
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`M_FORBIDDEN`. There may be additional keys depending on the error, but
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the keys `error` and `errcode` MUST always be present.
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Some standard error codes are below:
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`M_NOT_FOUND`
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The resource requested could not be located.
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`M_MISSING_PARAMS`
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The request was missing one or more parameters.
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`M_INVALID_PARAM`
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The request contained one or more invalid parameters.
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`M_SESSION_NOT_VALIDATED`
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The session has not been validated.
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`M_NO_VALID_SESSION`
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A session could not be located for the given parameters.
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`M_SESSION_EXPIRED`
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The session has expired and must be renewed.
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`M_INVALID_EMAIL`
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The email address provided was not valid.
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`M_EMAIL_SEND_ERROR`
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There was an error sending an email. Typically seen when attempting to
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verify ownership of a given email address.
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`M_INVALID_ADDRESS`
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The provided third party address was not valid.
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`M_SEND_ERROR`
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There was an error sending a notification. Typically seen when
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attempting to verify ownership of a given third party address.
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`M_UNRECOGNIZED`
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The request contained an unrecognised value, such as an unknown token or
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medium.
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`M_THREEPID_IN_USE`
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The third party identifier is already in use by another user. Typically
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this error will have an additional `mxid` property to indicate who owns
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the third party identifier.
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`M_UNKNOWN`
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An unknown error has occurred.
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="versions" %}}
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## Privacy
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Identity is a privacy-sensitive issue. While the identity server exists
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to provide identity information, access should be restricted to avoid
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leaking potentially sensitive data. In particular, being able to
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construct large-scale connections between identities should be avoided.
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To this end, in general APIs should allow a 3PID to be mapped to a
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Matrix user identity, but not in the other direction (i.e. one should
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not be able to get all 3PIDs associated with a Matrix user ID, or get
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all 3PIDs associated with a 3PID).
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## Web browser clients
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It is realistic to expect that some clients will be written to be run
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within a web browser or similar environment. In these cases, the
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identity server should respond to pre-flight requests and supply
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Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) headers on all requests.
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When a client approaches the server with a pre-flight (OPTIONS) request,
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the server should respond with the CORS headers for that route. The
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recommended CORS headers to be returned by servers on all requests are:
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Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
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Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS
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Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept, Authorization
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## Authentication
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Most endpoints in the Identity Service API require authentication
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in order to ensure that the requesting user has accepted all relevant
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policies and is otherwise permitted to make the request.
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Identity Servers use a scheme similar to the Client-Server API's concept
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of access tokens to authenticate users. The access tokens provided by an
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Identity Server cannot be used to authenticate Client-Server API
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requests.
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An access token is provided to an endpoint in one of two ways:
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1. Via a query string parameter, `access_token=TheTokenHere`.
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2. Via a request header, `Authorization: Bearer TheTokenHere`.
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Clients are encouraged to the use the `Authorization` header where
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possible to prevent the access token being leaked in access/HTTP logs.
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The query string should only be used in cases where the `Authorization`
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header is inaccessible for the client.
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When credentials are required but missing or invalid, the HTTP call will
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return with a status of 401 and the error code `M_UNAUTHORIZED`.
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_auth" %}}
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## Terms of service
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Identity Servers are encouraged to have terms of service (or similar
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policies) to ensure that users have agreed to their data being processed
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by the server. To facilitate this, an identity server can respond to
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almost any authenticated API endpoint with an HTTP 403 and the error
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code `M_TERMS_NOT_SIGNED`. The error code is used to indicate that the
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user must accept new terms of service before being able to continue.
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All endpoints which support authentication can return the
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`M_TERMS_NOT_SIGNED` error. When clients receive the error, they are
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expected to make a call to `GET /terms` to find out what terms the
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server offers. The client compares this to the `m.accepted_terms`
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account data for the user (described later) and presents the user with
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option to accept the still-missing terms of service. After the user has
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made their selection, if applicable, the client sends a request to
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`POST /terms` to indicate the user's acceptance. The server cannot
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expect that the client will send acceptance for all pending terms, and
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the client should not expect that the server will not respond with
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another `M_TERMS_NOT_SIGNED` on their next request. The terms the user
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has just accepted are appended to `m.accepted_terms`.
