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proposals/xxxx-media-preview-switch.md

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+# MSCXXXX: Media preview controls
+
+Matrix caters to a wide varity of networks configurations. Some networks are closed and the users have a high
+degree of safety, and other networks are open to the public internet and are inheriently less safe. This proposal
+aims to give the user more universal control over the content they see on Matrix, starting with media previews.
+
+Most graphical Matrix clients display media in the timeline of a room with a preview. Often these are delivered
+without any consent prompt, at least by default. This presents a risk to users who may be joining the network
+and do not have the same safety barriers that experienced users may have configured.
+
+With that in mind, this MSC provides a simple switch for users and homeservers to configure a global media preview
+preference.
+
+For the purposes of this MSC, the term "undesirable content" refers to images that the user does not want to see,
+be it illegal, abusive or otherwise wanted.
+
+
+## Proposal
+
+This proposal introduces a new account data key, `m.media_preview_config`.
+
+This key contains the following content.
+
+```json
+{
+  "media_previews": "off|on|private"
+}
+```
+
+The field `media_previews` may be one of three values.
+
+#### `off`
+
+The client MUST not show any previews for any media, in the room.
+
+Users may indivdually consent to seeing media, for example by clicking on a prompt to show a preview.
+
+If consent is given, the client SHOULD then track that consent and show the media again in the future.
+
+#### `on`
+
+Previews for media MAY be shown in any room without a prompt. 
+
+Users may indivdually hide media, and this preference must be respected over the room defaults.
+
+#### `private`
+
+Previws for media MAY be shown in "private" rooms without a prompt. A private room is any room where:
+  - The `m.room.join_rules` state exists.
+  - The `join_rule` key of this state is `invite`, `knock`, `restricted`, or `knock_restricted`.
+
+If any other `join_rule` is set, or cannot be determined by the client then the assumption MUST be that the
+room is public and previews should be shown. Future join rules may be added to this list, but it's critical
+that clients adopt a safety first approach here.
+
+This value is the **default** setting when no account data exists on the user's account.
+
+### Levels
+
+The account data may exist at both the global and room level. The global setting defines the preference for
+all rooms, unless a per-room setting overrides it.
+
+It is also possible for rules to cascade via spaces. A top level space may set a specific rule, and child
+rooms may set their own rules. When this is the case, the strictest rule must always be applied.
+
+For instance, given the following heirachy of rooms within a space tree:
+
+- Acme Corp <"on">
+  - Enginnering <"private">
+    - Room A <"off">
+    - Room B <no-value>
+  - Support <no-value>
+    - Room C <"off">
+  - Room D <"off">
+  - Room F <no-value>
+- Room F
+
+The result would be:
+ - Room A, Room C and Room D would be "off".
+ - Room B would be "private".
+ - Room E would be "on".
+ - Room E is out of the space, and would default to the user's global rule.
+
+
+### Notes
+
+It's important here that this account data MUST be configurable by a user.
+
+While a homeserver MAY be allowed to specify a default value ahead of time for the user, it must be mutable.
+
+Not all clients will respect this configuration initially, and many clients will continue to support
+their own variant of this setting in the short term.
+
+## Potential issues
+
+### The field is extremely coarse 
+
+This provides a blanket setting for all rooms and content recieved, rather than this applying to rooms
+specifically (via a state key or otherwise). 
+
+
+### Requires adjustments to well-known
+
+This proposal requires administrators to adjust their well-known, which means that bad-actor homeservers
+may potentially set the value of `content_trust_level` to `trusted` even if the content is not trusted.
+
+This is mitigated by users being able to override settings, but does however mean that unsuspecting users
+may be more exposed to content than they should be.
+
+
+## Alternatives
+
+This MSC has been iterated on a few times before being published, and several alternatives were considered.
+
+### A well-known field for a global trust policy
+
+This was [originally considered](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/tree/hs/homeserver-content-trust-level)
+to change the default policy on a server, so that users on that server would see previews based on their admin's preferences.
+
+This was rejected as it was far too coarse. Expressing a different rule based on the room you are in
+was not possible, and wouldn't allow homeservers to store different preferences. Also, confusingly
+if the server was a closed registration personal server that happened to federate with the internet
+then it would require you to mark your own server as untrusted, which felt wrong in practice.
+
+### Use join rules to determine safety
+
+This is actually part of the proposal under the "private" flag, but this alone wasn't satisfactory for all users. The join
+rules have no direct bearing on the content in the room, and bad actors inviting many people to a private room
+containing undesirable content would slip under this check.
+
+
+### Use space membership
+
+Like the above, we could determine that rooms within a trusted space are safe and rooms outside of it are
+not. However, this also comes with drawbacks. It would raise the bar for all clients to expose spaces
+as a feature in order to make their users safer, and in practice spaces are not fully supported either
+by the ecosystem (e.g. Element X) or organisations yet.
+
+### Room state safety flag
+
+Rooms could expose their safeness via a state event, similar to how this proposal does for account data.
+However, this would give administrators too much control over your own client experience. It would put the
+responsibility on safety on room administrators, who may lack the knowledge or time for proper room configuration.
+
+It also exposes another possible attack where users are invited to a room similar to a phishing attack, and the
+room state would override their personal safety settings to deliver undesirable content.
+
+## Security considerations
+
+This field is ultimately held by the homeserver, and a malicious homeserver may expose you to unwanted content. This is
+true today, and users should take caution with who they choose to host their account with.
+
+As with all account data fields, the content should be validated.
+
+## Unstable prefix
+
+The field should use `io.element.mscXXXX.media_preview_config` while the field is unstable.
+
+## Dependencies
+
+None.