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@ -112,24 +112,6 @@ usability because:
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For these reasons, this MSC does not specify a grace period or treat some user accounts
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without existing cross-signing keys as special.
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#### Interactions with MSC3882
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[MSC3882](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3882) allows clients to
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mint login tokens for new clients. However, the wording on the MSC is too weak (lacking 'MUST')
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to state that User-Interactive Authentication will _always_ be performed when minting the token.
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This means if a user's access token is compromised and that server has enabled
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[the setting](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest/usage/configuration/config_documentation.html#login_via_existing_session)
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then an attacker can provision new devices. These new devices can then upload the master/x-signing key
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without needing User-Interactive Authentication. This does not appear to materially change the
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outcome (the keys are still untrusted due to lack of out-of-band verification) but it does allow
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more of an account takeover than if this "feature" is not enabled.
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It's worth noting MSC3882 landed in the specification in Matrix v1.7 and is supported on major homeservers.
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The intention of this MSC was for an [earlier version of QR code login](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3906),
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which was superseded by [MSC4108](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4108). Due to this,
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in theory MSC3882 serves no purpose anymore, but it is now part of the specification and hence needs to be supported
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for a certain amount of time until it can be deprecated.
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## Unstable prefix
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