safely use vault to edit secrets (#68644)

* when possible, use filedescriptors from mkstemp to avoid race
  * when using path strings, ensure we are always creating the file

CVE-2020-1740
Fixes #67798

Co-authored-by: samdoran
(cherry picked from commit 28f9fbdb5e)
pull/68974/head
Brian Coca 5 years ago committed by Matt Clay
parent d41e38435b
commit 685a4b6d3f

@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
bugfixes:
- "**security_issue** - create temporary vault file with strict permissions when editing and prevent race condition (CVE-2020-1740)"

@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
from __future__ import (absolute_import, division, print_function)
__metaclass__ = type
import errno
import fcntl
import os
import random
import shlex
@ -27,6 +29,7 @@ import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import warnings
from binascii import hexlify
from binascii import unhexlify
from binascii import Error as BinasciiError
@ -845,42 +848,48 @@ class VaultEditor:
os.remove(tmp_path)
def _edit_file_helper(self, filename, secret,
existing_data=None, force_save=False, vault_id=None):
def _edit_file_helper(self, filename, secret, existing_data=None, force_save=False, vault_id=None):
# Create a tempfile
root, ext = os.path.splitext(os.path.realpath(filename))
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=ext, dir=C.DEFAULT_LOCAL_TMP)
os.close(fd)
cmd = self._editor_shell_command(tmp_path)
try:
if existing_data:
self.write_data(existing_data, tmp_path, shred=False)
self.write_data(existing_data, fd, shred=False)
except Exception:
# if an error happens, destroy the decrypted file
self._shred_file(tmp_path)
raise
finally:
os.close(fd)
try:
# drop the user into an editor on the tmp file
subprocess.call(cmd)
except Exception as e:
# whatever happens, destroy the decrypted file
# if an error happens, destroy the decrypted file
self._shred_file(tmp_path)
raise AnsibleError('Unable to execute the command "%s": %s' % (' '.join(cmd), to_native(e)))
b_tmpdata = self.read_data(tmp_path)
# Do nothing if the content has not changed
if existing_data == b_tmpdata and not force_save:
self._shred_file(tmp_path)
return
if force_save or existing_data != b_tmpdata:
# encrypt new data and write out to tmp
# An existing vaultfile will always be UTF-8,
# so decode to unicode here
b_ciphertext = self.vault.encrypt(b_tmpdata, secret, vault_id=vault_id)
self.write_data(b_ciphertext, tmp_path)
# encrypt new data and write out to tmp
# An existing vaultfile will always be UTF-8,
# so decode to unicode here
b_ciphertext = self.vault.encrypt(b_tmpdata, secret, vault_id=vault_id)
self.write_data(b_ciphertext, tmp_path)
# shuffle tmp file into place
self.shuffle_files(tmp_path, filename)
display.vvvvv(u'Saved edited file "%s" encrypted using %s and vault id "%s"' % (to_text(filename), to_text(secret), to_text(vault_id)))
# shuffle tmp file into place
self.shuffle_files(tmp_path, filename)
display.vvvvv(u'Saved edited file "%s" encrypted using %s and vault id "%s"' % (to_text(filename), to_text(secret), to_text(vault_id)))
# always shred temp, jic
self._shred_file(tmp_path)
def _real_path(self, filename):
# '-' is special to VaultEditor, dont expand it.
@ -956,21 +965,17 @@ class VaultEditor:
# Figure out the vault id from the file, to select the right secret to re-encrypt it
# (duplicates parts of decrypt, but alas...)
dummy, dummy, cipher_name, vault_id = parse_vaulttext_envelope(b_vaulttext,
filename=filename)
dummy, dummy, cipher_name, vault_id = parse_vaulttext_envelope(b_vaulttext, filename=filename)
# vault id here may not be the vault id actually used for decrypting
# as when the edited file has no vault-id but is decrypted by non-default id in secrets
# (vault_id=default, while a different vault-id decrypted)
# we want to get rid of files encrypted with the AES cipher
force_save = (cipher_name not in CIPHER_WRITE_WHITELIST)