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{{% event event="m.accepted_terms" %}}
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_terms" %}}
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## Status check
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_ping" %}}
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## Key management
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An identity server has some long-term public-private keypairs. These are
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named in a scheme `algorithm:identifier`, e.g. `ed25519:0`. When signing
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an association, the standard [Signing
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JSON](/appendices#signing-json) algorithm applies.
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The identity server may also keep track of some short-term
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public-private keypairs, which may have different usage and lifetime
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characteristics than the service's long-term keys.
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_pubkey" %}}
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## Association lookup
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_lookup" %}}
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### Client behaviour
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Prior to performing a lookup clients SHOULD make a request to the
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`/hash_details` endpoint to determine what algorithms the server
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supports (described in more detail below). The client then uses this
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information to form a `/lookup` request and receive known bindings from
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the server.
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Clients MUST support at least the `sha256` algorithm.
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### Server behaviour
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Servers, upon receipt of a `/lookup` request, will compare the query
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against known bindings it has, hashing the identifiers it knows about as
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needed to verify exact matches to the request.
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Servers MUST support at least the `sha256` algorithm.
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### Algorithms
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Some algorithms are defined as part of the specification, however other
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formats can be negotiated between the client and server using
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`/hash_details`.
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#### `sha256`
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This algorithm MUST be supported by clients and servers at a minimum. It
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is additionally the preferred algorithm for lookups.
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When using this algorithm, the client converts the query first into
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strings separated by spaces in the format `<address> <medium> <pepper>`.
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The `<pepper>` is retrieved from `/hash_details`, the `<medium>` is
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typically `email` or `msisdn` (both lowercase), and the `<address>` is
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the 3PID to search for. For example, if the client wanted to know about
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`alice@example.org`'s bindings, it would first format the query as
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`alice@example.org email ThePepperGoesHere`.
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{{% boxes/rationale %}}
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Mediums and peppers are appended to the address to prevent a common
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prefix for each 3PID, helping prevent attackers from pre-computing the
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internal state of the hash function.
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{{% /boxes/rationale %}}
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After formatting each query, the string is run through SHA-256 as
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defined by [RFC 4634](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4634). The
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resulting bytes are then encoded using URL-Safe [Unpadded
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Base64](/appendices#unpadded-base64) (similar to [room version
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4's event ID format](/rooms/v4#event-ids)).
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An example set of queries when using the pepper `matrixrocks` would be:
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"alice@example.com email matrixrocks" -> "4kenr7N9drpCJ4AfalmlGQVsOn3o2RHjkADUpXJWZUc"
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"bob@example.com email matrixrocks" -> "LJwSazmv46n0hlMlsb_iYxI0_HXEqy_yj6Jm636cdT8"
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"18005552067 msisdn matrixrocks" -> "nlo35_T5fzSGZzJApqu8lgIudJvmOQtDaHtr-I4rU7I"
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The set of hashes is then given as the `addresses` array in `/lookup`.
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Note that the pepper used MUST be supplied as `pepper` in the `/lookup`
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request.
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#### `none`
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This algorithm performs plaintext lookups on the identity server.
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Typically this algorithm should not be used due to the security concerns
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of unhashed identifiers, however some scenarios (such as LDAP-backed
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identity servers) prevent the use of hashed identifiers. Identity
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servers (and optionally clients) can use this algorithm to perform those
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kinds of lookups.
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Similar to the `sha256` algorithm, the client converts the queries into
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strings separated by spaces in the format `<address> <medium>` - note
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the lack of `<pepper>`. For example, if the client wanted to know about
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`alice@example.org`'s bindings, it would format the query as
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`alice@example.org email`.
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The formatted strings are then given as the `addresses` in `/lookup`.
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Note that the `pepper` is still required, and must be provided to ensure
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the client has made an appropriate request to `/hash_details` first.
