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---
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type: module
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---
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### Content repository
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The content repository (or "media repository") allows users to upload
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files to their homeserver for later use. For example, files which the
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user wants to send to a room would be uploaded here, as would an avatar
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the user wants to use.
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Uploads are POSTed to a resource on the user's local homeserver which
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returns a MXC URI which can later be used to GET the download. Content
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is downloaded from the recipient's local homeserver, which must first
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transfer the content from the origin homeserver using the same API
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(unless the origin and destination homeservers are the same).
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When serving content, the server SHOULD provide a
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`Content-Security-Policy` header. The recommended policy is
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`sandbox; default-src 'none'; script-src 'none'; plugin-types application/pdf; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; object-src 'self';`.
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{{% boxes/added-in-paragraph %}}
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{{< added-in v="1.4" >}} The server SHOULD additionally provide
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`Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin` when serving content to allow
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(web) clients to access restricted APIs such as `SharedArrayBuffer` when
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interacting with the media repository.
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{{% /boxes/added-in-paragraph %}}
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#### Matrix Content (MXC) URIs
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Content locations are represented as Matrix Content (MXC) URIs. They
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look like:
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mxc://<server-name>/<media-id>
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<server-name> : The name of the homeserver where this content originated, e.g. matrix.org
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<media-id> : An opaque ID which identifies the content.
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#### Client behaviour
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Clients can upload and download content using the following HTTP APIs.
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{{% http-api spec="client-server" api="content-repo" %}}
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##### Thumbnails
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The homeserver SHOULD be able to supply thumbnails for uploaded images
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and videos. The exact file types which can be thumbnailed are not
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currently specified - see [Issue
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\#1938](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/1938) for more
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information.
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The thumbnail methods are "crop" and "scale". "scale" tries to return an
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image where either the width or the height is smaller than the requested
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size. The client should then scale and letterbox the image if it needs
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to fit within a given rectangle. "crop" tries to return an image where
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the width and height are close to the requested size and the aspect
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matches the requested size. The client should scale the image if it
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needs to fit within a given rectangle.
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The dimensions given to the thumbnail API are the minimum size the
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client would prefer. Servers must never return thumbnails smaller than
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the client's requested dimensions, unless the content being thumbnailed
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is smaller than the dimensions. When the content is smaller than the
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requested dimensions, servers should return the original content rather
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than thumbnail it.
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Servers SHOULD produce thumbnails with the following dimensions and
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methods:
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- 32x32, crop
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- 96x96, crop
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- 320x240, scale
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- 640x480, scale
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- 800x600, scale
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In summary:
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- "scale" maintains the original aspect ratio of the image
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- "crop" provides an image in the aspect ratio of the sizes given in
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the request
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- The server will return an image larger than or equal to the
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dimensions requested where possible.
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Servers MUST NOT upscale thumbnails under any circumstance. Servers MUST
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NOT return a smaller thumbnail than requested, unless the original
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content makes that impossible.
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#### Security considerations
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The HTTP GET endpoint does not require any authentication. Knowing the
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URL of the content is sufficient to retrieve the content, even if the
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entity isn't in the room.
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MXC URIs are vulnerable to directory traversal attacks such as
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`mxc://127.0.0.1/../../../some_service/etc/passwd`. This would cause the
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target homeserver to try to access and return this file. As such,
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homeservers MUST sanitise MXC URIs by allowing only alphanumeric
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(`A-Za-z0-9`), `_` and `-` characters in the `server-name` and
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`media-id` values. This set of whitelisted characters allows URL-safe
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base64 encodings specified in RFC 4648. Applying this character
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whitelist is preferable to blacklisting `.` and `/` as there are
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techniques around blacklisted characters (percent-encoded characters,
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UTF-8 encoded traversals, etc).
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Homeservers have additional content-specific concerns:
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- Clients may try to upload very large files. Homeservers should not
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store files that are too large and should not serve them to clients,
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returning a HTTP 413 error with the `M_TOO_LARGE` code.
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- Clients may try to upload very large images. Homeservers should not
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attempt to generate thumbnails for images that are too large,
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returning a HTTP 413 error with the `M_TOO_LARGE` code.
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- Remote homeservers may host very large files or images. Homeservers
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should not proxy or thumbnail large files or images from remote
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homeservers, returning a HTTP 502 error with the `M_TOO_LARGE` code.
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- Clients may try to upload a large number of files. Homeservers
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should limit the number and total size of media that can be uploaded
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by clients, returning a HTTP 403 error with the `M_FORBIDDEN` code.
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- Clients may try to access a large number of remote files through a
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homeserver. Homeservers should restrict the number and size of
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remote files that it caches.
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- Clients or remote homeservers may try to upload malicious files
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targeting vulnerabilities in either the homeserver thumbnailing or
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the client decoders.
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