# Keep the same vault-id (and version) as in the header
if cipher_name not in CIPHER_WRITE_WHITELIST:
# we want to get rid of files encrypted with the AES cipher
self._edit_file_helper(filename, vault_secret_used, existing_data=plaintext,
force_save=True, vault_id=vault_id)
else:
self._edit_file_helper(filename, vault_secret_used, existing_data=plaintext,
force_save=False, vault_id=vault_id)
self._edit_file_helper(filename, vault_secret_used, existing_data=plaintext, force_save=force_save, vault_id=vault_id)
def plaintext(self, filename):
@ -1040,8 +1045,8 @@ class VaultEditor:
return data
# TODO: add docstrings for arg types since this code is picky about that
def write_data(self, data, filename, shred=True):
def write_data(self, data, thefile, shred=True, mode=0o600):
# TODO: add docstrings for arg types since this code is picky about that
"""Write the data bytes to given path
This is used to write a byte string to a file or stdout. It is used for
@ -1058,28 +1063,64 @@ class VaultEditor:
should be a byte string and not a text type.
:arg data: the byte string (bytes) data
:arg filename: filename to save 'data' to.
:arg thefile: file descriptor or filename to save 'data' to.
:arg shred: if shred==True, make sure that the original data is first shredded so that is cannot be recovered.
:returns: None
"""
# FIXME: do we need this now? data_bytes should always be a utf-8 byte string
b_file_data = to_bytes(data, errors='strict')
# get a ref to either sys.stdout.buffer for py3 or plain old sys.stdout for py2
# We need sys.stdout.buffer on py3 so we can write bytes to it since the plaintext
# of the vaulted object could be anything/binary/etc
output = getattr(sys.stdout, 'buffer', sys.stdout)
if filename == '-':
# check if we have a file descriptor instead of a path
is_fd = False
try:
is_fd = (isinstance(thefile, int) and fcntl.fcntl(thefile, fcntl.F_GETFD) != -1)
except Exception:
pass
if is_fd:
# if passed descriptor, use that to ensure secure access, otherwise it is a string.
# assumes the fd is securely opened by caller (mkstemp)
os.ftruncate(thefile, 0)
os.write(thefile, b_file_data)
elif thefile == '-':
# get a ref to either sys.stdout.buffer for py3 or plain old sys.stdout for py2
# We need sys.stdout.buffer on py3 so we can write bytes to it since the plaintext
# of the vaulted object could be anything/binary/etc
output = getattr(sys.stdout, 'buffer', sys.stdout)
output.write(b_file_data)
else:
if os.path.isfile(filename):
# file names are insecure and prone to race conditions, so remove and create securely
if os.path.isfile(thefile):
if shred:
self._shred_file(filename)
self._shred_file(thefile)
else:
os.remove(filename)
with open(filename, "wb") as fh:
fh.write(b_file_data)
os.remove(thefile)
# when setting new umask, we get previous as return
current_umask = os.umask(0o077)
try:
try:
# create file with secure permissions
fd = os.open(thefile, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_RDWR | os.O_TRUNC, mode)
except OSError as ose:
# Want to catch FileExistsError, which doesn't exist in Python 2, so catch OSError
# and compare the error number to get equivalent behavior in Python 2/3
if ose.errno == errno.EEXIST:
raise AnsibleError('Vault file got recreated while we were operating on it: %s' % to_native(ose))
raise AnsibleError('Problem creating temporary vault file: %s' % to_native(ose))
try:
# now write to the file and ensure ours is only data in it
os.ftruncate(fd, 0)
os.write(fd, b_file_data)
except OSError as e:
raise AnsibleError('Unable to write to temporary vault file: %s' % to_native(e))
finally:
# Make sure the file descriptor is always closed and reset umask
os.close(fd)
finally:
os.umask(current_umask)
def shuffle_files(self, src, dest):
prev = None

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