Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Damir Jelić <poljar@termina.org.uk>
pull/4129/head
Denis Kasak 2 months ago committed by GitHub
parent db90b1ca18
commit 6c7c55a536
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B5690EEEBB952194

@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ SH := ECDH(Ss, Gp)
EncKey_S := HKDF_SHA256(SH, "MATRIX_QR_CODE_LOGIN_ENCKEY_S|" || Gp || "|" || Sp, salt=0, size=32)
// Stored, but not yet used
EncKey_G := HKDF_SHA256(SH, "MATRIX_QR_CODE_LOGIN_ENCKEY_S|" || Gp || "|" || Sp, salt=0, size=32)
EncKey_G := HKDF_SHA256(SH, "MATRIX_QR_CODE_LOGIN_ENCKEY_G|" || Gp || "|" || Sp, salt=0, size=32)
NonceBytes_S := ToLowEndianBytes(Nonce_S)[..12]
TaggedCiphertext := ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt(EncKey_S, NonceBytes_S, "MATRIX_QR_CODE_LOGIN_INITIATE")
@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ If no device is found then the process should be stopped.
2. **Existing device confirms that the new device owns the private part of the committed-to device identity key**
The new device then proves it controls the public key to which it previously committed. It does this by doing an ECDH
The new device then proves it controls the private key to which it previously committed. It does this by doing an ECDH
between the committed-to identity key and the other device's secure channel ephemeral key to derive a shared secret,
which is used to construct a proof of ownership. Due to the properties of ECDH, the other device knows that the new
device can only do this if it possesses the private part of the committed-to identity key.

Loading…
Cancel
Save