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### Security considerations
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{{% boxes/note %}}
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[MSC2134](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/blob/main/proposals/2134-identity-hash-lookup.md) has much
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more information about the security considerations made for this section
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of the specification. This section covers the high-level details for why
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the specification is the way it is.
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{{% /boxes/note %}}
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Typically the lookup endpoint is used when a client has an unknown 3PID
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it wants to find a Matrix User ID for. Clients normally do this kind of
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lookup when inviting new users to a room or searching a user's address
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book to find any Matrix users they may not have discovered yet. Rogue or
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malicious identity servers could harvest this unknown information and do
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nefarious things with it if it were sent in plain text. In order to
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protect the privacy of users who might not have a Matrix identifier
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bound to their 3PID addresses, the specification attempts to make it
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difficult to harvest 3PIDs.
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{{% boxes/rationale %}}
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Hashing identifiers, while not perfect, helps make the effort required
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to harvest identifiers significantly higher. Phone numbers in particular
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are still difficult to protect with hashing, however hashing is
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objectively better than not.
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An alternative to hashing would be using bcrypt or similar with many
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rounds, however by nature of needing to serve mobile clients and clients
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on limited hardware the solution needs be kept relatively lightweight.
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{{% /boxes/rationale %}}
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Clients should be cautious of servers not rotating their pepper very
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often, and potentially of servers which use a weak pepper - these
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servers may be attempting to brute force the identifiers or use rainbow
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tables to mine the addresses. Similarly, clients which support the
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`none` algorithm should consider at least warning the user of the risks
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in sending identifiers in plain text to the identity server.
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Addresses are still potentially reversible using a calculated rainbow
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table given some identifiers, such as phone numbers, common email
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address domains, and leaked addresses are easily calculated. For
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example, phone numbers can have roughly 12 digits to them, making them
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an easier target for attack than email addresses.
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## Establishing associations
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The flow for creating an association is session-based.
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Within a session, one may prove that one has ownership of a 3PID. Once
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this has been established, the user can form an association between that
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3PID and a Matrix user ID. Note that this association is only proved one
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way; a user can associate *any* Matrix user ID with a validated 3PID,
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i.e. I can claim that any email address I own is associated with
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@billg:microsoft.com.
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Sessions are time-limited; a session is considered to have been modified
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when it was created, and then when a validation is performed within it.
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A session can only be checked for validation, and validation can only be
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performed within a session, within a 24-hour period since its most
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recent modification. Any attempts to perform these actions after the
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expiry will be rejected, and a new session should be created and used
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instead.
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To start a session, the client makes a request to the appropriate
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`/requestToken` endpoint. The identity server then sends a validation
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token to the user, and the user provides the token to the client. The
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client then provides the token to the appropriate `/submitToken`
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endpoint, completing the session. At this point, the client should
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`/bind` the third party identifier or leave it for another entity to
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bind.
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### Format of a validation token
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The format of the validation token is left up to the identity server: it
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should choose one appropriate to the 3PID type. (For example, it would
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be inappropriate to expect a user to copy a long passphrase including
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punctuation from an SMS message into a client.)
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Whatever format the identity server uses, the validation token must
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consist of at most 255 Unicode codepoints. Clients must pass the token
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through without modification.
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### Email associations
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_email_associations" %}}
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### Phone number associations
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_phone_associations" %}}
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### General
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_associations" %}}
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## Invitation storage
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An identity server can store pending invitations to a user's 3PID, which
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will be retrieved and can be either notified on or look up when the 3PID
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is associated with a Matrix user ID.
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At a later point, if the owner of that particular 3PID binds it with a
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Matrix user ID, the identity server will attempt to make an HTTP POST to
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the Matrix user's homeserver via the
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[/3pid/onbind](/server-server-api#put_matrixfederationv13pidonbind)
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endpoint. The request MUST be signed with a long-term private key for
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the identity server.
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_store_invite" %}}
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## Ephemeral invitation signing
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To aid clients who may not be able to perform crypto themselves, the
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identity server offers some crypto functionality to help in accepting
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invitations. This is less secure than the client doing it itself, but
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may be useful where this isn't possible.
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{{% http-api spec="identity" api="v2_invitation_signing" %}}
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